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  This dissertation is generally concerned with Plato’s conception of philosophy, as it 
is ascertainable in the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic’ dialogues. It argues that 
philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy’ does not mark 
off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various 
philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of 
self through intellectual activity. 
  A major part of this dissertation is concerned with examining Plato's science par 
excellence, ‘the science of dialectic’ (hē epistēmē dialektikē). The science of dialectic 
is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science 
of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means 
for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in 
Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical 
sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the 
only science constituting philosophy, Plato’s science of dialectic represents the 
intellectual zenith obtainable by man. Accordingly, the expert of this science is the 
topmost philosopher. 
  In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, 
always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert 
with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in 
conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a 
complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain 
things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par 
excellence.  
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What can a perusal of certain dialogues reveal about Plato’s conception of 
philosophy? What can this perusal tell us about the connection in Plato between the 
philosophical arts and sciences? What role does the elenctic Socrates play in Plato’s 
conception of philosophy? In particular, what is Socrates’ relation to other, non-
elenctic experts? What ultimately distinguishes an individual as being more 
philosophical than another; what makes him the best possible philosopher? 
Furthermore, where exactly do those (in)famous Platonic Forms, and related 
epistemology and metaphysics, stand in Plato’s conception of philosophy in the 
dialogues in question? These are some of the primary questions addressed in this 
dissertation.  
In general, this dissertation seeks to provide an account of Plato’s conception 
of philosophy, as said conception is ascertainable from the remarks about philosophy 
and the philosopher in especially the Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, 
Phaedrus and Philebus. Why focus on these dialogues? Firstly, I believe that it is in 
these dialogues that we get some of the most explicit and substantial remarks 
regarding the nature of philosophy (viz., what it is, and how it is meant to be 
distinguished from all that which can be generally classed as non-philosophical).1 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In many of the so-called ‘early’ or ‘Socratic’ dialogues, we are told more what philosophy is not, than 
what philosophy is. Cf. Nightingale (1995) 17-20. Though see Wolfsdorf (2008), who argues that there 
is a consistent Platonic doctrine (viz., a positive account of what philosophy is) found, albeit cryptically, 
in many of the ‘early’ dialogues (sc. Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, 
Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Meno, Protagoras, and Republic I). On the division 
of Plato’s dialogues into ‘early’, ‘transitional’, ‘middle’, and ‘late’ periods of composition, see Vlastos 
(1991) 46-7 and literature therein. I examine some uses of ‘philosophia’ and cognates in certain 
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middle books of the Republic, for example, are filled with remarks on philosophy as 
such.  The Theaetetus is famous for, amongst other things, a ‘digression’ on the 
contrast between the pre-eminent philosopher and the common man of the forum and 
law court. The Sophist and Statesman, which appear to prepare us for a non-existent 
Philosopher, contain intriguing passages on the philosopher and his use of the method 
par excellence, collection and division. The Phaedrus tells us about the philosopher’s 
preference for a particular type of logos (account, speech, argumentation). The 
Philebus speaks about the philosophers’, in contrast to non-philosophers’, superior 
grasp of certain abstract sciences. I think it intuitive, then, to focus on these dialogues 
in the hopes of putting together an account of Plato’s conception of philosophy.  
Secondly, the Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus and Philebus are 
considered by most scholars to have been composed after the Republic.2 (I shall go 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Socratic dialogues in Ch. I. I return to briefly discuss the use of the expression ‘Socratic dialogues’ in 
Ch. II. 
2 Whilst there is debate surrounding the chronology of several of Plato’s dialogues, most scholars 
accept that the Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws were written after the 
Republic. Cf. L. Brandwood (1990). However, see Keyser’s (1992) critique of Brandwood and other 
scholars’ stylometric analyses of Plato. Note, though, that Keyser (1992) 74 seems to accept 
Campbell’s (1867) conclusion that the Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws were 
composed after the Republic. Furthermore, many scholars take the Cratylus as being composed before 
the Republic. See, e.g., W.D. Ross (1955), Luce (1964), Kahn (1973), and Levin (2001). Ademollo 
(2011) 20-1 considers it a work of Plato’s middle period (see below): ‘Cra. does not belong to the “late” 
dialogues; it is designed to be read after Phd. and before Tht.; and that’s that’. Sedley (2003) 6-16 
considers at least the core of the text to be a ‘middle period’ work. By ‘middle period’, Sedley (2003) 6 
means a philosophical and literary period in Plato’s life during which ‘Plato became more optimistic 
than Socrates had been about finding the answers to the key questions regarding value and knowledge, 
and increasingly put into Socrates’ mouth positive doctrines about the soul, about the nature of nature, 
and about the metaphysical nature of the objects of inquiry, a process which culminated in the 
postulation of a separate realm of transcendent entities, the Forms’. The Republic is categorized as 
another middle period work. Note that any later revisions to the Cratylus, as argued for by Sedley 
(2003) 6-16, do not directly pertain to the remarks concerning the dialectician in the dialogue. The 
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ahead and group these dialogues under the heading ‘post-Republic’.) I am interested 
in seeing what, if anything, these post-Republic dialogues share in common with the 
Republic regarding the nature of philosophy. 
At least two things need to be clarified at this juncture. (1): Chronology and 
the ordering of the dialogues hardly play a role in my dissertation. I seek to produce 
an account of Plato’s conception of philosophy, as said conception is ascertainable in 
certain dialogues that are selected on account of their interesting remarks regarding 
philosophy and the philosopher.  In order to accomplish this task, I need not commit 
myself to many chronological assumptions. In fact, the sole chronological assumption 
I make in this dissertation is a popular (and so relatively safe) one amongst scholars: 
that certain dialogues were composed after the Republic (see n. 2).  
This brings us to the second point of clarification. (2): this dissertation does 
not attempt to put together an account of philosophy representative of the whole of 
Plato; it does not aim to produce a single, all-encompassing account of Plato’s 
conception of philosophy.3  All the same, I believe that it offers a serious contribution 
to Plato studies: it provides us with a positive answer to what philosophy, at least in 
certain dialogues, is for Plato. More precisely, it shows that there is general agreement 
across a series of dialogues on the nature of philosophy. 4  Ultimately, in this 
dissertation I show that ‘philosophy’, especially in the Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, 
Statesman, Phaedrus and Philebus, usually does not single out a particular science; 
that, in general, philosophy is not to be equated with just one discipline. Quite the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
importance of this fact will be revealed below when I turn to analyze the Cratylus’ remarks on dialectic 
in Ch. I. 
3 Such an attempt has already been made; see, e.g., Zuckert (2009). Though I strongly hesitate to say 
that this is the definitive book on the matter. See, e.g., Clark’s (2011) critical assessment of Zuckert’s 
project. 
4 I shall return to reflect on some of the findings of this dissertation in my concluding chapter. 
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contrary, I argue that in these dialogues philosophy is cast as something multi-
disciplinary; ‘philosophia’ is a term meant to mark off, not so much a particular 
discipline, but an assortment thereof that are broadly unified under one general aim: 
betterment of self through intellectual activity.  
This general aim of philosophy is worked toward in (what I term) both a 
‘negative’ and a ‘positive’ fashion. The act of philosophizing can be ‘negative’, 
insofar as it can involve examining and, where necessary, purging one of any 
untenable beliefs regarding the subject matter at hand. Philosophizing, then, can 
involve arriving at negative knowledge, i.e., knowledge of what X (the subject matter) 
is not (say, F). The elenctic episodes conducted by Plato’s Socrates typify this 
negative aspect of philosophy. Yet the act of philosophizing can also be positive, 
insofar as it can involve investigating the nature of things, with the hope of arriving at 
some sort of positive knowledge (e.g., knowing that X is, say, G).  This positive 
aspect of philosophy is typified in particular by those sciences highlighted in many of 
Plato’s dialogues, the mathematical disciplines.  
Yet, as much as these mathematical disciplines are lauded in Plato, they 
ultimately do not reach the philosophical zenith envisioned in the dialogues focused 
on in this dissertation.  Indeed, what a perusal of these dialogues reveals is that at the 
top of the philosophical hierarchy (i.e., the grouping of disciplines that represent 
genuine philosophical activity according to Plato) there sits alone a science of 
dialectic. This science, however it is presented in a particular dialogue (see below), is 
distinguished in general by its unique grasp of certain universals as such. I argue that 
this science is showcased in the Republic, and returns, albeit in different forms, in 
certain post-Republic dialogues as the topmost science of philosophy.   
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To be clear, in this dissertation I argue that only the expert of the science of 
dialectic is fully aware of the epistemological and metaphysical implications of the 
universal status of his subject matter; that all other experts have an inferior grasp of 
reality on account of their limited awareness of these epistemological and 
metaphysical implications. I show that throughout the selected dialogues the science 
of dialectic is consistently cast as the science par excellence; it is the science that 
constitutes the highest (positive) philosophical activity. Accordingly, the philosopher 
par excellence is cast as that expert whose body of knowledge is completed by 
mastery of this science. Having said that, I also argue that we should not be so quick 
as to fix the philosopher par excellence to any specific branch of knowledge; that the 
philosopher par excellence is, in accordance with the multi-disciplinary nature of 
philosophy itself, multi-disciplinary as well. In other words, Plato’s topmost 
philosopher is cast as a polymath invested in numerous intellectual matters ranging 
across all domains of knowledge. 
Note that I speak of a science of dialectic, not a method. I am here alluding to 
what typically separates a science from a method: a science is a systematically 
organized body of knowledge on a particular subject (e.g., geometry, or 
statesmanship), whilst a method is a systematic procedure adopted for the sake of 
accomplishing or approaching a particular subject (e.g., the procedure of 
hypothesizing in mathematics). Richard Robinson once said that, ‘the word “dialectic” 
had a strong tendency in Plato to mean “the ideal method, whatever that may be.”’5 I 
fully agree with Robinson. Yet I argue that the word ‘dialectic’ also had a strong 
tendency in Plato, particularly in the Republic and certain post-Republic dialogues, to 
mean ‘the ideal science, whatever that may be’. In this dissertation I show that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Robinson (1953) 70 
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distinction between a science and a method is not just one that Plato is aware of, but 
further endorses; that there is a science called ‘dialectic’ (sometimes referred to as ‘hē 
(epistēmē) dialektikē’), which is attributed a subject matter that no other science has 
access to. In the Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus and Philebus, a particular method 
called ‘dialectic’ is used by this science. Indeed, in this dissertation a good amount of 
time is spent reflecting on collection and division as the dialectical method par 
excellence for Plato. But the method of dialectic does not itself constitute a discipline 
with its own special subject matter; dialectic qua science is distinct from dialectic qua 
method.  
To be clear, I do not argue that there is only one set account of the science of 
dialectic in the relevant dialogues. I do not claim that the science of dialectic, 
described in Dialogue A as possessing unique subject matter X, is described verbatim 
in Dialogue B (C, D, etc.). Instead, what I argue is more open: that, just like ‘dialectic’ 
refers to different philosophical methods in Plato, so too does it refer to different 
philosophical sciences. In other words, Plato does not have has a fixed referent for the 
science he often calls ‘dialectic’. All the same, what these different sciences called 
‘dialectic’ have in common is that each, as presented, constitutes the highest 
achievable knowledge for the philosopher. 
A particular aim of mine is to show that Plato’s science of dialectic makes a 
standalone appearance in the Republic as the science of the Good as such. In doing so, 
I argue, contra Charles Kahn,6 that the remarks on ‘dialectic’ in certain ‘Group I’ or 
‘pre-Republic’ dialogues (terms explained below in Ch. I), which generally refer to a 
particular philosophical method, or methodology, do not serve as convincing evidence 
for Kahn’s proleptic reading of dialectic in Plato. Alternatively, I maintain that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Kahn (1996) 
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most we can say about dialectic in these pre-Republic dialogues is that it forms the 
loose foundation upon which Plato comes to develop the science that is promoted as 
the theoretical zenith of philosophy in the Republic. Simply put, in those pre-Republic 
dialogues, so I argue, the science of dialectic is not left lurking in the shadows, as 
Kahn’s reading may suggest.  Rather, it simply does not exist, not at any rate as a 
science with a distinguished knowledge of Forms, above all the Good, as such.  
What exactly do I mean by ‘Forms’? In truth, I spend hardly any time in this 
dissertation attempting to explain the exact nature of these special beings. Most 
generally, Forms are universals, intelligible objects whose natures are eternal and 
invariable. Further, and this too is a relatively safe point to make, I consider Forms to 
be at minimum more metaphysically important and correspondingly more 
epistemically valuable than the instantiated, sensible objects that at best approximate 
any given Form (sc. they are more important insofar as they are supposed to be the 
causes of F-ness in sensibles, and so more epistemically valuable than sensibles for 
the topmost philosopher to comprehend). A primary goal of mine is to show that these 
special beings are fully understood only by the topmost philosopher, the expert of the 
science of dialectic; that what distinguishes the topmost philosopher is his full 
understanding of Forms as such, of what it means for a Form to be a Form. In general, 
then, ‘Forms’ functions solely as a placeholder for those universal objects only fully 
understood by the topmost philosopher. 
I should point out that my account of the philosopher post-Republic butts 
heads with, in particular, Mary Louise Gill’s.7  Gill similarly maintains that certain 
post-Republic dialogues (primarily the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and 
Statesman) reveal a rough insight into the nature of Plato’s philosopher, an expert 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Gill (2013) 
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distinguished in major part by his skill in ‘dialectic’ (i.e., division).8  Yet Gill 
distinguishes herself in two ways. Firstly, she argues that there is a single professional 
philosopher in the selected group of dialogues who is ascribed a distinguished 
knowledge (epistēmē); she holds that there is only one scientist who technically 
merits the appellation ‘philosopher’: the scientist of Being qua Being. Secondly, Gill 
argues that the selected dialogues only give us pieces of a greater puzzle regarding the 
philosopher’s ‘object’ (Gill’s term): the Form of Being.9 According to Gill, the true, 
complete account of the philosopher is revealed only when all of the puzzle pieces 
regarding Being as such are put together correctly (i.e., when the problem particularly 
regarding the metaphysical status of Being as such is solved).10 Ultimately, Gill 
argues that the problem regarding Being is solved when we understand that Being as 
such both changes and is at rest (i.e., Being includes both things that change and 
things at rest).11 The philosopher ‘is interested in all beings’,12 according to Gill, in 
contrast to other specialists who carve off a part of Being for their respective domains 
of expertise. Accordingly, she ascribes knowledge of Being as such solely to her 
expert philosopher. 
Contra Gill, I argue that in the selected post-Republic dialogues there are no 
good grounds to identity the philosopher as an expert of specifically Being as such. I 
show that ‘philosopher’ in these dialogues does not mark off just one specific expert; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cf. Gill (2013) 211-14, 223-27. Gill (2013) 242-4 acknowledges that the philosopher is not the only 
expert who uses division; she compares and contrasts the philosopher’s use of division with the true 
rhetorician’s use of it in the Phaedrus (a comparison I analyze as well in Ch. IV). 
9 On Being as such being the philosopher’s ‘object’, see Gill (2013) Introduction. 
10 This is discussed in further detail in Ch. III. 
11 Another point to be discussed in more detail in Ch. III. 
12 Gill (2013) 241 
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that both the Republic and post-Republic dialogues agree on the point that there are 
various philosophoi corresponding to various branches of philosophia.  
Where does the elenctic Socrates fit into the picture of philosophy promoted in 
this dissertation? I discuss the character Socrates in almost every chapter of this 
dissertation. In particular, I compare and contrast the elenctic persona of Socrates 
with the expert of the science of dialectic. Ultimately, I show that the two are not 
identical; that we are dealing with different types of philosophers in the selected 
dialogues. I argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls 
short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive 
knowledge of certain Forms as such.  
I am not the first scholar to question Socrates’ philosophical standing in 
certain dialogues. Dorothea Frede, for example, has argued that, particularly in the 
Philebus, Socrates’ use of division falls noticeably short of what would be expected 
of a master dialectician.13 According to Frede, this ought to make us question Socrates’ 
standing as Plato’s topmost philosopher.14 I consider Frede’s, amongst other scholars’, 
views on Socrates’ philosophical standing in each of the dialogues perused in this 
dissertation. Whilst I side with Frede et al. on the point that Socrates is not projected 
as the topmost philosopher for Plato in certain dialogues, I take pains to show that 
Socrates is still regarded by Plato as very much a philosopher. In general, I seek to 
accommodate (the predominantly elenctic) Socrates into a philosophical hierarchy 
capped by a supra-mathematical science-however exactly this science is depicted in a 
given dialogue. I show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the 
true philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship (here is where the 
positive and negative fashions of philosophy meet): the elenctic philosopher gets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Frede (1993) and (2004).  
14 See as well C.C.W. Taylor (2006), who questions Socrates’ philosophical standing in the Sophist.  
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pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work 
with the philosopher par excellence. In general, I show that Socrates is a certain type 
of philosopher who provides vital philosophical/psychical conditioning. 
Let us briefly review how I place myself vis-à-vis certain other scholars 
working on some of the same topics.15 With regard to Plato’s ‘dialectic’ in general, I 
endorse Robinson’s view that dialectic stands for whatever method at a given point in 
time is the most viable one for the sake of achieving insights into the nature of 
universals. Yet I add that the ‘dialectic’ in the Republic and certain post-Republic 
dialogues may also refer to a science, not a method; that Plato thinks of ‘dialectic’ as 
both a way of doing philosophy, as well as a science that represents the greatest 
philosophical knowledge. I argue, pace Charles Kahn, that the science, cast as a 
science of above all the Good as such, makes a standalone appearance in the 
Republic; that no pre-Republic dialogue, which mentions ‘dialectic’, alludes to the 
science par excellence of Republic VI-VII. Ultimately, I wish to emphasize a 
distinguishing feature of the account of philosophy in the Republic: that it is namely 
in this dialogue (and no pre-Republic dialogue) that we are explicitly told that there 
exists a topmost supra-mathematical science. 
On the nature of philosophy in the post-Republic dialogues, I show, pace Gill, 
(a) that philosophy is not equated with a particular science. Accordingly, (b) 
‘philosopher’ does not mark of a single expert versed in a single science. Moreover, 
(c) I show that, whilst Plato has a topmost philosopher in mind in these post-Republic 
dialogues (sc. the expert of the science of dialectic), this philosopher is not an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Obviously other scholars, as well as other related topics, are discussed in this dissertation. All I am 
doing here is singling out those topics and scholars that have had the greatest influence on this 
dissertation. I should add that I take Sandra Peterson (2011) to task in Ch. V for questioning Socrates’ 
(Plato’s) endorsement of philosophy as depicted in the Theaetetus; I argue that there are no good 
grounds to deny Socrates’ (Plato’s) endorsement. 
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Aristotelian metaphysician; he is not distinguished by way of his knowledge of Being 
qua Being. Lastly, on the character Socrates, I side with Frede et al. on the point that 
Socrates is not projected as the philosopher par excellence in certain dialogues. All 
the same, I show that Socrates and the real philosopher par excellence form a 
complementary relationship; that Plato still considers Socrates to be very much a 
philosopher with a vital contribution to make to philosophy. 
 To conclude this introduction, I now turn to outline the main chapters of this 
dissertation. In Ch. I, I elucidate the central place of the science of dialectic (hē 
dialektikē) in Plato’s conception of philosophy in the Republic. In doing so, I argue 
against a purported connection between the middle books of the Republic and certain 
other Platonic dialogues regarding dialectic. I argue that there is no allusion in the 
Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, or Cratylus to the account of dialektikē presented in the 
middle books of the Republic; that the unique science of dialectic makes a standalone 
appearance in the middle books of the Republic. I argue that all cognates of ‘dialectic’ 
(e.g., to dialegesthai, to dialektikon) found in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, and 
Cratylus, which refer either to a general skill in philosophical conversing, or method 
of inquiry or debate, do not serve as a real hint or foreshadowing of the science of 
dialectic of the Republic. Simply put, not one of the remarks on dialectic in the 
Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, or Cratylus adequately prepares us for the science of the 
Good as such showcased in the Republic. 
 In Ch. II, I argue that being an expert in the science of dialectic satisfies just 
half of what Plato, at least when writing the Republic, thinks is the complete life for 
the philosopher: a unique combination of the theoretical and political life; the 
practical application, in the form of ruling, of one’s knowledge of Forms as such. In 
this chapter I also compare Socrates, as variously depicted in certain other dialogues, 
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with the expert of dialektikē in the Republic. I argue that, whilst not an expert of the 
science of dialectic, and so a candidate for the best possible philosopher in the 
Republic, Socrates is nonetheless a philosopher in the more general sense of the word: 
an intellectual bent on pursuing genuine wisdom. 
In Ch. III, I examine the remarks on the philosopher in the Sophist and 
Statesman. My chief claim in this chapter is that, in the Sophist and Statesman, Plato 
deliberately leaves the account of his topmost philosopher open so as to allow his 
topmost philosopher to concern himself with asking and answering a variety of 
questions (e.g., ‘What is a sophist?’ ‘What is the relation between Being as such and 
Non-Being as such?’). In doing so, Plato prevents his topmost philosopher from being 
fixed to any particular branch of knowledge. In other words, I claim that Plato subtly 
casts the topmost philosopher as someone who transcends the epistemic boundaries 
that mark off the typical statesman, the typical geometer, and so on.  
In Ch. IV, I analyze how the Phaedrus and Philebus distinguish philosophy: 
in the Phaedrus a contrast is drawn especially, though not exclusively, between 
philosophy and proper rhetoric (my term, explained below). Plato distinguishes the 
two by highlighting the different aims each seeks to satisfy via the same method: 
division. The philosopher is distinguished not on account of any unique method, or 
specific domain of knowledge, but by being someone who always seeks to grasp and 
in turn reflect with others on the truth of the matter, always accepting that his account 
may not be absolute. In the Philebus a hierarchy of sciences, reminiscent of the one in 
the Republic, is alluded to toward the end of the dialogue. ‘Dialectic’ is found at the 
top of this hierarchy. Accordingly, the Philebus shows us that Plato continues to 
regard the highest philosophical science as supra-mathematical. 
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In Ch. V, I consider the connection between three portraits of the philosopher 
found in Plato: the expert of the science of dialectic, Socrates the intellectual midwife 
of the Theaetetus, and the philosopher of Socrates’ digression in the Theaetetus.  A 
particular aim of this chapter is to show how Socrates the intellectual midwife is not 
to be equated with the philosopher of the digression. This chapter further shows that 
the philosopher of Socrates’ digression is not straightforwardly identifiable with the 
expert of the science of dialectic. What is Plato’s reason for not presenting a uniform 
philosopher, a uniform conception of philosophy? The Theaetetus shows us, in 
agreement with the findings of earlier chapters of this dissertation, that philosophia is 
not one art or science; it is not just intellectual midwifery, nor is it strictly the science 
of dialectic. Indeed, the Theaetetus affirms that there exist various philosophoi 
corresponding to various branches of philosophia, all of which come together under 
one general aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity. In the last section of 
this chapter, I critically assess Sandra Peterson’s reading of the Theaetetus. Ultimately, 
I show that her reading is misguided; that, in particular, we have no good reason to 











‘DIALECTIC’ IN THE REPUBLIC AND CERTAIN OTHER DIALOGUES 
 
  
In this first chapter I elucidate the central place of the science of dialectic (hē 
dialektikē) in Plato’s conception of philosophy in the Republic. In doing so, I argue 
against a purported connection between the middle books of the Republic and certain 
other Platonic dialogues regarding dialectic. I argue that there is no allusion in the 
Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, or Cratylus to the account of dialektikē presented in the 
middle books of the Republic; that the unique science of the Good as such makes a 
standalone appearance in the middle books of the Republic. I argue that all cognates 
of ‘dialectic’ (e.g., to dialegesthai, to dialektikon) found in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, 
Meno, and Cratylus, which refer either to a general skill in philosophical conversing, 
or method of inquiry or debate, do not serve as a real hint or foreshadowing of the 
science of dialectic of the Republic. Simply put, not one of the remarks on dialectic in 
the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, or Cratylus adequately prepares us for the science 




A search in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae reveals that cases of ‘ἡ 
διαλεκτικὴ’ occur only in the Republic, Phaedrus and Sophist, the latter dialogues 
safely placed after the Republic.16 Yet I shall not examine the Phaedrus, Sophist, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 On the chronology of the dialogues, see Introduction p. 2 n. 2. On a separate note, the TLG search, 
which indicates that ‘dialektikē’ does not appear before Plato, indirectly supports what Diogenes, Lives 
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any other commonly termed ‘later’ dialogue in any detail in this chapter. What 
dialogues shall I examine in detail in this chapter? Along with the Republic, I shall 
look at the Gorgias, Euthydemus, Meno, and Cratylus. Since I question a purported 
foreshadowing of the account of dialectic in Republic VI-VII in these dialogues, I 
assume that the four dialogues highlighted are all ‘pre-Republic’.17  
  Now, Charles Kahn maintains that remarks on dialectic in certain dialogues 
are meant to prepare us for the account of dialectic in Republic VI-VII: 
 
‘[T]he Republic is the very first dialogue in which Plato tells us what he 
means by dialectic. There are nevertheless unmistakable allusions to 
this topic in three earlier dialogues, namely in the Meno, Euthydemus, 
and Cratylus. Read retrospectively, from the vantage point of the 
Republic, these passages are fully intelligible; read in their immediate 
context at least two of these texts must seem enigmatic. For only in the 
Republic do we learn that “dialectic” has been chosen as the official 
designation for the highest kind of philosophical knowledge, the 
knowledge that is identical with, or indispensable for, the art required of 
the statesman: the politikē technē of the Gorgias and the royal art of the 
Euthydemus [i.e., a knowledge of ‘Forms’ or ‘unchangeable realities’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. 24. 10-13, says about Plato coining, amongst other terms, ‘dialektikē’: καὶ πρῶτος ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ 
ἀντίποδα ὠνόµασε [sc. Plato] καὶ στοιχεῖον καὶ διαλεκτικὴν καὶ ποιότητα καὶ τοῦ ἀριθµοῦ τὸν 
προµήκη καὶ τῶν περάτων τὴν ἐπίπεδον ἐπιφάνειαν καὶ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν. Kahn (1996) 325, preceded by 
Müri (1944), has already noted that ‘dialektikē’ is Plato’s coinage.  
17 This need not be strictly construed as a chronological assumption. Kahn (1996) 48 sees certain 
dialogues, regardless their actual date of composition, as being intended to be read prior to certain 
others, particularly the Republic: ‘[the structuring of the dialogues in this sense] is [the] systematic 
orientation towards the Republic that ties all or most of these dialogues together and offers the most 
enlightening perspective on their interrelationship.’ 
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cf. Kahn (1996) 295 et passim]. And it is only from this point of view 
that the relevant passages in the Euthydemus and Cratylus can be 
understood.’18 
 
One of Kahn’s central claims is that ‘Group I’ dialogues19 are to be read first, in 
preparation for the philosophical insights of the Republic. In particular, Kahn argues 
that Plato has a specific notion of dialectic as a method leading to Forms that is only 
gradually revealed to the reader as the latter makes progress in his philosophical 
studies; ‘it is in the central books of the Republic that dialectic is most fully 
described.’20  
 To qualify Kahn’s claim, I argue that ‘dialektikē’ in the middle books of the 
Republic refers only to a science, not a method.21 I believe that the distinction 
between science and method is one that Plato is not only aware of, but further 
enforces in the Republic. Plato distinguishes between a method of ‘dialectic’ (sc. 
philosophical investigation, or skill in philosophical conversation),22 namely with the 
term ‘(to) dialegesthai’, and a distinguished science of ‘dialectic’, namely with ‘hē 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kahn (1996) 293, my bold 
19 Kahn’s (1996) 47 term, which refers to a set of dialogues (Apology, Crito, Ion, Hippias Minor, 
Gorgias, Menexenus, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis, Euthydemus, 
Symposium, Phaedo, and Cratylus), respectively placed across six distinct stages, which are meant to 
be read in anticipation of the Republic. I shall adopt the term simply to refer to certain dialogues. 
20 Kahn (1996) 294. Cf. Kahn (1996) 326-7. Kahn’s ‘proleptic’ reading (sc. a dramatic foreshadowing 
and philosophical conditioning) of dialectic in the dialogues in question obviously does not extend to 
dialogues placed after the Republic, cf. Kahn (1996) 296 ff. on dialectic after the Republic. 
21 Kahn (1996) 326-7 jumps from referring to the same thing, dialektikē, as a science, art, and method. 
On the distinction between method and science, see Intro. pp. 5-7. Said distinction is recalled above. 
22 Of course, ‘dialegesthai’ does not translate simply as ‘to philosophically converse’. However, given 
the philosophical context in which the term is used in Plato, I take the liberty in this chapter to have 
most instances of ‘to dialegesthai’ refer to conversation of a philosophical nature. 
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(epistēmē) dialektikē’. The science may be related to the method or skill; it is not to be 
equated with it.  
More substantially, I argue that, reading the Group I dialogues 
‘retrospectively’, one would have to precariously contort the more natural reading of 
relevant passages in the highlighted dialogues in order for said passages to agree with 
the account of dialektikē in Books VI-VII of the Republic. Alternatively, I maintain 
that the most we can say about dialectic in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, and 
Cratylus is that it forms the loose foundation upon which Plato comes to develop the 
science that is promoted as the theoretical zenith of philosophy in the middle books o 
the Republic. In these highlighted dialogues, so I argue, the science of dialectic 
distinguished in the Republic is not left lurking in the shadows, as Kahn’s reading 
may suggest.  Rather, it simply does not exist, not at any rate as a science with a 
unique body of knowledge. Again, I am not denying that in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, 
Meno and Cratylus Plato at times speaks of dialectic as expertise or skill in 
philosophical conversation (that is, conversation or argumentation conducted for the 
sake of arriving at the truth of the matter). What I am denying is that such a notion of 
dialectic is hinting at that unique science whose experts have a synoptic view of all 
pertinent sciences framed by their knowledge of above all the Good as such. 
To be clear, I do not examine whether there is a cohesive and consistent 
picture of the dialectician (dialektikos) across the Gorgias, Euthydemus, Meno, and 
Cratylus. What I focus on is comparing and contrasting each dialogue’s respective 
picture of the dialectician with the account of the expert of dialektikē of Republic VI-
VII. Ultimately, I show that remarks on skill in to dialegesthai or philosophical 
conversing, as mentioned in at least four ‘Group I’ dialogues (Euthydemus, Gorgias, 
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Meno, Cratylus),23 do not allude to a science of Forms; that dialectic, as variously 
described in these dialogues, can be understood in its original context, that is to say 
without interpolating the account of the science of dialectic of the Republic. Indeed, I 
show that interpolating said account only raises more questions than it answers.  
 
DIALEKTIKĒ IN THE REPUBLIC 
 
 Before examining the remarks on dialectic in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, 
Cratylus, I think it best to first lay out the account of hē (epistēmē) dialektikē in 
Books VI-VII of the Republic.  
 In Book VI, whilst rounding out his account of the divided line, which relates 
a conception of hierarchical levels of comprehension and their corresponding objects 
as found across an intelligible plane and a visible one, Socrates says that it is strictly 
‘via the power of dialectic (τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάµει)’ that understanding is 
obtained of first principles (511b).24 Upon comprehending the first principle, the 
Good itself (see below), the dialectician (unnamed as such in the text) turns around 
and, guided by nothing sensible and ditching hypotheses, continues his studies 
making use of ‘only Forms themselves, moving on from Forms to Forms, and ending 
in Forms’ (ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη, 511c1-2).25  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Until shown otherwise, apart from the later dialogues, I can only find the following passages that 
remotely speak of dialectic as an art or science. Note that ‘to dialegesthai’ is used in the Protagoras (cf. 
esp. 336bd) to indirectly refer to an argumentative method. Of course, the expression itself simply 
means an activity of conversing. Regardless, we should not immediately equate an argumentative 
method with a systematized art. The text in the Protagoras certainly does not equate the two. 
24 Unless otherwise noted, English translations of Plato are from Cooper (1997). Greek is from the 
OCT texts. Abbreviations of the dialogues’ titles are adopted from Cooper (1997) 1746. 
25 In the Republic, a ‘principle’ (archē) may refer to an hypothesis used by a mathematician. However, 
as is clear at 511bc, ‘the unhypothetical first principle of everything’ (τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου…τὴν τοῦ 
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 Note that up to 511c dialectic is still not explicitly nominated as a science. 
Dialectic is referred to as a dunamis (power), not a technē or epistēmē.26 Yet in 
Glaucon’s summary of Socrates’ remarks, dialectic is taken to be just that, a proper 
science: 
 
‘I understand, if not yet adequately…that you want to distinguish the intelligible part 
of that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic (τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
ἐπιστήµης), as clearer than the part studied by the so-called sciences (τῶν τεχνῶν 
καλουµένων),27 for which their hypotheses are first principles.’ (511c3-8) 
 
With Socrates’ approval of Glaucon’s summary (511d), there is no question as to the 
identity of ‘dialectic’ here as a proper science. It is specifically dialektikē that fully 
comprehends the intelligible plane of reality (cf. 509d), which we later find out to be 
the realm in which certain intelligible objects exist, particularly ‘the happiest’ or ‘best’ 
(τὸ εὐδαιµονέστατον, 526e3-4, τοῦ ἀρίστου, 532c5) amongst those which are (τοῦ 
ὄντος, 526e4, ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, 532c5), that is the Good itself. 
 The ensuing remarks on dialektikē in Book VII relate a fairly detailed account 
of what is cast as the unique science of principally the Good. Yet we may infer that, 
dealing with mere Forms (511c), above all the Good, Just and Fine (484ce, 506a, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
παντὸς ἀρχὴν, 511b6-7) refers to the Good itself. Note that the passage suggests all genuine ‘Forms’, 
are principles distinct from the archai qua hypotheses the mathematicians rely on.  On the relation 
between these different archai, see Burnyeat (2000) 41-2 and n. 59. 
26 See the quotation below, where technē and epistēmē are used interchangeably. However, see n. 27. 
27 Further ahead (533d), Socrates suggests that ‘technē’ should not be equated with ‘epistēmē’ and vice 
versa; that a technē only approximates an epistēmē in its comprehension of reality. Note, nonetheless, 
that Socrates is not denying the important supplementary role that all technai serve-obviously all 
‘preludes’ to dialectic must be passed prior to a proper comprehension of the science of dialectic. 




532c, 534bc, 540ab),28 it is the sole epistēmē of Forms as such.  In general, dialektikē 
ultimately seeks ‘the Good itself with understanding itself’ (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ 
νοήσει, 532b1), reaching the end of the intelligible realm in contrast to all other 
subjects, which terminate at the end of either the sensible realm or the subordinate 
intelligible one (532ad, cf. 517bc). Whilst the exact method employed by dialektikē is 
left somewhat vague (533a), 29  what is made clear is that only this science 
‘systematically (ὁδῷ) attempts to grasp with respect to each thing itself what the 
being of it is, for all the other crafts (ἀλλ' αἱ…ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι) are concerned with 
human opinions and desires, with growing or construction, or with the care of 
growing or constructed things’ (533b3-6). And the subordinate sciences (see below) 
at best have an approximate grasp of the true nature of mathematical entities. Indeed, 
all other crafts and subordinate sciences at best obtain an inexact grasp of the nature 
of whatever they set their sights on (533bc).  
  During a critique of the method of hypothesis, Socrates says that all ‘preludes’ 
(i.e., subordinate sciences) to dialektikē rely on hypotheses, which are left unqualified 
due to their being unknown: 
 
‘[w]hat mechanism could possibly turn any agreement into knowledge (τὴν τοιαύτην 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The remarks at 484ce and 506a, particularly those at 506a detailing the importance of the 
philosophical guardian knowing the Good itself in order to know what are ‘just and fine things’ (δίκαιά 
τε καὶ καλὰ, 506a4), comes before dialektikē is showcased in the Republic. However, because this 
guardian turns out to be none other than an expert of dialektikē, it is safe to infer that it is on account of 
his grasp of the Forms in question (viz., the Good, Just and Fine) that he is able to know what is 
particularly valuable, and so expertly run a city-state. 
29 An account of this method is abandoned, really (cf. 533a).  
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ὁµολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήµην γενέσθαι) when it begins with something unknown and 
puts together the conclusion and the steps in between from what is unknown?’ 
(533c3-5) 
 
By contrast, dialektikē ultimately has no need for hypotheses. It rather seeks 
knowledge of and in turn starts from a first principle so as to leave no part of any 
investigation into the nature of a given thing unqualified. Surely this is what Socrates 
means when he says the science of dialectic seeks out the first principle so as to be 
‘secure’ (βεβαιώσηται, 533c9). Note, though, that hypotheses are used initially to 
arrive at knowledge of at least one first principle, which surely must allude to the 
importance of mathematics in the dialectician-in-training’s ascent to the Good (cf. 
511bc). Nonetheless, once the seeker of the Good has obtained a vision of it with his 
mind alone, thereupon (mathematical) hypotheses are abandoned. In what sense are 
they abandoned? The professional dialectician now starts any further inquiry with 
knowledge of at least one first principle. He does not start with a proposition assumed 
to be true (or false) and proceeding until it is shown to be true (or false). Hence, 
dialektikē is primarily responsible for bringing the soul closest to the true nature of 
that which is (533d, cf. 513bd). 
 Whilst what generally defines an expert of dialektikē is his capacity to give 
and receive an account ‘of each thing [that is]’ (ἑκάστου…τῆς οὐσίας, 534b3-4), we 
should stress that what distinguishes this unique scientist is his capacity to thoroughly 
give and receive an account of especially the Good itself. As Socrates claims,  
 
‘[u]nless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything 
else, can survive all refutation, as if in a battle, striving to judge things not in 
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accordance with opinion but in accordance with being, and can come through all this 
with his account still intact, you’ll say that he doesn’t know the good itself or any 
other good.’ (534b8-c5) 
 
For sure, we are told that only the expert of dialektikē knows how to properly give 
and receive an account of the true being (nature) of whatever he is investigating 
without the need of sense perception (531e-532a, 534b). But this expert’s thorough 
account of a given thing’s nature is possible only in light of his prior grasp of the 
Good itself; without knowledge of the Good one can hardly have a precise grasp of 
the being of whatever else he looks to.  
 Now, given the overall power and influence that the Good itself has (cf. 517c), 
coupled with the claim that only a proper dialectician can come to know it, the 
science of dialectic is superior to all other sciences (cf. 533c-535a). Accordingly, 
dialektikē is the last science to be mastered by the philosopher-kings-in-training 
(535a). Furthermore, we are told that the dialectically inclined individual must form a 
‘synoptic’ (sunopsis) or unified vision; he must incorporate all that he has learned 
about the sciences into a greater body of knowledge (537bc). For that reason, he must 
undergo rigorous tests. Moreover, Socrates notes that only a handful of those training 
actually become full-fledged dialecticians, avoiding poor upbringing and so 
corruption in the process (537d-540a). 
 What is especially important to note at this juncture is that dialektikē is not 
only identified as that superior science of sciences. It is also projected as the very 




‘Then, at the age of fifty, those who’ve survived the tests and been successful both in 
practical matters and in the sciences must be led to the goal and compelled to lift up 
the radiant light of their souls to what itself provides light for everything. And once 
they’ve seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, and 
themselves in order, using it [sc. the Good] as their model. Each of them will spend 
most of his time with philosophy (πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ), but, when his turn comes, he must 
labor in politics and rule for the city’s sake.’ (540a4-b4) 
 
 For the moment, I wish to skip over the political obligations the expert of the 
science par excellence is saddled with in the Republic.30 The passage above identifies 
those intellectuals who have passed all preludes and tests prior to reaching the science 
of dialectic. The description of the intellectual between 540ab focuses on his time 
spent mastering dialektikē, seeing ‘the Good itself’ (τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, 540a8-9), and 
ultimately coming down to govern the masses only after due comprehension of the 
Good. Accordingly, when Socrates speaks of the intellectual spending most of his 
time philosophizing, he must be specifically referring to that time, after the age of 50, 
and so after all preliminary studies, when the professional dialectician is at home with 
the Good and the rest of the Forms. What I wish to stress here is the point Socrates is 
rather subtly making: dialektikē completes the theoretical aspect of philosophia.31 As 
we shall see up ahead, nowhere in the ‘Group I’ dialogues mentioned above are 
philosophia and dialektikē connected like this. Nowhere in those dialogues does Plato 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I return to this topic next chapter. 
31  Interestingly, the passage suggests that the theoretical life of the philosopher is explicitly 
distinguished (though certainly not divorced) from the practical-political life the philosopher is saddled 
with. At a given time the competent philosopher either theorizes about special beings, or he rules over 
a polis; the activities are not done concurrently. All the same, they are complementary-a point I return 
to next chapter. 
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hint at a notion of dialectic as that science which acts as the copingstone of all 
pertinent sciences completing the philosopher’s theoretical life.32 
 
SOME ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN COGNATES OF 
‘DIALECTIC’ IN THE REPUBLIC 
 
 We should note that, in the Republic, Plato does not fix the referents of all 
cognates of ‘dialectic’. Take the expression ‘power of dialectic’ (hē dunamis tou 
dialegesthai), as found in Books VI and VII. When comparing its use in Book VI at 
511cd and again in Book VII between 537d-539d, we see an immediate discrepancy: 
at 511cd, the ‘power of dialectic’ refers to a science used by reason alone in order to 
obtain knowledge of the Good itself. In fact, ‘hē dunamis tou dialegesthai’ is here 
shown to be synonymous with ‘hē epistēmē tou dialegesthai’ (cf. 511c5), or what is 
later referred to as just ‘dialektikē’. By contrast, between 537d-539d, ‘hē dunamis tou 
dialegesthai’ refers to a refutative method of argumentation, synonymously referred 
to as just  ‘to dialegesthai’ (cf. 537e1). What is particularly noteworthy about the 
mention of the power of dialectic between 537d-539d is that said power presupposes 
no comprehension of Forms, especially the Good itself. Indeed, this passage is notable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Kahn (1996) 327 omits the lines that immediately follow the reference to dialectic being the 
copingstone of the sciences that constitute the subjects (mathēmata) to be learned. In doing so, he 
leaves out the fact that dialektikē is implicitly classed as a science, not a method:  
 
‘Then do you think that we’ve placed dialectic at the top of the other subjects (τοῖς µαθήµασιν) like a 
coping stone and that no other subject can rightly be placed above it (καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου µάθηµα 
ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθα), but that our account of the subjects that a future ruler must learn has 





for its discussion of the abuse of ‘dialectic’, in context a refutative or elenctic method 
of argumentation, by young people. I think that the most sensible explanation here for 
the variant use of ‘hē dunamis tou dialegesthai’ is that the meaning or referent of 
certain cognates of ‘dialectic’ in the Republic varies depending upon context. I 
emphasize ‘certain’ cognates here because I want to further suggest that the meaning 
or referent of ‘hē dialektikē’ and  ‘hē epistēmē tou dialegesthai’ does not vary from 
Book VI to the end of the Republic; that the ‘science of dialectic’ always refers to that 
particular science of the Good and the rest of the Forms. I maintain this point given 
the simple fact that there is no textual evidence in the Republic that ‘hē dialektikē’ and  
‘hē epistēmē tou dialegesthai’ refer to anything else apart from this unique science. 
 
DIALECTIC IN THE EUTHYDEMUS 
 
In the Euthydemus, we find two clear uses of  ‘(to) dialegesthai’: 
 
‘{Socrates} Well, Euthydemus, if you think this is how to do things, we must do them 
your way, because you are far more an expert at discoursing (ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι) 
than I, who have merely a layman’s knowledge of the art (τέχνην)’ (295d8-e3). 
 
‘{Socrates} Then isn’t it also the case that the same is the same and the different 
different? Because I don’t imagine that the different is the same, but I thought even a 
child would hardly doubt that the different is different. But you must have neglected 
this point deliberately, Dionysodorus, since in every other respect you and your 
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brother strike me as bringing the art of argument (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι)33 to a fine pitch of 
excellence, like craftsmen who bring to completion whatever work constitutes their 
proper business’ (301b7-c5). 
 
Now, Socrates is definitely not endorsing Euthydemus’ and Dionysodorus’ 
‘pancratistic art’ of refuting any thesis, be it true or false (cf. 272ab, 303a-304d). 
Socrates’ obviously sly response at 301bc surely underlines the insincere nomination 
of eristic disputation as the art of conversational discourse, as the art Socrates would 
sincerely promote and seek expertise in. Indeed, we are not meant to take Socrates 
seriously when he equates eristic disputation with a genuine philosophical art (on 
‘philosophy’ in the Euthydemus, see below). Notwithstanding, does Socrates have a 
sincere answer to what is genuine skill in to dialegesthai in the Euthydemus? At first 
blush (I return to this topic below), it would rather broadly be some conversational or 
argumentative art that seeks the truth. So, I agree with Charles Kahn on the point that 
at times ‘dialegesthai’ and cognates refer to a philosophical conversation, that is to a 
discursive engagement in pursuit of truth, and that this art is meant to be contrasted 
with the eristic (i.e., debate), victory-loving, non-knowledge seeking style of 
disputation that Socrates is up against in many dialogues.34 But beyond this rather 
meager account in the Euthydemus, there is no further textual evidence, save the 
likewise vague description of the dialectician (see below) that genuine dialectic, 
which applies to any philosophical investigation, foreshadows a science whose unique 
domain of knowledge consists in Forms in and of themselves. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 I accept ‘the art of argument’ as a paraphrase based on what is said between 295d8-e3. However, the 
expression itself translates literally as no more than an activity of conversing. 
34 Cf. Kahn (1996) 303 et passim 
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 Granted, the use of ‘dialektikos’ (dialectician) in the Euthydemus requires 
some attention: 
 
‘No art of actual hunting, he said [sc. Clinias], extends any further than pursuing and 
capturing: whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of 
using it, but they and the fisherman hand over their prey to the cooks. And again, 
geometers and astronomers and calculators (who are hunters too, in a way, for not one 
of these make their diagrams; they simply discover those which already exist), since 
they themselves have no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand 
over the task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians (παραδιδόασι…τοῖς 
διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὑρήµασιν)-at least, those of them do so who 
are not completely senseless.’ (Euthd., 290b7-c6) 
 
From this passage the only thing that we can immediately say about the dialectician is 
that he is ascribed a distinguished, albeit unqualified, supervisory role: he uses the 
theoretical knowledge first obtained by certain mathematicians (how exactly is left 
unsaid). Anything else that one would wish to add to this account of the dialectician 
would be strict conjecture.  
 Kahn, amongst others, interprets this passage ‘as an allusion to the relationship 
between mathematics and dialectic described in Republic VI-VII...[It] must imply the 
epistemology of the Divided Line and, even more precisely, the curriculum of the 
guardians in Republic VII, where we meet the three branches of mathematics 
 	  
28	  
mentioned in this text.’35 Against Kahn et al., I offer certain objections that question 
the force of this purported cross-reference.  
To start, in this portion of the Euthydemus (288e-289d) a contrast is drawn 
between two kinds of art: on the one hand we have the art (e.g., hunting) with the 
knowledge of capturing something (e.g., duck), and on the other hand we have the art 
(e.g., cookery) with the knowledge to make use of that which has been captured, (e.g., 
canard à la rouennaise). Crucially, the text suggests that the user in each field 
normally does not possess the distinct expertise of the ‘hunter’. Note Clinias’ plea for 
the discovery of a hitherto unidentified art that, implicitly in contrast to hunting and 
cookery, hunting and generalship, and most importantly for us mathematics and 
dialectic, both possesses and uses a unique Knowledge X that in turn makes man 
happy (290bd, cf. 289be).  
In light of this contrast between the arts, let us spell out the relation between 
the mathematician and the dialektikos drawn in the Euthydemus. The dialektikos does 
not possess the mathematician’s distinct knowledge or expertise (viz., that of hunting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Kahn (1996) 308. In a later work, Kahn (2000) 90 says that the Euthydemus passage on dialectic is 
‘impossible’ to understand without interpolating the account of dialectic in Republic VII:  
 
‘We can regard the enigmatic passage at Euthydemus 290c, about mathematicians turning their 
discoveries over to the dialecticians, as a proleptic reference to the doctrine of Republic VII, where the 
study of mathematics is proposed as a preparation for dialectic...the passage of Euthydemus 290c refers 
proleptically to Republic VII since it is impossible to understand the first text without reference to the 
second.’ 
 
Hawtrey (1978) 15 with n. 5 and (1981) 127-9 also sees a direct allusion to the Republic in this passage 
of the Euthydemus. So too do Narcy (1984) 183 and Burnyeat (2002) 40–66. However Burnyeat (2002) 
63 n. 46, in contrast to Kahn (1996) 307-9, sees the allusion in the Euthydemus as a back-reference to 
the Republic. Schofield (2006) 151-2 states that ‘this reference [sc. to the relation between 
mathematicians and dialecticians in the Euthydemus] only makes sense as an allusion to the 
epistemology and metaphysics of Books 6 and 7 of the Republic (to the theory, whether or nor the text 
of the Republic was already composed by the time the Euthydemus was written).’ 
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down already existing mathematical figures). Again, the dialektikos is only explicitly 
said to have the knowledge to make use of the mathematician’s discoveries. This 
picture of the dialectician as someone who may not have the mathematician’s 
knowledge does not mesh well with the picture of the expert of dialektikē in the 
Republic: in the latter dialogue, the expert of dialektikē must possesses mathematical 
knowledge prior to obtaining superior knowledge of the Good itself. Surely a 
complete mathematical knowledge includes knowledge of hunting down 
mathematical diagrammata. 
I am not the first scholar to question the intimate connection between the 
dialecticians of the Euthydemus and Republic. Richard Robinson, followed by R.S. 
Sprague,36 have argued that the epistemology of the Divided Line and the educative 
scheme of the Republic do not suggest that the expert of dialektikē makes use of the 
mathematicians’ work as conclusions, in contrast to what is suggested of the 
dialectician in the Euthydemus. However, R. S. W. Hawtrey has reasonably argued 
that the mathematicians’ diagrams in the Euthydemus might not be conclusions after 
all: 
 
‘Geometry is more likely to start from a figure than to end with one, 
and the word ἀνευρίσκουσιν suggests that Plato is thinking rather of the 
discovery of certain figures with their particular properties than of the 
drawing from them of conclusions. Or, more probably, he may be 
referring generally to the subject matter rather than to either end of a 
process…’37 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Cf. Robinson (1953) 74; Sprague (1964) 35 with n. 56. 
37 Hawtrey (1978) 14 
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Let us, for the sake of argument, agree with Hawtrey on the role of the diagrammata 
in the Euthydemus.38  
What follows from this? Ultimately, Hawtrey maintains that the dialectician’s 
use of the mathematician’s diagrammata is understandable only in light of what is 
said about the dialectician’s use of mathematics in the Republic: the dialectician of the 
Euthydemus, like the dialectician of the Republic, may use the approved diagrammata 
of subordinate mathematicians as starting points during a given inquiry.39 Like Kahn, 
then, Hawtrey believes that the Republic VI-VII account of dialectic needs to be 
interpolated into the passage of the Euthydemus in order for the latter to make any 
sense. 
In reply, I note that Hawtrey’s reading still does not fully account for the 
distinction drawn in the Euthydemus between expert possessor and expert user. As 
noted above, there is no confirmation in the Euthydemus that the dialectician as user 
of diagrammata knows how to first hunt down already existing diagrammata. Yet if 
the dialectician does not know how to do that, then the dialectician does not know 
everything about the diagrammata. And if he does not know everything about the 
diagrammata, then surely his grasp of geometry and astronomy is deficient to some 
extent. Again, this does not mesh well with the picture of the expert of dialektikē in 
the middle books of the Republic: the expert of dialektikē must know everything 
about select mathematics, and this must include knowing how to ‘hunt down’ and in 
turn use mathematical diagrammata (cf. n. 38). I shall offer an alternative account of 
the connection between the mathematician and dialectician of the Euthydemus below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In defence of Hawtrey (cf. (1978) 14), I believe that the diagrammata of the Euthydemus are more 
akin to the approved figures (schēmata) of the Republic (cf. 510c, 529d) than to the ‘worked out 
diagrammata’ (ἐκπεπονηµένοις διαγράµµασιν, 529e2), which are criticized by Socrates (cf. 529de).  
39 Cf. Hawtrey (1978) 15 
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In the interim, though, I would like to cast further doubt on the claim that remarks on 
the dialectician in the Euthydemus allude to the expert of dialektikē of the Republic. 
In the ideal city of the Republic, statesmen are full-fledged philosophers; 
statesmen have and in turn apply knowledge of the Good as such.40 This connection 
between dialectician-philosophers and statesmen is not drawn in the Euthydemus, 
especially at 290bd. Again, dialecticians in the Euthydemus are the appliers of certain 
mathematicians’ discoveries, whilst, quite distinctly, statesmen are identified as the 
managers of, amongst other things, generals’ products (291cd). When we consider the 
apparent scientific hierarchy suggested in the text (289b f.), namely that there exists in 
particular a supreme science for man, one which alone will make him happy, to which 
all other sciences are subordinate, there arises an unresolved tension between dialectic 
and the political craft: where in this scientific hierarchy do the two stand? Is one 
science meant to be recognized as superior to the other?  
Kahn might say that the reader is meant to somehow connect dialectic with 
statesmanship here in the Euthydemus in a way that agrees with the account of the 
philosopher-king in the Republic. Yet there is at least one problem with this attempted 
connection: statesmanship is proffered as that distinct knowledge which philosophy 
seeks to make man happy only after dialectic has been considered and in turn passed 
over as that very knowledge (more on this below). Surely this implies that 
statesmanship is somehow prior to the art of dialectic with regard to making man 
happy. But this placement of statesmanship over dialectic does not fit well with what 
is reported in the Republic: a statesman must have expertise in dialektikē (viz., 
knowledge of the Good) if he is to be any good at his job; knowledge of dialektikē in 
the Republic is prior to knowledge of statesmanship. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 A point I draw out next chapter. 
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There is a smaller issue to address: there is confusion within the drama of the 
dialogue concerning the authorship of the statements at Euthydemus 290bd (cf. 290e). 
Socrates ultimately makes the vague suggestion that perhaps it was some ‘superior 
being’ (τις τῶν κρειττόνων) (291a).41 Whoever this mysterious figure is, his account 
on dialecticians, generals and statesmen fails to provide the answer sought. For in the 
ensuing discussion (291b-293a) Socrates notes that the individuals present tried in 
vain to account for that superior art, which would make man happy, that would itself 
know how to use the knowledge that it obtained by itself via making or capturing (cf. 
290d, 293a). Again, Socrates never returns to examine the art of dialectic mentioned 
at 290c, to see if it satisfies the criteria cited.42  
Why does he not do so? It is most sensible to read the remarks on the relation 
between mathematicians and dialecticians (as well as the other experts mentioned in 
the text) as serving the straightforward purpose of illustrating the relation between 
generals and statesmen: generals hand over their possessions to statesmen for the 
latter to utilize (therefore generalship cannot be philosophy’s knowledge, which both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 C. Gill (2000) 140 suggests that the superior being is not meant to be equated with a specific person; 
that the superior being could in fact be more abstractly the ‘Socratic dialectic’ or ‘protreptic dialectic’ 
(Gill’s terms) witnessed in the dialogue. ‘Dialectic’ in this sense is a method of argumentation 
employed for the sake of encouraging both partners in a given inquiry to identify legitimate 
philosophical puzzles and accordingly seek to resolve them. This dialectic is to be contrasted with, and 
ultimately preferred over, the eristic argumentation employed by the sophistic brothers in the dialogue. 
I note that Gill does not match Socratic or protreptic dialectic with the art employed by the dialektikos 
at 290bc. 
42 Ademollo (2011) 143-4 uses the Euthydemus description of philosophy, as the possession and use of 
knowledge (Euth. 288d, 289b), in support of his argument that in the Cratylus the real authoritative 
linguistic expert (i.e., both the maker and user of words) is the name-giver and dialectician wrapped up 
into one; that linguistics is not a joint-venture between distinct experts. However, he does not take into 
account the fact that in the Euthydemus dialectic is never identified as philosophy’s knowledge. Nor 
does he note the explicit contrast between having knowledge of making or possessing X and having 
knowledge of using X-dialectic being openly classified in the Euthydemus as an art of use. I shall 
return to the Cratylus (and Ademollo) below. 
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possesses and employs that which it possesses), just as mathematicians hand over 
their discoveries to dialecticians for the dialecticians to interpret or analyze (see 
below), just as speech writers hand off their speeches to speakers for the speakers to 
recite, just like lyre makers hand off their lyres to lyre players for the latter to play, 
and so on and so forth (cf. 288e-290e). By the by, we should not loose sight of the 
fact that what is so amazing to Crito is that the lad, Clinias, is capable of 
understanding and in turn explaining why particularly generalship cannot be 
philosophy’s supreme knowledge, knowledge which is ultimately identified as 
statesmanship, not the art of interpreting mathematical diagrammata (see below). The 
main point here is that 290 ff. contrasts philosophy’s superior knowledge with all 
preceding lower ones, mathematics and dialectic included. 
Now, so far I have not addressed the possibility that the Euthydemus postdates 
the Republic. M.M. McCabe, in particular, holds this view.43 She also believes that 
the Euthydemus serves in major part to criticize certain aspects of the Republic.44 
Accordingly, McCabe would probably interpret Socrates’ failure in the Euthydemus to 
return to examine the art of dialectic, to see if it is the superior art, as a pulling back 
from the confident identification of the ruler with the dialectician in the Republic. 
Whilst McCabe’s view must be taken seriously,45 I have to point out that, just 
focusing on dialectic in the Euthydemus, it is very hard to see what would motivate 
Plato to downgrade not only the political role of the dialectician in the Euthydemus, 
but also, and arguably more importantly, the dialectician’s epistemic reach.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 McCabe (2002). I have already pointed out that Burnyeat (2002) likewise considers the Euthydemus 
a post-Republic work.  
44 See McCabe (2000) 
45 Especially the connected, more substantiated thesis that certain post-Republic dialogues (esp. the 
Statesman and Philebus) attack central tenets of the Republic. For this see McCabe (2000) Ch. 5-8. 
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Here is the problem, as I see it: why would Plato, post-Republic, ascribe to the 
dialectician a downgraded grasp of select mathematics (viz., a knowledge of a use of 
diagrams without the separate knowledge of first tracking them down)? Why 
jeopardize the dialectician’s position as a super-mathematical scientist? A reasonable 
reply may be that Plato, after composing the Republic, brings his topmost scientist 
down to Earth; there is no need (alternatively, it is quite improbable) for the expert of 
dialektikē to master all ostensibly subordinate sciences in accordance with the 
educative programme established in the Republic. However, whilst it is not my 
intention to directly enter into a chronological debate, what I hope to show in 
subsequent chapters is that evidence gathered from those dialogues commonly 
considered to postdate the Republic, particularly the Sophist, Statesman and Philebus, 
is consistent with what is said in the Republic: that (i) there exists a supra-
mathematical science, whose exclusive understanding of certain intelligibles as such 
is considered (be it implicitly or explicitly) the topmost science; (ii) that the expert of 
this science, however precisely accounted for in a given dialogue, has acquired 
knowledge of other sciences, particularly mathematical ones. What I want to suggest 
here is that the Euthydemus picture of an epistemically downgraded dialectician does 
not mesh well with any picture of the expert of the science of dialectic found in any 
dialogue that is typically considered to postdate the Republic: post-Republic, the 
expert of dialektikē has, or at least strives for, a complete grasp of reality. Surely in 
the process of knowing his unique subject matter the topmost philosopher learns how 
to ‘hunt down’ mathematical diagrammata or schemata. This argument can only be 
fully defended as we proceed. 
Now, what do I think of the dialecticians in the Euthydemus? If their 
description does not immediately hint at the topmost scientists of the Republic, who 
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are these dialektikoi, and what exact role do they serve? I believe that ‘dialektikoi’ in 
the Euthydemus should be taken in a relatively modest sense: these dialecticians have 
the skill to debate, interpret and in turn broadcast in speech to a wider intellectual 
audience the mathematical findings that are difficult, or are otherwise 
incomprehensible, to understand immediately outside the field of mathematics (i.e., 
astronomy, geometry and calculation); the dialecticians, unlike the mathematicians, 
are capable of putting together some sort of account concerning these mathematical 
figures and broadcasting it to others. It is even plausible that the dialecticians ‘use’ 
mathematical figures by explaining how such abstract discoveries can be applied for 
more practical purposes by non-mathematicians (e.g., carpenters, house-builders, 
navigators, etc.).46 This skill is of genuine worth without interpolating either a 
Platonic metaphysics, or more precisely the educational curriculum of the Republic 
and the relation between the science of Forms and the mathematical sciences.  
The reader may interject: why cannot the mathematician do what any good 
math teacher ought to do? Why must he rely on the dialectician to interpret his 
findings for a variety of audiences? In reply, I do not deny that the mathematician is 
capable of acting as a teacher; nothing in the text rules it out. But surely qua teacher 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Again, the other examples in this passage of the Euthydemus (288e-290d) suggest a practical 
application (usage) by Discipline B of things first grasped by Discipline A. All this goes some way to 
explain Socrates’ remark: ‘[mathematicians] hand over the task of using their discoveries to the 
dialecticians-at least those of them do so who are not completely senseless (ἀνόητοί)’ (290c5-6). 
Someone is ‘completely senseless’ if he holds onto those discoveries without wishing to see them put 
to some practical use. Incidentally, Kahn (1996) 308 reads an allusion in the Euthydemus to the 
Divided Line of Republic Book VI. Is ‘ἀνόητοί’, then, at 290c6 supposed to remind us of the Divided 
Line of the Republic, where noesis, surpassing the mathematicians’ dianoia (thought), sits at the top? If 
so, Kahn would have to explain why noesis in the Euthydemus is implicitly attributed to 
mathematicians, who pass on their mathematical discoveries to dialecticians, when in the Republic it is 
restricted to those who only concern themselves with Forms as such (cf. Rep. VI, 509d-511e). In other 
words, Kahn needs to account for the apparent difference between the Euthydemus and Republic on the 
subject of noesis. 
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the mathematician would only be instructing others how to similarly ‘hunt down’ 
mathematical findings (and perhaps also lecture on his own mathematical discoveries) 
to aspiring mathematicians. The mathematician would not be applying his skill in any 
other way. In other words, as a teacher the mathematician (apart perhaps from 
lecturing on mathematics) would do nothing more than instruct others how to make 
their own mathematical discoveries. Accordingly, the mathematician would not be 
saddled with the task of interpreting this knowledge for use by non-mathematicians.  
To briefly review, given the lack of textual evidence, I believe that Plato does 
not allude to (prepare us for) a notion of dialectic as a science of Forms in the 
Euthydemus; that the metaphysics and epistemology of these intelligible objects, 
which are prominently displayed in the middle books of the Republic, and which 
ground the unique domain of knowledge for the science of dialectic, are not hinted at 
in the Euthydemus. To be clear, neither Kahn nor Hawtrey go so far as to say that 
dialectic in the Euthydemus is the same as dialectic in the Republic.47  But I still wish 
to take them to task here for even suggesting that the remarks on dialectic in the 
former hint at the science found in the latter; that little to no sense could be made of 
the passages on dialectic in the Euthydemus unless one interpolates the account of the 
science of dialectic of Republic VI-VII. 
Switching direction a bit, I should point out that, when ‘philosophia’ and 
cognates are used in the Euthydemus, they hardly evoke the science of dialectic of the 
Republic. In the Euthydemus philosophy is said to be the acquisition (ktēsis) of 
knowledge (epistēmē), which is beneficial to its possessors. This sort of knowledge in 
particular brings together knowing how to produce X and knowing how to use X (cf. 
288d, 289b). Now, 288d-291d is surely an argument to the effect that philosophia is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Cf. Kahn (1996) 308-9; Hawtrey (1978) 14-8 and (1981) 119-20 
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knowledge of statesmanship (the kingly art, the epistēmē of happiness). Granted, this 
equation is shown to generate various puzzles (cf. 292b ff.). The equation, in other 
words, is not trouble-free. This is partly because of the puzzles that it generates about 
good persons and knowledge, and partly because the influential man described by 
Crito (cf. 304c ff., see below) thinks philosophy, construed as the sort of eristic 
argumentation exemplified by the sophistic brothers in the dialogue, is a waste of time. 
Yet it is not clear that both the puzzles and the critical remarks made by the 
mysterious figure48 are supposed to make us reject the equation between philosophy 
and statesmanship.  
Accordingly, I believe that there is one particularly important question that 
needs to be addressed:  Does Plato equate philosophy-statesmanship with dialectic in 
the Euthydemus? If Plato does not do so, then Kahn’s proleptic thesis takes another hit. 
For the separation of philosophy, statesmanship and dialectic in the Euthydemus can 
hardly serve to prepare us for the amalgamation of the three in the Republic.49  
My answer is indeed ‘no’. What Socrates says about the dialektikos at 290bc 
leaves us without a clear picture of the relation between the dialectician and the 
philosopher-statesman of the Euthydemus. What the Euthydemus does leave room for 
is an account of this relation that does not immediately match up to the relation as 
presented in the Republic: in the Euthydemus statesmanship is proffered as that 
distinct knowledge which philosophy seeks to make man happy only after dialectic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This figure is likely a caricature of Isocrates. Cf. Hawtrey (1981) 189-90 
49 Perhaps Kahn could say that certain philosophical problems arise at the end of the Euthydemus due 
to the separation of philosophy-statesmanship and dialectic. These problems in the Euthydemus, Kahn 
could say, are meant to foreshadow their own resolution in the Republic (viz., with the amalgamation 
of philosophy, statesmanship and dialectic). But even if this is so, it does not follow that the Republic 




has been considered and in turn passed over as that very knowledge. Again, this 
implies that statesmanship is somehow prior to the art of dialectic with regard to 
making man happy. But this placement of statesmanship over dialectic does not fit 
well with what is reported in the Republic: a statesman must have expertise in 
dialektikē (viz., knowledge of the Good) if he is to be any good at his job; knowledge 
of dialektikē in the Republic is prior to knowledge of statesmanship.  
Moreover, what emerges from 304c ff. is that the Isocrates-type (i) equates 
philosophy (or what he thinks philosophy means for Socrates) with dialectic, and (ii) 
equates dialectic with what Euthydemus and his brother do: 
 
‘You [sc. Crito] would have heard men conversing (διαλεγοµένων) who are the wisest 
of the present day in this kind of argument [i.e., the sophistic dialectic witnessed 
throughout the Euthydemus]. And I said, what did they show you? Nothing else, said 
he, than the sort of thing one can hear from such people at any time –chattering and 
making a worthless fuss about matters of no consequence…But surely, I said, 
philosophy (φιλοσοφία) is a charming thing. Charming, my innocent friend? he said-
why it is of no value whatsoever!’ (Euthd. 304e1-305a1) 
 
Accordingly, if Plato wants to equate philosophy proper with genuine dialectic (or 
some super kind of dialectic, particularly dialectic as a science of Forms à la Republic 
VI-VII), then he needs to show the difference between genuine dialectic and 
Euthydemian sophistry. And this is so whether or not he wants to maintain that 
philosophy proper is also statesmanship.  
As it stands, the only indication in the dialogue that Plato answers this 
challenge is when he has Socrates indirectly (303d) and then Crito directly (304d) 
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state that they would rather be refuted by sophistic arguments than refute others by 
way of such sophistry. All this ultimately tells us is that genuine dialectic is not 
Euthydemian sophistry; it tells us nothing about what it truly is. Granted, the 
willingness to be refuted may be meant to evoke Socratic elenchus, and, ideally, the 
willingness of the person refuted to ditch his untenable theses upon realizing the 
untenable nature of said theses. Could Plato in the Euthydemus be hinting that 
genuine dialectic is in fact Socratic elenchus? Perhaps. But identifying genuine 
dialectic with Socratic elenchus is problematic for the proleptic reading of the 
Eurthydemus. For Socratic elenchus is neither statesmanship nor a science of Forms. 
Nor moreover can it be used to first grasp the nature of Forms (I discuss Socratic 
elenchus in more detail next chapter). So identifying genuine dialectic with Socratic 
elenchus hardly serves as good evidence for a proleptic reading of the Euthydemus. It 
certainly does not adequately prepare us for the leap from dialectic as Socratic 
elenchus to dialectic as a distinct science of Forms. 
In sum, I believe my preceding treatment of dialectic in the Euthydemus shows 
why it is unnecessary to interpolate the account of dialektikē drawn in the Republic, 
and in turn radically adjust the most natural reading of the text: the leap from an art 
that interprets mathematical diagrams (possibly amongst other things) for a wider 
audience to a productive art of happiness is simply a leap too far.  
 
DIALECTIC IN THE GORGIAS AND MENO 
 
Let us continue with our critique of the proleptic story, and turn to the 




‘{Socrates} He [sc. Polus] hardly seems to me to be answering the question. 
{Gorgias} Why don’t you question him then, if you like? {Soc} No, I won’t, not as 
long as you yourself may want to answer. I’d much rather ask you. It’s clear to me, 
especially from what he has said, that Polus has devoted himself more to what is 
called oratory than to discussion (ῥητορικὴν µᾶλλον µεµελέτηκεν ἢ 
διαλέγεσθαι.)…No one, however, asked you [sc. Polus] what Gorgias’ craft is like, 
but what craft it is, (οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς) and what one 
ought to call Gorgias.’ (Grg., 448d5-e7) 
 
‘{Socrates} Already at the start of our discussions, Polus, I praised you because I 
thought you were well educated in oratory. But I also thought that you had neglected 
the practice of discussion (τοῦ…διαλέγεσθαι).’ (Grg., 471d3-5) 
 
‘{Socrates} and if my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious debaters, I 
would say to him: “I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it.” 
Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they 
must answer {more dialectically} (διαλεκτικώτερον). By {more dialectically} (τὸ 
διαλεκτικώτερον) I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms 
admittedly known to the questioner.’ (Men., 75c8-d7) 
 
In what follows I argue that in the passages just cited there is no clear indication 
(allusion, etc.) of dialectic as a science of Forms in the Meno and Gorgias; that 
whatever ‘special force’ (Kahn’s term, see below) the term ‘dialectic’ has in the Meno 




To be clear, Kahn thinks that the remarks on dialegesthai in the Gorgias do 
not directly reference the account of dialectic in the middle books of the Republic:  
 
‘The passage at Gorgias 448d seems to be the only example before the 
Republic where dialegesthai or its cognates is directly connected with 
the search for a definition. However, the emphasis there is probably on 
skill in question-and-answer rather than on the what-is-X? question.’50  
 
All the same, since Kahn’s overarching claim is that several remarks on dialectic in 
certain dialogues (Gorgias included) serve the function of gradually preparing the 
reader for the account of dialektikē in the Republic,51 surely we are left to infer that, 
when Plato uses a form of the word ‘dialectic’, with the purported ‘special force’ that 
Kahn thinks such a form has in these dialogues leading up to the Republic,52 then 
Plato is in fact hinting at (even if circuitously) the account of dialektikē in Republic 
VI-VII. 
Now, in the Gorgias Socrates does allude to his typical ‘what is X?’ question. 
Socrates is eager to know what is Gorgias’ art (cf. 448c). In general, Socrates is 
asking ‘what is rhetoric?’53 Yet it is specifically the remarks (quoted above) on skill 
in to dialegesthai that we ought to consider now. To start, then, is skill in to 
dialegesthai considered a genuine technē (art) in the Gorgias? Surely it is, if we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Kahn (1996) 304 n. 15 
51 Cf. Kahn (1996) 293 ff. 
52 ‘There are six dialogues earlier than the Republic in which dialegesthai and related forms are used 
with a special force.’ Kahn (1996) 303 
53 For an in depth treatment of the ‘what is X?’ question, as posed in the Gorgias, see Doyle (2010). It 
is important that we distinguish simply asking ‘what is X?’ and both asking and answering ‘what is X?’. 
Anyone skilled in to dialegesthai must be capable of both. See above. 
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assume that answering ‘what is X?’ is equivalent to giving an account of X’s nature. 
Yet surely this equates dialectic with every technē (medicine, agriculture, etc.): 
something that has and in turn can explicate an account (logos) of the nature (phusis) 
of whatever it is concerned with; it is able to provide an account of the cause (aitia) of 
that which it is concerned with (cf. 465a). Here dialectic is exemplified by knowing 
the difference between saying what X is, and saying with X is like (for any X).  
As a brief aside, we may ask whether Socrates is skilled in to dialegesthai? At 
first blush, he is, if we take skill in to dialegesthai, unlike rhetoric, to be generally 
concerned with asking and answering ‘what is X?’ Note that Socrates not only poses 
the ‘what is X?’ question, he provides an account of rhetoric’s nature as well: rhetoric 
is a knack (cf. 462e-466a). Nonetheless, we should not loose sight of the primary 
objective here. What I am particularly concerned with answering is whether, in the 
Gorgias, skill in to dialegesthai hints at the science par excellence of the Republic. 
I argue that there are a few problems to address at this juncture, problems 
which cast doubt on connecting skill in to dialegesthai in the Gorgias with dialektikē 
in the Republic. Firstly, identifying the exact X that the expert in to dialegesthai is 
skilled in should distinguish this art from any other art. It should accordingly shed 
light on its exact relation to dialektikē of Republic VI-VII. But here we broach a 
notable predicament: in the Gorgias, skill in to dialegesthai is not once explicitly 
ascribed a definitive X that it has expertise in. We could assume that ‘X’ stands for a 
knowledge-set; that the expert in to dialegesthai can provide an account of multiple 
subjects that all fall under knowledge-set X. But this just compounds the problem; 
when and where does skill in to dialegesthai stop? The Gorgias does not say. 
Moreover, there is simply no hint in the Gorgias that a given X’s phusis refers to the 
Form of such an X (i.e., the metaphysical Platonic entity X). And, as I believe 
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Richard Robinson has already adequately shown, in the so-called Socratic dialogues 
there is no convincing evidence to equate the phusis of X with a Form X.54 To 
emphasize this point here, there is patently no evidence that, say, rhetoric’s phusis, as 
clearly described in the Gorgias, is identifiable with any eternal, invisible and self-
predicative Form of rhetoric, which would agree with the description of Forms as 
described in the Republic. Accordingly, even if skill in to dialegesthai is considered a 
genuine art in the Gorgias, there are no convincing grounds to connect this art of 
dialectic in the Gorgias with the science of Forms of the Republic. This is because the 
former simply does not seek the latter’s knowledge. Moreover, it would definitely be 
a stretch of the imagination to think the account of the former prepares us for the 
account of the latter; the account of dialectic in the Gorgias is certainly intelligible 
without bringing in Kahn’s proleptic thesis. 
Switching direction a bit, I would like to examine the use of ‘philosophia’ and 
cognates in the Gorgias, in order to see if these terms refer to the account of dialektikē 
in the Republic. Socrates claims Philosophia supports the thesis that committing 
injustice is worse than suffering it (482ab). Callicles interprets philosophia as good 
education for adolescents, yet worthless chatter for adults (484c-486bd). In particular, 
Callicles criticizes the way in which the philosopher speaks ‘haltingly’ (ἀνδρὸς…τις 
ψελλιζοµένου, 485c1). At one point, Callicles identifies Socrates’ current refutation 
(ἐλέγχων) as philosophical activity (486c). Then just ahead, to philosophize is to 
‘cultivate wisdom’ (τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον, 487c5) with the added qualification, 
ascribed to Callicles and Co.,55 that one ‘be careful not to become wiser than 
necessary and so inadvertently bring yourself to ruin’ (ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. Robinson (1953) 49-60 
55 Teisiander of Aphidnae, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholarges. Socrates calls 
these men, plus Callicles, ‘partners in wisdom’ (κοινωνοὺς…σοφίας, 487c2), cf. 487bc. 
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παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως µὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόµενοι λήσετε 
διαφθαρέντες, 487c7-d2, cf. 487bd). At the very end of the Gorgias, the soul of the 
philosophos is sent to the Isles of the Blessed, for the philosophos, in the process of 
seeking out the truth, alone amongst mortals has led the most virtuous life (526c, 
527de). We need not worry at this juncture about disentangling what Socrates and 
Callicles respectively say about philosophy. What we should specifically focus on is 
the fact that neither of them hints at dialektikē of the Republic when mentioning 
philosophia. 
Even if we identify the good orator of the Gorgias with Socrates, or more 
generally a genuine philosopher (cf. 500c-504e), the account of the good orator does 
not match with the description of the dialectician as expert of dialektikē of the 
Republic: 
 
‘{Soc} So this is what the skilled and good orator will look to when he applies to 
people’s souls whatever speeches he makes as well as all of his actions, and any gift 
he makes or any confiscation he carries out. He will always give attention to how 
justice may come to exist in the soul of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten rid 
of, how self-control may come to exist there and lack of discipline be gotten rid of, 
and how the rest of excellence may come into being there and badness may depart. 
Do you agree or not? {Callicles} I do (Συγχωρῶ).’ (Grg., 504d5-e5). 
Granted, there is at least one point of similarity between the guardians of Kallipolis 
(i.e., the dialectician-philosophers) and the good orator: both are attributed the role of 
promoting virtuous behaviour amongst hoi polloi. But unlike the guardians of 
Kallipolis, the orator is not required to possess knowledge of the Good itself or any 
other Form in order to perform his task. The distinctive activity of the good orator is 
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to point out which appetites (epithumiai) should be satisfied, and which ones should 
remain unsatisfied, in order to morally better his audience (504cd). We should note 
that, unlike the guardian, the orator is not attributed an actual governing function 
within any polis. Accordingly, the account of the good orator is comprehensible 
without attaching to it a theory of Forms; that Callicles accepts Socrates’ description 
of the good orator should evidence this. What on Earth would Callicles know about 
these special beings? 
Let us now turn to remark on the Meno passage cited above. All Socrates is 
saying in the Meno is that proper discussion requires that (i) both asker and answerer 
share a common vocabulary (see the ensuing terminological examples, 74d-76e), and 
(ii) that the responses be true (talēthē). Kahn in particular states that ‘dialegesthai [in 
the Meno passage] represents a constructive cooperative form of conversation as 
opposed to quarrelsome competition.’56 Fair enough. But to be very clear, the criteria 
above only refer to a proper methodology that any legitimate art ought to adopt. 
Hence the example with the definition of ‘shape’ (schēma), which illustrates simply 
how a geometer should explicate his terms employed:  
 
‘{Socrates} Do you call something ‘the end?’ I mean such a thing as a limit or 
boundary, for all those are, I say, the same thing…surely you call something ‘finished’ 
or ‘completed’-that is what I want to express, nothing elaborate (τὸ τοιοῦτον 
βούλοµαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον). {Meno} I do, and I think I understand what you 
mean. {Socrates} Further, you call something a plane, and something else a solid, as 
in geometry (τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωµετρίαις)? {M} I do. {Soc} From this you may understand 
what I mean by shape, for I say this of every shape (κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήµατος τοῦτο 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Kahn (1996) 305. Whilst Kahn does not actually make a proleptic claim about the Meno passage, 
below I point out that he is ultimately constrained to make one. 
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λέγω), that a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a 
solid.’ (Men., 75d4-76a7) 
 
The most important thing to take away here is that to speak ‘more dialectically’ 
(dialektikōteron) means to employ a proper methodology, whose criteria (i) and (ii) 
were cited above, in discussion with regard to whatever topic in whatever relevant 
scientific field. To speak ‘more dialectically’, then, does not suggest working in 
accordance with a particular art. It most definitely does not suggest mastering a 
science whose body of knowledge is that of Forms as such topped by the Good itself.  
To be fair to Kahn, his analysis of the same passage in the Meno does not 
explicitly equate speaking ‘more dialectically’ with the science of dialectic. 57 
However, I must repeat that, since his overarching claim is that several remarks on 
dialectic in certain dialogues (Meno included) serve the function of gradually 
preparing the reader for the account of dialektikē in the Republic,58 surely we are left 
to infer that, when Plato talks of ‘speaking dialectically’, he (Plato) is ultimately 
alluding to them metaphysics and epistemology of Forms, particularly the Good, 
which the expert of dialektikē in the Republic is invested. But, again, all that the 
passage in the Meno actually says is that, when an individual is called to give an 
account of whatever he is referencing, a proper methodology should be employed that 
hopefully brings both partners in discussion to the same state of truth regarding the 
thing in question. Surely this point is cogent without having to presuppose a science 
of the Good as such. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Cf. Kahn (1996) 305-6 
58 Cf. Kahn (1996) 293 ff. 
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Incidentally, what about the use of ‘philosophia’ and cognates in the Meno? 
Do they hint at dialektikē of the Republic? The fact is no occurrence of ‘philosophia’ 
appears in the Meno. 
 
DIALECTIC IN THE CRATYLUS 
  
‘{Socrates} And what would you call someone who knows (ἐπιστάµενον) how to ask 
and answer questions? Wouldn’t you call him a dialectician (διαλεκτικόν)? 
{Hermogenes} Yes, I would. {Soc} So it’s the work of a carpenter to make a rudder. 
And if the rudder is to be a fine one, a ship-captain must supervise him. {Hermo} 
Evidently. {Soc} But it’s the work of a rule-setter, it seems, to make a name. And if 
names are to be given well, a dialectician must supervise him.’ (390c10-d5) 
 
First observation: the dialectician knows how to deftly use language for the 
sake of inquiring into things. He is also assigned a distinguished, albeit unqualified, 
supervisory role: he validates the terms that the word-giver has proffered (how 
exactly is left unsaid). Accordingly, we may infer that the dialectician of the Cratylus 
has a complete grasp of this linguistic expertise: the word-giver’s (i.e., maker’s) 
knowledge is also possessed by the dialektikos (i.e., the user), so as to make the user 
also a judger of the maker’s work.59  
There is, I should point out, a point of similarity between the accounts of the 
dialectician as respectively drawn in the Euthydemus and Cratylus: in both dialogues 
the dialectician has a complementary connection (mathematics and linguistics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 One may question the identification of the dialectician of the Cratylus as an expert in linguistics. 
Surely the dialectician has to qualify as an expert in linguistics in light of his capacity to confirm or 
deny the correctness of words, linguistics generally construed here as the study of human language. 
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respectively) with some distinct expert.60 Now, I have argued that in the Euthydemus 
there is no strong evidence to equate the dialectician therein with the expert of 
dialektikē in the Republic; that the account of dialectic in the former does not hint at 
the unique domain of knowledge that essentially distinguishes dialektikē from all 
other sciences in the latter. Turning to the Cratylus, I wish to similarly maintain that 
there is no good evidence to suggest that the account of dialectic serves as proleptic 
evidence for the account of dialektikē of the Republic.  
 By contrast, Charles Kahn reads an explicit allusion to dialektikē into this 
portion of the dialogue, i.e., 389b-391d,61 (partially cited above):  
 
‘[Cratylus 390cd is] truly proleptic, in that [it] must strike the reader as 
enigmatic in [its] context.’62 
 
‘Here, for the first time…the dialektikos is conceived as someone who 
must have access to the Forms-to the Form of Name in general as well 
as to the Form corresponding to any particular name-in order 
successfully to exercise his conversational skills.’63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 However, note that the neither dialogue attributes both sciences (sc. mathematics and linguistics) to 
the dialectician. Moreover, nowhere in the Cratylus is the dialectician’s dual expertise identified as 
philosophy’s knowledge (i.e., knowledge which will ultimately make man happy), cf. Euthd. 288d ff.. 
61 ‘{Soc} Don’t you evaluate Greek and foreign rule-setters in the same way? Provided they give each 
thing the form of name suited to it (τὸ τοῦ ὀνόµατος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ), no matter what syllables it 
embodies in, they are equally good rule-setters, whether they are in Greece or abroad? {Hermo} 
Certainly. {Soc} Now, who is likely to know whether the appropriate form of shuttle is present (τὸ 
προσῆκον εἶδος κερκίδος) in any given bit of wood? A carpenter who makes it or a weaver who uses 
it? {Hermo} In all likelihood, Socrates, it is the one who uses it’ (Crat., 390a4-b4). 
62 Kahn (1996) 61 
63 Kahn (1996) 307. Ademollo (2011) 140 ff. also sees a direct connection between dialectic in the 




So Kahn thinks that the account of dialectic in the Cratylus will only make sense upon 
interpolating the account of dialectic from Republic VI-VII. I beg to differ. I argue 
that the remarks on the dialektikos of the Cratylus are intelligible without 
interpolating the account of dialectic of Republic VI-VII.64 
 Granted, the description in the Cratylus of the dialectician as ‘someone who 
knows how to ask and answer questions’ looks, prima facie, like an uncomplicated 
anticipation of the description of the expert of dialektikē in the Republic: 
 
‘{Socrates} Then you’ll legislate that they [sc. the philosopher-kings in training] are 
to give most attention to the education that will enable them to ask and answer 
questions most knowledgeably (ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστηµονέστατα)? 
{Glaucon} I’ll legislate it along with you. {Soc} Then do you think that we’ve placed 
dialectic (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ) at the top of the other subjects like a coping stone…’ (Rep., 
VII 534d8-e3) 
 
But let us not be too quick to read the connection between the Cratylus and Republic 
as evidence of Kahn’s proleptic reading of Plato. The description of the dialektikos as 
someone who asks and answers questions (in a philosophical manner) is found in 
several dialogues. Importantly, this description of the dialectician clearly occurs in the 
Meno and Gorgias, dialogues that we have just examined and in turn shown do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Snider (1999) 627 also questions (albeit in passing) Kahn’s proleptic claim regarding this passage in 
the Cratylus.  
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convincingly serve as proleptic indicators of the account of dialectic in Republic VI-
VII.65   
 Let us look again at the quotations from the Gorgias and Meno: 
 
‘{Socrates} He [sc. Polus] hardly seems to me to be answering the question. 
{Gorgias} Why don’t you question him then, if you like? {Soc} No, I won’t, not as 
long as you yourself may want to answer. I’d much rather ask you. It’s clear to me, 
especially from what he has said, that Polus has devoted himself more to what is 
called oratory than to discussion (ῥητορικὴν µᾶλλον µεµελέτηκεν ἢ 
διαλέγεσθαι.)…No one, however, asked you [sc. Polus] what Gorgias’ craft is like, 
but what craft it is, (οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς) and what one 
ought to call Gorgias.’ (Grg., 448d5-e7) 
 
‘{Socrates} and if my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious debaters, I 
would say to him: “I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it.” 
Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they 
must answer {more dialectically} (διαλεκτικώτερον). By {more dialectically} (τὸ 
διαλεκτικώτερον) I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms 
admittedly known to the questioner.’ (Men., 75c8-d7) 
 
The Meno description of the dialectician in particular suggests that all experts across 
an indeterminate number of disciplines ought to speak ‘more dialectically’: to speak 
dialectically (i.e., to properly ask and answer questions), which is identified as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 We should keep in mind the dialectician of the Euthydemus as well. For, whilst not explicitly called 
an expert in question and answer, the description of him leaves room for us to posit that he knows how 
to properly ask and answer questions regarding mathematical diagrammata. 
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methodology, not a science, is not the exclusive property of a single art or science. 
The point to emphasize here is that in Plato, even in those dialogues Kahn sees as 
anticipating the Republic, to properly ask and answer questions need not suggest 
having scientific knowledge of Forms as such. Nor does it require the interpolation of 
such knowledge in order for remarks on dialegesthai to be intelligible in their original 
context. 
 What about the remarks on dialectic in the Cratylus? Again, Charles Kahn 
thinks that the dialectician of the Cratylus is ‘someone who must have access to the 
Forms-to the Form of Name in general as well as to the Form corresponding to any 
particular name-in order successfully to exercise his conversational skills.’66 Here I 
generally agree with Kahn; the expert of dialectic shares alongside other experts in 
different fields some sort of understanding of Forms.67 To be clear, Kahn conceives of 
Forms as referenced in the Cratylus to be (roughly) ontologically the same as the 
Forms described in works like the Phaedo and Republic.68 Now, I must note that there 
is certainly no unanimity amongst scholars with regard to the exact ontological status 
of the eidē (Forms) mentioned in the Cratylus, particularly between 389b-390b. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Kahn (1996) 307 
67 Cf. Ademollo (2011) 127-8 on the point that in the Cratylus (and elsewhere in Plato) all genuine 
craftsmen and scientists look, with varying degrees of awareness of the epistemological and 
metaphysical implications of doing so, to an eternal paradigm (i.e., Form) in their particular field of 
expertise. As Ademollo observes, ‘in any art or craft there is a (more or less conscious) conceptual 
component, insofar as the craftsman manufactures his product by having a general idea of the kind of 
thing he is producing, the proportions it must embody, the purpose it will serve, etc. From Socrates’ 
(and Plato’s) vantage point, this conceptual experience is, as a matter of fact, grounded in the existence 
of the forms; hence his description– a de re description– of the craftsman ‘looking to’ the form.’ (127) 
68 Cf. Kahn (1996) 364 ff.. By ‘ontologically the same’, I mean that Form X as referenced in the 
Cratylus is, be it explicitly said or not, saddled with roughly the same essential properties (e.g., self-
predication, eternal being) that Form X is (or would be) described as having in the Phaedo and 




Richard Ketchum,69 for example, has plausibly argued that a coherent account of a 
given name-Form (what he calls ‘Proper Form’)70 need not rely on an ontology of 
‘transcendent’ (Platonic) Forms.71  
 That being said, my position need not question the ontological status of Forms 
in the Cratylus. Indeed, I am happy to grant Kahn, and any other scholar for that 
matter,72 that the Forms in question at this point in the Cratylus are ontologically 
similar to Forms as spoken of in the Republic and Phaedo; that Forms share most (if 
not all) of the same properties (viz., immutability and eternal being). And, again, I am 
happy to grant Kahn et al. that in the Cratylus there is a dialektikos with some sort of 
access to Forms. Accepting this, it is natural to point out similarities between the 
account of dialectic in the Cratylus and the account of dialectic as the science of 
Forms in the Republic (viz., that both are distinguished disciplines, and that both have 
access to Forms). However, does the former account serve as proleptic evidence for 
the latter one? More precisely, does the account of dialectic in the Cratylus come 
across as so enigmatic, as Kahn claims, that it requires the interpolation of the 
Republic? Hardly.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 ‘Ketchum (1979) 137-8 
70 A name-Form is a form that enables all appropriate names in any language to generally refer to (i.e., 
carry the meaning of) a designated thing in the world. E.g., the name-Form ‘shuttle’ permits the word 
‘shuttle’ (and any variant in any language) to refer to any actual shuttle. 
71 However, Ketchum (1979) 144 does ultimately favour a ‘Platonic Form’ reading. Yet there is 
definitely room for an alternative interpretation, particularly at this stage of the dialogue, as he 
indirectly admits: ‘when we find the antecedents of these conditionals [i.e., points ‘1-4’ at 137, 
paraphrased conditionals gleaned from what is said between 389b-390b] in the text, I read only the 
consequents. The terminology of the consequents may of course commit one to a Platonic ontology of 
abstract objects or Forms. I simply want to avoid this issue. I hope to be able to present the relevant 
aspects of the shuttle analogy without arguing for the ontology’ (1979) 136-7. See Calvert (1970), for 
an alternative, ‘non transcendent [i.e., Platonic] Form’ reading of the text particularly between 389a-
390e. Ketchum’s (1979) 146 n. 8 critique of Calvert comes across as rather weak. 
72 Cf. Ademollo (2011) §§3.4.1–3, 9.1.3; Gold (1978) 
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 To question the force of the proleptic reading of the Cratylus, let us look once 
more at the account of dialectic in the Cratylus. What the dialogue (be it explicitly or 
implicitly) tells us is that (i) dialectic is identified as a distinct art concerned with 
linguistics, hence the natural appellation ‘dialektikos’ for its practitioner (390cd). In 
general,  (ii) the dialektikos knows how to ask and answer questions (ibid.). (ii*) What 
ultimately distinguishes this dialektikos as a linguistic expert is the fact that his 
knowledge of asking and answering questions is intimately connected to his access to 
Name-Forms. 73  (ii) and (ii*) account for the dialectician’s role as a linguistic 
supervisor: (iii) having access to Name-Forms, the dialectician can adequately check 
the correctness of words that are crafted by the word-makers for use in any human 
language. Given the dialectician’s complete grasp of linguistics, (iv) we may infer 
that one of his central aims, like that of the word-maker, is to use names as a tool for 
teaching, that is for showing someone what distinguishes one object from another: 
 
‘{Socrates} What do we say when we name? {Hermogenes} I don’t know what to 
answer. {Soc} Don’t we instruct each other, that is to say, separate the objects as they 
stand (τὰ πράγµατα διακρίνοµεν ᾗ ἔχει)? {Herm} Certainly. {Soc} So just as a shuttle 
is a tool for dividing warp and woof [cf. 387d-388b], a name is a tool for giving 
instruction, that is to say, for separating being (διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας).’ (388b7-c1)74 
  
 I do not deny that facets (i)-(iv) of the dialectician of the Cratylus generally 
harmonize with the description of the supreme dialetikos of the Republic. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Cf. Ademollo (2011 27) 141 
74 Tr. Reeve with minor adjustments on my part, which are influenced by Ademollo’s (2011) 110 
translation of the same passage. On the meaning of ‘being’ (ousia) in this passage, cf. Ademollo (2011) 




Nevertheless, I argue that (i)-(iv) are intelligible within the confines of the Cratylus.75 
The account of the dialectician in the Cratylus need not require the account of 
dialektikē of Republic VI-VII for elucidation. Even if the facets of the Cratylus’ 
dialectician bring to mind the supreme dialectician of Republic VI-VII, any similarity 
between the dialectician of the Cratylus and the expert of dialektikē need not entail an 
anticipation in the Cratylus of dialektikē of Republic VI-VII. Moreover, we should 
not neglect to point out the dissimilarities between the two pictures of dialectic. The 
epistēmē of dialectic of the Republic is intimately associated with other more abstract 
disciplines, especially mathematical ones. What is more, it constitutes the zenith of 
the novel philosopher-king-in-training’s body of knowledge. There is not the slightest 
suggestion in the Cratylus that dialectic has any connection, let alone a strong one, 
with mathematics (or politics, or ethics, for that matter).  Moreover, nowhere in the 
Cratylus is dialectic hinted as being the topmost science for the philosopher, more 
precisely as a science of the Good as such. Accordingly, the remarks on dialectic in 
the Cratylus could just as reasonably be taken to indicate certain desiderata, which 
fall short of the account of dialektikē introduced in the middle books of the Republic. 
 There are two other passages in the Cratylus that more effectively serves as 
evidence against Kahn’s proleptic reading of the dialogue. Toward the end of the 
Cratylus, Socrates and Cratylus agree that it is better to learn about ‘real things’ (τὰ 
ὄντα) ‘through one another…and through themselves’ (δι' ἀλλήλων…καὶ αὐτὰ δι' 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 By the by, I cannot help but feel that Kahn’s proleptic reading of the dialogues runs the risk of 
failing to appropriately evaluate a given dialogue on its own terms.  As Christopher Gill (1998) 
similarly observes, ‘…by placing the early dialogues in groups, and locating their philosophical 
significance within the argument framed by the group, Kahn negates the idea that any given dialogue 
constitutes an attempt to map the essential principles of method or reality.’ 
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αὑτῶν, 438e7), rather than through their names (cf. 438d-439b).76 The dialogue does 
not rule out the potential for a name to act as a good likeness for the real thing. 
Regardless, no name, qua likeness, can bring someone closer to knowing the real 
thing more than the thing itself can. However, the dialogue eventually ends with the 
agreement that the investigation must start anew. What follows, then, is that the exact 
role the dialectician is supposed to fill is not made determinate. And given the fact 
that no one expert is nominated as being he who is equipped to know real things 
through one another and through themselves, I strongly hesitate to equate the 
dialectician, especially as described between 390cd, with the anonymous knower of 
things ‘through one another and through themselves’. The fact that there are no good 
grounds to equate the dialectician at 390cd with the anonymous knower of things in 
and through themselves is surely problematic for the proleptic reading of Plato. This 
is because, whilst the remarks at 438d ff. could be considered evidence for the 
proleptic reading,77 surely in order for the evidence to carry any substantial weight, it 
would need to connect nicely with the Cratylus’ remarks on the dialectician, which it 
does not. 
 The second passage follows: 
 
‘…because he [sc. Pluto] is unwilling to associate with human beings while they have 
their bodies, but converses with them only when their souls are purified of all the 
desires and evils of the body, doesn’t he seem to you to be a philosopher? (οὐ 
φιλοσόφου δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι) For hasn’t he well understood that when people are free of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Similar to the Republic (cf. n. 29), how exactly one should go about understanding things in 
themselves is notably put aside (cf. Crat., 439b). 
77 Surely the remarks on the anonymous expert bring to mind the expert of dialektikē in the Republic, 
who alone amongst experts knows, with full awareness of the epistemological and metaphysical 
implications, the essences of things. 
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their bodies he can bind them with the desire for virtue, but whilst they feel the 
agitation and madness of the body not even the famous shackles of his father Cronus 
could keep them with him?’ (403e7-404a6) 
 
Kahn does not address the quotation above. Nor, then, does he address the relation, if 
any, between this philosopher and the dialectician described earlier in the text.78  
 These omissions are problematic for Kahn, for it is difficult to see how we can 
connect this brief remark on the philosopher, which is notably reminiscent of the 
account drawn of him in the Phaedo (cf. 65a-67d), with the description of the 
dialectician at 390cd. Even if we take it for granted that the philosopher and the 
dialectician of the Cratylus are identical, Kahn is still faced with a problem: the 
philosopher-dialectician of the Cratylus ostensibly anticipates (or presupposes)79 the 
philosopher of the Phaedo. Yet the philosopher of the Phaedo, far from anticipating 
the expert of dialektikē of Republic VI-VII, appears to be notably contrasted with him. 
The former is, in particular, attributed neither knowledge of a science of dialectic nor 
knowledge of statesmanship. Nor, then, is he saddled with any political duties that 
call on him to apply knowledge of dialektikē (particularly knowledge of the Good).80 
In general, then, we could hardly anticipate the account of Plato’s top philosopher in 
the Republic simply judging by the remarks on the philosopher in the Phaedo.81 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ademollo (2011) 193-5 draws out the Phaedo allusion in this passage. Yet he says nothing about 
how to connect this remark on the philosophos with the dialektikos mentioned earlier in the dialogue. 
79 Cf. Ademollo (2011) 194-5 
80 Kahn (1996) 274-5 connects the philosopher of Republic VI with the philosopher of the Phaedo by 
way of their respective passion (erōs) for knowledge. I agree that Plato depicts the philosopher in both 
dialogues as having a relentless desire for knowledge, particularly knowledge of Forms. Yet surely this 
by itself cannot serve as convincing evidence for prolepsis.  
81 We may add to this by noting that there is no suggestion in the Phaedo that years of regimented 
mathematical study are required before grasping Forms as such. 
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Accordingly, if the philosopher-dialectician of the Cratylus anticipates the 
philosopher of the Phaedo, yet the philosopher of the Phaedo does not anticipate the 
philosopher par excellence of the Republic, then we have no good reason to see the 
philosopher-dialectician of the Cratylus as anticipating the philosopher par excellence 




 Given the preceding analysis of the various references to skill in to 
dialegesthai and the dialektikos in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno and Cratylus, 
there is little evidence to support the claim that cognates of ‘dialectic’ found in these 
dialogues anticipate (hint at, foreshadow) a science of above all the Good as such, of 
Forms as such in general. By contrast, when we turn to the middle books of the 
Republic, we are told in no uncertain or cryptic terms that the intellectual zenith of 
philosophy is mastery of dialektikē; that the philosopher par excellence is an expert of 
a unique scientist whose domain of knowledge concerns Forms as such, above all the 
Good as such.  As we shall subsequently see, the remarks on philosophy in the middle 
books of the Republic, with a ‘science of dialectic’ cast as philosophy’s supra-










PHILOSOPHY IN THE REPUBLIC 
 
In this chapter I argue that being an expert in the science of dialectic satisfies just half 
of what Plato, at least when writing the Republic, thinks is the complete life for the 
philosopher: a unique combination of the theoretical and political life; the practical 
application, in the form of ruling, of one’s knowledge of Forms as such. In this 
chapter I also compare Socrates, as variously depicted in certain dialogues, with the 
expert of dialektikē in the Republic. I argue that, whilst not an expert of dialektikē, 
and so a candidate for the best possible philosopher in the Republic, Socrates is 
nonetheless a philosopher in the more general sense of the word: an intellectual bent 
on pursuing genuine wisdom. 
 
DIALEKTIKĒ AND PHILOSOPHIA IN AND OUTSIDE KALLIPOLIS 
 
‘And once they’ve seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, 
and themselves in order, using it [sc. the Good] as their model. Each of them will 
spend most of his time with philosophy (πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ), but, when his turn comes, 





 (1) Can the best possible philosopher, identified in the passage above as a 
theoretician and ruler, exist outside the psychological climate of Kallipolis?82 (2) Can 
mastery of dialektikē, as the systematic science envisaged in Books VI-VII, be 
seriously pursued outside Kallipolis? I start this chapter explaining why Plato’s best 
possible philosopher cannot exist without the right psychological climate to facilitate 
the political application of his superior knowledge. Yet I argue that evidence for a 
negative answer to the first question does not commit us to answer negatively the 
second question. 
 On (1), the remarks at 540ab (quoted above) refer to the activity of 
philosophizing as generally a theoretical pursuit culminating in an understanding of 
distinct intelligible objects, the topmost of those being the Good itself. In general, to 
philosophize in Kallipolis technically means to pursue knowledge of the Good under 
the auspices of a distinguished educational programme. But completing this 
programme envisaged in the middle books is not by itself sufficient for making 
someone the best possible philosopher. This is because, according to Plato in the 
Republic, (a) the best possible philosopher is he who applies his theoretical 
knowledge, particularly of the Good,83 to the political arena. In other words, Plato 
holds that the philosopher becomes better qua philosopher by way of ruling a city-
state. 
 To substantiate (a), let us start by highlighting Plato’s insistence on political 
rule for the philosopher: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 By ‘psychological climate’ I mean the community’s attitude toward, and corresponding acceptance 
of, philosophers as rulers. 
83 Surely the philosopher’s knowledge of the virtue-Forms (sc. Justice as such, Temperance as such, 
etc.) is required. The focus here on the Good reflects the attention and importance given to it by Plato 
in the middle books. 
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‘{Socrates} It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the 
study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the 
good. But when they’ve made it and look sufficiently, we mustn’t allow them to do 
what they’re allowed to do today. {Adeimantus} What’s that? {Socrates} To stay 
there and refuse to go down to the prisoners in the cave (καταµένειν καὶ µὴ ἐθέλειν 
πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσµώτας) and share their labors and honors, 
whether they are of less worth or greater…we’ve made you [sc. experts of dialektikē] 
kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, both for yourselves and for the 
rest of the city. You’re better and more completely educated than the others and are 
better able to share in both types of life (ἀµφοτέρων µετέχειν).’ (VII, 519c8-520c1, cf. 
519b-521a) 
 
So the philosopher needs to share in both the theoretical and political life. Yet there 
immediately arises a problem, one that Socrates spends a great deal of Books V and 
VI addressing: the conjoined life cannot occur in a polis where philosophers have no 
chance of ruling; a psychological climate inhospitable to philosophers, be they real or 
charlatans (cf. 474b-480a, 489b-490d), prohibits real philosophers from ruling.84   
 But it does not stop there. This inhospitable climate ultimately prevents the 
philosopher from achieving (a); it stops short the philosopher’s development qua 
philosopher: 
 
‘{Socrates} Under a suitable one [sc. constitution], his [i.e., the philosopher’s] own 
growth will be fuller, and he’ll save the community as well as himself (µᾶλλον 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 This inhospitable climate extends beyond the hypothetical city-state. Indeed, Socrates’ first target 
audience, which he wishes to persuade, is all those present in current poleis who are against 
philosophers ruling. See below. 
 	  
61	  
αὐξήσεται καὶ µετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει){Adeimantus} I have nothing to add on 
that point. But which of our present constitutions do you think is suitable for 
philosophers? {Soc} None of them. That’s exactly my complaint: None of our present 
constitutions is worthy of the philosophic nature (φιλοσόφου φύσεως), and, as a result, 
this nature (αὐτήν) is perverted and altered, for, just as a foreign seed, sown in alien 
ground, is likely to be overcome by the native species and to fade away among them, 
so the philosophic nature fails to develop its full power (οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὑτοῦ 
δύναµιν) and declines into a character alien to its nature (εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος 
ἐκπίπτειν).’ (VI, 497a3-b6, tr. Grube, with slight adjustment on my part) 
 
This passage straightforwardly says that the philosopher reaches his greater power 
(dunamis) when allowed to rule.  
Indeed, the remark about declining into a character alien to its nature strongly 
suggests that it belongs to the very nature of the philosopher to rule a polis. This claim 
appears to be already alluded to in Book V:  
 
‘Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men 
genuinely and adequately philosophize, that us, until political power and philosophy 
entirely coincide (συµπέσῃ), while the many natures (αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις) who at 
present pursue either one exclusively (τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευοµένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον) 
are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils.’ (473c11-
d5)85 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 The passage, by itself, is not strong enough for the development of the philosopher qua philosopher 




 What exactly does it take for the philosopher to achieve his fullest potential, to 
be both the topmost theoretician and ruler? I argue that (b) only in an environment 
suitable for philosophers to govern will the full capacity of the philosopher as such 
(i.e., (a)) be unleashed. Kallipolis exhibits the conjunction of (a) and (b): it shows the 
best possible philosopher governing under the right psychological climate. To be clear, 
I am passing over the subsequent event: compelling the philosopher to rule, whether 
or note he personally wants to rule (cf. VI, 499b, VII, 519c ff.).86 Whilst an important 
part of the philosopher’s development, I want to focus on what Plato thinks must 
occur before the point of compelling the philosopher to ascend to the throne (viz., the 
right psychological attitude toward philosophers as rulers, which facilitates that very 
rise to the throne). 
 Let us go over the evidence to back all of this (i.e., the conjunction of (a) and 
(b)) up. What the previous quotations reveal is that the philosopher’s time spent ‘in 
philosophy’ (i.e., theoretical activity) is complemented by the political career ascribed 
to him; the fulfilled conjunction of the two completes the philosopher’s development 
qua philosopher. But the most developed life for the philosopher as such necessarily 
depends on the right environment to promote such a synthesis (i.e., the political 
application of his theoretical knowledge). Presently, if a true philosopher manages to 
come about in a hostile environment (viz., one that provides little in the way of 
facilitating his intellectual growth), it is normal that he avoids public life: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 I am also passing over the point that the guardian/philosopher-king may use drugs and approved 
falsehoods to control his city-state after he has ascended to the throne (cf. II, 382c ff., III, 414b ff., V, 




‘When people like you come to be in other cities, they’re justified in not sharing in 
their city’s labours, for they’ve grown there spontaneously, against the will of the 
constitution. And what grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing 
has justice on its side when it isn’t keen to pay anyone for that upbringing (ἐκτίνειν 
τῳ προθυµεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα).’ (520a9-b4) 
 
However, this retreat from public life comes at a cost both to the philosopher and to 
the community.  
What Plato is particularly concerned with stressing in the Republic is the idea 
that no actual philosopher is fully developed under any present constitution, that the 
best possible philosopher cannot exist outside Kallipolis. I feel it necessary to return 
to this passage: 
 
‘{Socrates} Under a suitable one [sc. constitution], his [i.e., the philosopher’s] own 
growth will be fuller (µᾶλλον αὐξήσεται), and he’ll save the community as well as 
himself {Adeimantus} I have nothing to add on that point. But which of our present 
constitutions do you think is suitable for philosophers? {Soc} None of them. That’s 
exactly my complaint: None of our present constitutions is worthy of the philosophic 
nature, and, as a result, this nature is perverted and altered, for, just as a foreign seed, 
sown in alien ground, is likely to be overcome by the native species and to fade away 
among them, so the philosophic nature fails to develop its full power and declines into 
a character alien to it nature.’ (VI, 497a3-b6) 
 
‘µᾶλλον αὐξήσεται’; talk of the philosopher’s growth (i.e., development) is essential 
to stress here. Note the analogy with farming: a certain seed in an alien (read 
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inhospitable) soil is very unlikely to survive, let alone grow to its fullest potential by 
nature. Similarly, the philosophic nature of an individual in an inhospitable 
environment is unlikely to achieve its fullest potential. Indeed, it is more likely to 
falter; the individual is prone to corruption, to use his otherwise laudable intellectual 
traits for immoral ends.87 
Once more, it is important to highlight the essential role the community’s 
attitude toward philosophers performs here: according to Plato, the best possible 
philosopher is someone who develops his intellectual traits, studies all that ought to 
be known, and in turn applies his knowledge for the benefit of all around him. But all 
this is possible only if the community is first open to it. Accordingly, the community 
needs to be convinced that philosophers ought to rule, hence Socrates’ presentation of 
the nature and political potential of the real philosopher (a project that extends from 
Book V to Book VII).  
 
‘{Glaucon} So, with the promise of this assistance [sc. Glaucon’s (and later 
Adeimantus’) support of the ensuing presentation], try to show the unbelievers (τοῖς 
ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐνδείξασθαι) that things are as you say they are. {Socrates} I must try it, 
then, especially since you agree to be so great an ally. If we’re to escape from the 
people you mention. I think we need to define for them who the philosophers are that 
we dare to say must rule.’ (V, 474b1-6) 
 
Socrates’ ensuing presentation is explicitly given with a view to convince 
those currently hostile to philosophers that philosophers ought to rule-an aim 
ostensibly achieved, cf. VI 501c-502a. In general, the idea is that once everyone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 A summary of the intellectual traits that Plato has in mind is found at 494ab. A summary of the 
corruption of the philosophic mind is given between 494c-495c. 
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registers who the real philosopher is and what he is capable of, once especially the 
nonbelievers’ attitude toward genuine philosophers changes, it will be possible for the 
ideal city-state to fully come about, now overseen by its rightful rulers. The very fact 
that such a task is considered necessary, even for someone like Glaucon, who is 
presumably a friend of philosophy in general, shows how important the right 
psychological climate is for the philosopher’s development qua philosopher, and so 
the future preservation of the best possible city-state. The point to emphasize here is 
that only if the community facilitates the philosopher’s rise to study and power will 
the philosopher be able to progress toward becoming the topmost philosopher 
envisaged in the middle books of the Republic.  
I stress ‘envisage’, because no present day community is open to this move; 
no present-day constitution suitably fosters the growth of the philosopher (cf. 494a). 
Indeed, what Socrates is saying in no uncertain terms is that the combined theoretical 
and political goal of the best possible philosopher has hitherto never been achieved in 
any actual constitution. And the reason why this conjunction has failed to obtain so 
far is in major part because the environment in which the philosopher presently lives 
prohibits him from fully developing qua philosopher to the point of applying his 
knowledge as ruler of a polis. To be clear, the present-day philosopher’s truncated 
growth is not due strictly to any intellectual limitation.88 All the same, possessing 
knowledge of the Good is not good enough. It takes applying said knowledge, (a), 
which can only occur in the right environment, (b), in order to become the best 
philosopher. 
Switching direction a bit, why does Plato believe that the optimum 
philosophical life is a synthesis of what are otherwise perceived as two separate lives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See Socrates’ remark at 519cd, quoted above. I return to this important point below. 
 	  
66	  
(sc. the theoretical and political)? A rough answer has to suffice here. Plato must 
believe that he who knows what is good for the community is, as such, obligated to 
help bring such good about.89 Now, at least at the time of writing the Republic, Plato 
holds that he alone who truly knows what is politically good is the philosopher versed 
above all in the Good itself, the expert of dialektikē.90 Accordingly, this philosopher is, 
as such, obligated to help bring about what is good for the community by way of 
ruling it. All of this goes some way in answering the question: the political function of 
the philosopher, whose end is the moral excellence of the polis (cf. VI 484cd), is the 
practical application of his theoretical knowledge of the Good (and Fine, Just, etc.) 
itself. Such knowledge being divine (cf. VI, 500cd), the political good brought about 
by the philosopher reflects, at least to an approximate extent, the divine good: 
 
‘{Socrates} And if he should come to be compelled to put what he sees there [sc. in 
the divine, eternal realm] into people’s characters, whether into a single person or into 
a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor 
craftsman of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue? {Adeimantus} He 
least of all.’ (VI, 500d4-9, cf. 500d-502a) 
 
On a separate note, this reading of the best possible philosopher’s life, I think, 
sheds light on Socrates’ remark in Book VI concerning that ‘very small group who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 A point echoed in the Euthydemus (288e f.): he who knows X only makes the most use out of such 
knowledge if he knows in turn how to apply it. 
90 There is good reason to believe that Plato changes his mind in later dialogues, especially the 
Statesman; that the topmost philosopher is not expected to give up his theorizing to become an active 
politician. I examine the philosopher of the Statesman in Ch. III. I return once more to consider Plato’s 




consort with philosophy in a way that’s worthy of her’ (Πάνσµικρον… τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν 
ὁµιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ) [496a11-b1, cf. 496a-497a]. Socrates includes himself in this 
group. Yet this group of philosophers still comes up short of being both the theoretical 
and political titans of Book VII. Granted, Socrates’ remarks between 496a-497a occur 
prior to the account drawn of the science of dialectic (dialektikē). So at best this 
passage foreshadows the contrast between the best possible philosophers of Kallipolis, 
and current deficient-to-some-extent philosophers. But the fact remains that a contrast 
between philosophers is drawn; that Socrates and his company are, by implication, 
patently not identified as the best possible philosophers envisaged in the Republic. For 
sure, the philosopher in any present constitution who best shields himself from the 
storm is to be lauded. He alone possesses a ‘noble and well brought-up character’ 
(γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραµµένον ἦθος, 496b2). Regardless, Socrates is clear in pointing 
out that the best philosophical life cannot be fully realized (viz., knowledge of the 
Forms as such cannot be applied to the political and moral ends envisaged) whilst its 
most prominent supporters (Socrates included) spend so much time ‘hiding behind a 
wall’.91  
 
COMPARING READINGS OF REPUBLIC V 496a-497b  
 
It may be helpful at this juncture to compare my reading of this passage on 
philosophers outside Kallipolis (roughly 496a-497b) with those of other scholars. 
Nicholas White,92 for example, interprets this passage as if the ‘ruling part’ of the 
philosopher, a part of the philosopher’s ‘natural role’, is simply unused in a current 
polis. I broadly agree with White that the philosopher’s theoretical knowledge is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 I return to discuss the relation between Socrates and the expert in dialektikē below. 
92 White (1979) 169-70 
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put to use politically (i.e., to rule) in an inhospitable environment. Yet White leaves 
open the possibility that the philosopher has a ruling part already fully formed, yet left 
idle outside Kallipolis.93 Frankly, I do not quite see how such a part can be fully 
developed in an environment that gives the philosopher no reason to develop it. Put 
differently, if no present-day constitution encourages the philosopher to apply his 
knowledge of the Good and the rest of those special beings to political ends, to 
accordingly combine a theoretical and political life, then there is arguably no reason 
for him to prepare for political life. Accordingly, there is no good reason to think that 
he conditions his ruling part to its fullest.94  
C. D. C. Reeve95 reads this passage as evidence that Plato thinks that the 
historical Socrates’ ‘philosophic nature’ was “perverted and altered” (στρέφεσθαί τε 
καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, 497b1-3) due to having been brought up in a non-Kallipolis. Reeve 
sees the Socrates of Book I as representative of that historical figure. By contrast, the 
Socrates of Books II-X, according to Reeve, shows ‘that same man as he would have 
taught and theorized had he found the right kind of nurture’.96 Similar to Reeve, 
Nickolas Pappas97 interprets this passage as Plato’s way of showing how the political 
realities of the historical Socrates’ day prevented the historical Socrates from 
becoming the best possible philosopher. What Reeve and Pappas fail to highlight, 
though, is the fact that no present-day philosopher, be he historical or fictional (i.e., 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 White (1979) ibid. ostensibly thinks that the ruling part of the philosopher belongs to the philosopher 
qua philosopher. Yet he is not especially clear on this point. White (1979) ibid. adds that, in light of the 
inhospitable environment in current poleis, the philosopher ‘must therefore retire and exercise the other 
part of their role, the part consisting in the search for wisdom.’ 
94 Of course, it is logically possible that someone reach the heights of the theoretical life without any 
prospect of ruling. But given that said height is understanding of the Good itself, it is highly unlikely 
that people will push on to this if they have no chance of ruling on its basis. 
95 Reeve (1988) 23-4 
96 Cf. Reeve (1988) 24 
97 Pappas (2003) 86 
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within the dramatic confines of the Republic), fully accords with the paradigmatic 
philosopher as accounted for in Books VI-VII; no present-day philosopher is 
complete because no present-day philosopher has grown up in the right environment 
that has allowed him to become both an expert of dialektikē (i.e., a knower of the 
Good, Fine, etc.) and a bona fide political leader (i.e., an applier of his knowledge in 
the polis).98 I will come back to this point later, when I show exactly how Socrates 
fails to match up to the depiction of the topmost philosopher of the Republic. 
 Roslyn Weiss99  identifies Socrates and Co. as useless politicians in the 
typically misguided political climate of your average polis. Weiss also acknowledges 
that these philosophers fall short of their full potential in a typical polis.100 Weiss has 
an answer to account for the contrasting portrayals between, on the one hand, Book 
VI’s philosopher behind the wall, and, on the other, Book VII’s philosopher-king.101 
The latter, according to Weiss, is ‘not by nature philosophic’.102 Indeed, according to 
Weiss, the philosopher-king is a caricature crafted to appease Adeimantus and 
Glaucon; the philosopher-king is not the real ideal philosopher for Socrates.103  
I must point out, though, that Weiss’ answer rests precariously on an odd 
reading of VI 503b-504a: 
 
‘On the one hand, these men [sc. the future philosopher-kings] are to be 
intellectually gifted…On the other hand, they are to be steadfast, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Let us not confuse the typical misguided politics that Socrates speaks of when he mentions Theages’ 
physical problems restricting his political career (540b) with the promoted political expertise of the 
philosopher-king.  
99 Weiss (2012) 
100 Weiss (2012) 27-8 
101 Weiss (2012) 1 goes so far as to call these portrayals ‘irreconcilable’.  
102 Weiss (2012) 50 
103 Weiss (2012) 6-8 
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trustworthy, and implacable in the face of fears…Generally speaking, 
however, as Socrates observes, people whose minds are mercurial tend 
not to be reliable and orderly. And people who are immovable in war 
are likely to be plodding in their studies. Yet this new and exotic (503b) 
breed of men104 is expected to excel at both war and studies.’105 
 
Contra Weiss, I must point out that Socrates clearly indicates that the 
philosopher-kings will have a psychic profile that takes the best from both the 
philosophic (503c) and courageous (503cd) characters traits:  
 
‘Yet we say that someone must have a fine and goodly share of both characters  
(ἀµφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς µετέχειν) or he won’t receive the truest education, 
honors or rule’ (503d7-9, cf. 503d-504a).106  
 
This description of the philosopher-king fits perfectly with the description of the 
philosopher described as early as Book III and the start of IV (cf. 376bc, 410de, 414d-
420b): a full-fledged philosopher is both a towering intellectual and a formidable 
defender of the city-state (more on this below). What the Book VII description of the 
philosopher ultimately does is qualify this description of the full-fledged philosopher: 
to be the best possible philosopher, one must know the Forms of the virtues, above all 
the Good as such, and in turn apply this knowledge in the political realm. Accordingly, 
I must contest Weiss’ description of the philosopher-king as ‘not by nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 I must object to this description of these philosophers as ‘new and exotic’. Nowhere at 503b is it 
even suggested that these philosophers are ‘new and exotic’. They are rare, yes, but not new and exotic. 
105 Weiss (2012) 52 
106 Compare the description of Theatetus by Theodorus at the beginning of the Theaetetus (143e-144b). 
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philosophic’107. Whilst the philosopher of Book VII is indeed different from Socrates 
and Co. as described between 496a-497a, it is not on account of the former being a 
non-philosophic philosopher (whatever that really means).108 Instead, the philosopher-
king shares in the best traits of current philosophers and then some; the philosopher-
king is that very philosopher, whom Socrates hints at between 497ab, who lives up to 
the philosopher’s fullest potential as both intellectual and ruler. 
 
ON ‘PHILOSOPHIA’ IN REPUBLIC II-VI & VIII-X 
 
Before turning to directly answer (2) - ‘Can mastery of dialektikē, as the 
systematic science envisaged in Books VI-VII, be seriously pursued outside 
Kallipolis?’ - it is worth noting that (a) outside the context of Kallipolis, ‘philosophy’ 
and cognates in the Republic do not hint at the amalgamated theoretical-political 
career constituting the life of the best possible philosopher. (b) They do not even 
allude to the peak of the theoretical aspect of philosophy, the science of dialectic. 
Now, as far as I know, no scholar denies either (a) or (b). However, in light of my 
own work highlighting the important place that dialectic as a special science has in 
Plato’s conception of philosophy, it is important, I think, to show just how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Weiss (2012) 50 et passim 
108 Weiss (2012) has some rather puzzling remarks on the purportedly non-philosophic philosopher of 
Book VII: ‘The philosophers of Book 7 are called ‘true philosophers’…but they are not said to have 
the true philosopher’s nature’ (67, n. 40); ‘As we have seen, Book 7’s philosophers are also warriors 
and so must be spirited. Their natures are thus an odd mix of intellectual aptitude, appetitiveness, and 
spiritedness. What they lack is love of wisdom’ (68, n. 43).  
 
How can one be a philosopher (Weiss never denies that the philosopher-king is in some sense a 
philosopher) without a philosophic nature? How can one be identified as a lover of wisdom 
(philosopher) without loving wisdom? 
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multifaceted Plato’s conception of philosophy truly is. What I want to show is how, 
just in the Republic, Plato thinks of philosophy as (i) concurrently a specific science, 
(ii) a synthesized life of theoretical and political activity, and (iii) more generally any 
approved study, or psychical disposition moving one to study. To be clear, what I am 
saying is that Plato never commits himself to using ‘philosophia’ to refer to just one 
thing, especially just one science. The science of dialectic remains central to Plato’s 
conception of philosophy without being cast as the only philosophy for Plato. 
In Book II philosophy is construed as generally a pursuit of wisdom, where 
‘wisdom’ is left unqualified: 
 
‘And surely, I said [sc. Socrates], the love of learning is the same thing as 
philosophy? It is [sc. Adeimantus]. Then, may we confidently assume in the case of a 
human being, too, that if he is to be gentle toward his own and those he knows, he 
must be a lover of learning and wisdom (φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλοµαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν 
εἶναι).’ (376b8-376c2)109 
 
Somewhat more precisely, philosophy is depicted as a trait necessary for the future 
guardian to already possess by nature: 
 
‘Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength (Φιλόσοφος…θυµοειδὴς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ 
ἰσχυρὸς) must all, then, be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine and 
good guardian of our city,’ (376c4-5) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Grube’s translation with slight adjustment on my part 
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 This notion of philosophy as more a trait or disposition than a synthesized 
theoretical-political life, or specifically a unique science, is repeated across Books III-
VI. Socrates refers to the conditioning of ‘the philosophic part of one’s nature’ (ἡ 
φιλόσοφος…φύσις, 410e1, cf. 410de). He speaks of the ‘spirited and philosophic 
parts of the soul itself’.110 In Book IV, the female guardian is attributed, amongst 
other traits, the character of being philosophic (φιλόσοφός, cf. 456a). Jumping ahead 
to Book VI, Socrates again refers to the philosophic nature’ (φιλοσόφου φύσεως, 
476b2) of those in actual poleis (cf. 476ab).  None of these quotations make an 
allusion to either dialektikē, or to the relation between dialektikē and the philosopher’s 
ensuing political career. 111  Even when Socrates announces in Book V that 
philosophers must rule the ideal polis, philosophy itself is not identified as a science 
(cf. 474c-474a). 
 Granted, the real philosopher is distinguished from your typical craftsman and 
common man, your general ‘lover of sights’ (cf. V, 476a-480a). This distinction is 
based on the philosopher’s unique pursuit of ‘the things themselves that are always 
the same in every respect’ (αὐτὰ ἕκαστα…καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα, 479e7-
8).  But the most Socrates does in Book V is suggest that the philosopher is an expert 
in some unnamed esoteric science. And given what is said in Book VII, that all 
approved studies aim at what is intelligible and eternal (cf. 527b, 529b), Plato 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 ‘It seems, then, that a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except 
incidentally, for the body and the soul but for the spirited and wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, 
(ἐπὶ τὸ θυµοειδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα, εἰ µὴ εἰ πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνω) in 
order that these might be in harmony with one another, each being stretched and relaxed to the 
appropriate degree’ (411e4-412a2). 
111 ‘each of them [sc. full-fledged philosophers]  will spend most of his time with philosophy, but, 
when his turn comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city’s sake…Then, having educated 
others like himself (ἄλλους ἀεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιούτους) to take his place as guardians of the city, he 
will depart for the Isles of the Blessed and dwell there’ (540b2-7). 
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arguably does not have a single science in mind at this point in Book V. What Plato is 
more likely to be doing in this part of the Republic is mentioning all approved 
intellectuals who identify as philosophers because of their common aim to understand 
what is intelligible and eternal. That these philosophers individually vary with regard 
to their proximity to what is intelligible and eternal, that some ultimately reach the 
best amongst the intelligible (sc. the Good as such) whilst others do not, is irrelevant 
here. Indeed, Plato is not so much concerned with making distinctions within the 
broad class of philosophers, as he is with distinguishing this broad class of 
philosophers from the broad class of sight-lovers (i.e., the sophist, rhetorician, typical 
craftsman, etc.). In general, then, Plato’s main task toward the end of the Book V is 
not to describe a novel science, but rather to highlight a select group of individuals 
with a love of what is recognized as genuine knowledge. It is only after beginning to 
distinguish the sciences at the end of Book VI, and then turning to describe the 
educative programme of Kallipolis in Book VII, that Plato ultimately establishes a 
hierarchy of the sciences. In the process, he comes to identify the peak of the 
theoretical life as the mastery of dialektikē. 
 To be clear, the science of dialectic is the theoretical pinnacle of philosophy. 
But it most definitely is not the only philosophy. For sure, at one point in Book VII 
‘philosophy’ implicitly refers to dialektikē (540ab). No other science knows the Good 
itself. But this is a momentary identification capping the project of Book VII: to 
highlight a philosopher’s progression toward mastery of a distinct science, which is 
projected in no uncertain terms as the topmost domain of knowledge achievable by 
man. It is rather telling that all ensuing uses of ‘philosophia’ and cognates in Books 
VIII-X (548a, 561d, 581bd, 582be, 587a, 611e, 619de) do not evidently refer to the 
science of dialectic. Perhaps the strongest case for an allusion to the science comes 
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right at the start of Book VIII, when Socrates speaks of ‘those who have turned out to 
be the best in philosophy and warfare’ (τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεµον 
γεγονότας ἀρίστους, 543a5-6). But the grouping of ‘philosophy’ with a knack for 
warfare more naturally connects with the earlier discussion of a soul with a healthy 
balance of the intellectual and strategic. Indeed, Book VII 543ac is essentially a 
summary of the end of Book III and the start of IV (414d-420b).  
 With the other citations from Books VIII-X (561d, 581bd, 582be, 587a, 611e, 
619de), we can more confidently say that ‘philosophy’ after Book VII refers either to 
any approved intellectual pursuit, or (especially in IX) to a psychical disposition.112 
Coupling this observation with the prior treatment of ‘philosophia’ in Books II to the 
end of VI enforces the idea that philosophy according to Plato is primarily a catchall 
for any promoted intellectual endeavour, or a psychical disposition, and only 
secondarily a placeholder for a specific science. Even when the second case applies, 
the equation is temporary; philosophia is not to be identified with just one science in 
all contexts. 
 For sure, Plato in the Republic may think that philosophy par excellence, the 
science of dialectic, gives the focal meaning of a more broadly used term. Yet he 
returns to using the term in a broader sense, particularly after Book VII, because he 
does not want people to view in particular dialectic as just a supreme, exotic, and by 
most of us currently unknowable super science. Plato obviously thinks there is some 
kind of continuity between dialectical practice (i.e., philosophical discussion in 
general) as conducted by himself (or dramatically by Socrates in the dialogues) and 
the supreme science of dialectic of Republic VI-VII. What the Republic evidences, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 That the uses of ‘philosophia’ and cognates in Books VIII-X agree more naturally with those found 
in Books II-VI may encourage the idea that the passages on philosophy and dialektikē in Books VI and 
VII were written after the other books. I shall not delve into this suggestion any further. 
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then, is Plato’s attempt to balance the two notions of dialectic, and with it philosophy, 
taking pains not to come across as ditching the more generalized notions of dialectic 
and philosophy for the more particular and esoteric ones of Books VI and VII. 
 
DIALEKTIKĒ AND PHILOSOPHIA IN AND OUTSIDE KALLIPOLIS (CONT.) 
 
 Let us finally turn to answer (2): can mastery of the science of dialectic be 
seriously pursued outside Kallipolis? A negative answer to (1) does not commit us to 
negatively answer (2). As I argued above, what essentially differentiates the present-
day philosopher from the idealized one envisioned by Socrates is not strictly any 
intellectual limitation, but rather a failure on the former’s part, due particularly to an 
inhospitable environment, to couple his intellectual achievement with political duty.  
 The claim that present-day philosophers are on intellectual par with the 
philosophers of Kallipolis is supported by the following passage: 
 
‘{Socrates} It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the 
study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the 
good. But when they’ve made it and looked sufficiently, we mustn’t allow them to do 
what they’re allowed to do today (ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται). {Glaucon} What’s that? {Soc} 
To stay there (καταµένειν) and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave 
and share their labours and honors, whether they are of less worth or greater.’ (519c8-
d7) 
 
We can overlook the obvious critique levied against individuals consumed with 
theorizing. That Socrates indirectly acknowledges that there exist at present (νῦν, 
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519d2) individuals who ‘make the ascent and see the good’ (ἰδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ 
ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν, 519c10-d1), who, by implication, aspire to master 
the science of dialectic (cf. 511bc, 517bc), is what matters most here.  
 Granted, it is not made absolutely clear at 519cd whether certain present-day 
philosophers who ‘look at’ the Good actually fully comprehend it, though ‘ἱκανῶς 
ἴδωσι’ (519d2), which by implication is attributed to certain present-day philosophers 
as well as ideal ones, strongly suggests that they have some sort of grasp of it; that at 
minimum they are currently in pursuit of knowledge of Forms as such. Further, a 
central point made immediately preceding 519c8-d7 is that the problem with present-
day philosophers is not a lack of education (we may infer of the Forms as such, see 
ensuing quotation), but a failure to apply said education: 
 
‘{Socrates} And what about the uneducated who have no experience of the truth? 
Isn’t it unlikely-indeed, doesn’t it follow from what was said before-that they will 
never adequately govern a city? But neither would those who’ve been allowed to 
spend their time in education to the end (µήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωµένους διατρίβειν 
διὰ τέλους).113 The former would fail because they don’t have a single goal at which 
all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim; the latter would fail because 
they’d refuse to act (τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν), thinking that they had 
settled while still alive in the faraway Isles of the Blessed.’ (519b7-c6, tr. Grube, rev. 
Reeve, with slight adjustment on my part) 
 
Accordingly, 519cd serves to qualify the point about the shortcomings of the 
educated-type of both the present-day and Kallipolis at 519bc: he who truly knows the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Surely in this context being educated ‘διὰ τέλους’ must imply ultimately being educated about 
Forms as such. 
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Forms as such, or is at least capable of it (i.e., he who currently is pursuing such 
knowledge) must not rest on his epistemic laurels. In an ideal environment, this would 
mean compelling the philosopher who has fully comprehended the Good, and so 
mastered dialektikē, to apply said knowledge by way of ruling Kallipolis (519e-520a).  
 Note as well that, by having Socrates indirectly mention non-Kallipolis 
pursuers of dialektikē, Plato is further committed to the point that the highlighted 
studies of Book VII, which ultimately prepare one for dialektikē, are not just found in 
Kallipolis; if there exists an aspiring expert of dialektikē outside Kallipolis, then there 
must be, in some shape or form, an educative course that ends with expertise in 
dialektikē (i.e., knowledge of the Good and the rest of the Forms, cf. 533ab). Perhaps 
the educative programme detailed in Book VII is specific to Kallipolis. But the 
studies, which comprise said programme, and which lead one to expertise in 
dialektikē, are not just found in Kallipolis. That is what I wish to emphasize here.  
Of course, the very existence of these pursuers (and so the science itself) 
outside Kallipolis may be hard to envision. I am not simply speaking about the 
majority, as depicted in Books V and VI, who are incapable of distinguishing between 
real and fake philosophers. This issue extends beyond the pages of the Republic. How 
many of Plato’s contemporaries would be able to distinguish these men in a crowd? It 
does not help that the existence of such pursuers of mastery of dialektikē outside 
Kallipolis is strongly implied at 519bd. One’s suspicion is only compounded by the 
fact that this implication is meant to carry us through to the end of the dialogue; that 
pursuers of dialektikē as a complete super science exist particularly outside Kallipolis 
is a claim that is never argued for in the Republic. Yet given the sheer scope of the 
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Republic, this is ostensibly an assumption that Plato expects his audience to accept.114 
Indeed, the magnitude of a central claim of Book VII reinforces this conjecture: what 
makes Kallipolis the best possible city-state is not just that it accommodates experts 
of dialektikē, but that it is ultimately ruled by them.  
Accordingly, I must qualify Myles Burnyeat’s observation (my italics): 
 
‘Plato’s task in Books VII-VII is to persuade us, through Glaucon, that the most 
important kind of knowledge [sc. knowledge of the Good] is out of our reach, beyond 
our present capability, so that we would do well, should the day of Utopia come, to 
give political power to philosophers whose knowledge we do not share.’115 
 
What I hope to have shown so far is that the knowledge in question, according to 
Plato, can be seriously pursued outside Kallipolis; that certain people outside the ideal 
city-state have the intellectual capability to pursue it. For Plato, the chief problem is 
that, outside Kallipolis, even if someone were to master dialektikē, he would in all 
likelihood fail to apply said knowledge in the political realm, and so fail to fully 
develop qua philosopher. 
 All this is not to say that Plato fully comprehends, or claims to fully 
comprehend the Good. The remarks between 532e-534c clearly relay the difficulties 
and concerns with fully knowing and in turn explaining the nature of the Good. And it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 This may go some way to explain how Socrates, who claims to have no knowledge of the Good (a 
point I return to later), is in any sort of position to claim that there are people outside Kallipolis who 
have seen the Good. Roughly put, what we see especially between 519bd is the author’s (Plato’s) voice 
pushing through to insist that certain people (himself included) have some sort of grasp of the Good 
itself. Compare 519bd to the remark made at 533a, where Socrates insists that we must assume Forms 
exist. 
115 Burnyeat (2000) 64 
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is by all means possible that these difficulties and concerns reveal (be it intentional or 
not on his part) Plato’s personal concerns with his metaphysical system capped by his 
anhupothetos archē. As Nicholas White observes, 
 
‘In 534b-c he [sc. Plato] seems to hint at some more substantial definition [of the 
Good], but it is unclear what it would be like, or out of what materials it would be 
construed. Plato does not pursue these matters. He knows that he is moving over very 
difficult ground, and that he does not have it entirely under his control.’116 
 
 Looking forward, the Sophist, Statesman and Philebus respectively confirm 
that ‘the science of dialectic’ is treated as an actual science under non-ideal 
conditions.117 We shall return to this science, as variously presented in these later 
dialogues, in subsequent chapters. For now, what we should especially take away 
from the preceding sections is that, according to the Republic, simply being an expert 
of Forms as such does not mean that one is the best possible philosopher; that a 
complete philosophical life is a perfect combination, fostered by the right 
psychological climate, of a theoretical and political career. All the same, Plato 
believes, albeit obscurely, that knowledge of dialektikē is pursuable outside Kallipolis, 
that at least the theoretical half of the complete philosophical life can be seriously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 White (1976) 103 
117 Whilst the Statesman speaks of an ideal city-state ruled by the genuine statesman, the remarks 
therein on dialecticians do not place these experts within the ideal city-state. On a separate note, 
‘dialektikē’ is not used in the Philebus or Statesman. Nonetheless, certain cognates of ‘dialectic’ are 
used in both dialogues (e.g., ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναµις, Phlb., 57e6-7; διαλεκτικωτέροις, Pol. 285d6). 
And these cognates clearly allude to that unique science (cf. Phlb., 57e-58e, Pol., 285d-286b). I say 
more on this in Ch. III and IV. 
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undertaken in a non-ideal environment. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall see 
where exactly Socrates fits in this picture of the complete philosophical life.  
ACCOMMODATING BOTH THE ELENCTIC SOCRATES AND THE EXPERT 
OF FORMS 
 
 Alexander Nehamas claims that the metaphysical theory of Forms, on 
prominent display in the Republic, ultimately ‘underwrites the nature and practice of 
dialectic’.118 What Nehamas means by this is that the theory of Forms comes to 
distinguish the philosopher from particularly the sophist: the philosopher seeks out the 
true intelligible nature of x; he parts ways with sensory apparatus and sensibilia, along 
with human opinion, to obtain genuine knowledge of real, unchanging, non-sensuous 
entities via reasoning. The sophist, by contrast, relies solely on sensory apparatus, 
sensibilia, human opinion and logical fallacies. Ultimately, the sophist holds 
preference for victory in argument over the truth of the matter.119  
 Nehamas points out that the philosopher’s overarching aim (sc. knowledge of 
Forms) is unique to Plato’s so-called ‘middle period’ (especially the Phaedo and 
Republic): ‘the exclusion of the senses, the reliance on reason, and the very idea of the 
Good itself constitute critical innovations on Plato’s middle period: nothing like them 
can be found in his Socratic dialogues.’120 Let us, for the sake of argument, accept 
Nehamas’ claim, namely that in the Phaedo and Republic Plato openly gives us his 
view of what philosophy, at least at its theoretical best, is: an esoteric study, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Nehamas (1999) 117 
119 Technically, the philosopher’s pursuit of Forms contrasts him with all ‘lovers of sights and sounds’. 
Nehamas is just focusing on the differences between sophist and philosopher in his article. I return to 
address this point below. 
120 Nehamas (1999) 117 
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employs a variety of methods used to ascertain the nature of certain intelligible 
objects. If we accept all this, we must admit that the philosopher Nehamas has in 
mind, who more precisely ought to be identified as the expert of dialektikē (i.e., he 
alone amongst the experts identified in the middle books of the Republic who is 
ascribed full knowledge of Forms), is not just contrasted with typical lovers of sights. 
He is also contrasted with the elenctic Socrates prominently on display in the Socratic 
dialogues.  
  ‘Socratic dialogues’ is a notoriously loaded term.121 What I want to do with 
this term in what follows is use it to refer to a group of dialogues wherein Socrates 
primarily takes on the role of elenctic examiner.122 By ‘elenctic Socrates’ I mean that 
Socrates who is primarily recognized in the Socratic dialogues as employing 
(Socratic) elenchus: quizzing his interlocutor on what exactly constitutes the nature of 
a particular topic, x, and drawing out a particular answer, F, that is in turn scrutinized. 
This Socrates usually takes issue with every answer  (F, G, H, etc.) attributed to an 
interlocutor; no definitive answer to the overarching question (‘what is x?) is found. 
In turn, a state of aporia (confusion, puzzlement) is pronounced.123 Formulaically put, 
in a typical conversation the elenctic Socrates is noted for refuting a given interlocutor 
by showing that the interlocutor’s thesis, say ‘that x is F’, is at minimum untenable.124  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See, e.g., Bonazzi et al. (2009) 
122 Particularly the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras, and 
Ion. 
123 What aporia is exactly in Plato is up for debate, cf. Politis (2006) and literature therein. I shall not 
delve into this contentious issue. In this chapter, let aporia signify an inconclusive state, generally 
construed, especially on the part of the interlocutor, noticed at the terminus of a given instance of 
Socratic elenchus. 
124 ‘Refuting’, with regard to Socratic elenchus in general, can mean proving that A’s x, a topic or 
object (e.g., Piety), is false, cf. Vlastos (1983) 27-58, and (1991). Alternatively, it could mean showing 
that A’s x is inconsistent with his other mutually held beliefs, cf. Benson (2000 & 2011). There is no 
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For, beyond x, Socrates has elicited from his interlocutor a set of beliefs, {p, q}, 
which entails the contradictory of the interlocutor’s original thesis. 125  What is 
particularly characteristic of Socratic elenchus is that it is critical: Socrates always 
declines at the start of a discussion to provide his own thesis to the question under 
debate. Socrates, in other words, always plays the part of the questioner.  
 Does Socrates have his own answer to the question at hand? Perhaps, but that 
is irrelevant given the circumstances of the discussions depicted especially in the 
Socratic dialogues. As Gregory Vlastos has already replied, ‘giving and defending 
[his thesis] would be a topic for another argument.’126  
 But when we search for that argument, particularly concerning a theory of 
Forms in the Socratic dialogues, it is nowhere to be found. To be clear, when the 
elenctic Socrates speaks of seeking out the truth or knowledge of x, he usually means 
that he is inquiring into the nature of x. Nonetheless, there is no solid textual evidence 
in the Socratic dialogues to equate the nature of x with the ‘Form’ x, with the x-itself 
set apart in the Phaedo and Republic. Granted, the elenctic Socrates does use the word 
‘form’ (eidos) to refer to the object of definition in certain Socratic dialogues (e.g., 
Euthyphro 6de). However, apart from suggesting that an eidos is some sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
need to argue for one meaning over the other in this chapter, that we grant that ‘x is F’ is at minimum 
shown to be untenable by Socrates suffices. 
125 This rough formula is based on Vlastos’ (1991) 266. Again, whether Socrates proves x to be false, 
or rather shows x just to be inconsistent with the interlocutor’s other mutually held beliefs, is beside the 
point here. Rowe (2011) 205-6 contests a major part of the Vlastos reading of Socratic elenchus by 
arguing that in many cases the interlocutor is not committed to a particular thesis (cf. Vlastos (1991) 
134, who uses the term ‘commitment’ to qualify how close to a given thesis an interlocutor is). I agree 
with Rowe that Vlastos may be going too far in saying that all of Socrates’ interlocutors are committed 
(I take it here to mean ‘feel a (strong) dedication or loyalty’) to a given thesis. However, even if the 
present interlocutor only half-heartedly defends a given thesis-remember that he does ultimately 
promote a thesis with some varying degree of dedication to it-that he does so honestly suffices for 
Socrates to continue the elenchus, particularly in the role of questioner. 
126 Vlastos (1991) 112 
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universal, the elenctic Socrates’ use of the term is metaphysically non-committal; it 
does not carry with it the presupposition of certain ontological features ascribed to 
Forms in the Phaedo and Republic.127 A fortiori, there is no good reason to saddle the 
elenctic Socrates therein with a theory of Forms. Accordingly, both the expert of 
dialektikē and the elenctic Socrates seek the truth. And both can generally be said to 
be inquiring into the nature of x. Yet only the expert of dialektikē identifies the nature 
of x with a Phaedo or Republic-style Form x. 
 It is safe to say that Nehamas would take no issue with there being an essential 
difference between the expert of dialektikē and the elenctic Socrates; that the two 
philosophers seek out the truth, yet only one, the expert of dialektikē, is attributed an 
epistemology and metaphysics reflective of a theory of Forms. Indeed, Nehamas 
would probably say that the difference between philosophers only supports his 
article’s conclusions: Plato ultimately sees the limitations of his elenctic Socrates, a 
Socrates tied to his eponymous method of inquiry (all of this, perhaps, reflective of 
Plato’s once close connection to the historical Socrates).128 In crafting his own unique 
view of philosophy, Plato eventually turns to re-mould Socrates (and whomever else 
he casts in his dialogues, e.g., the Eleatic Visitor, Timaeus, the Athenian Visitor) into 
the mouthpiece for his distinctly Platonic view of reality (enter the theory of Forms, in 
particular). The bottom line is: Plato has changed, and now so too has his Socrates.  
 In passing, I note that this is not the only (reasonable) answer we can give to 
account for the contrast between the expert of dialektikē and the elenctic Socrates. An 
alternative, which does not presuppose a chronological ordering of the dialogues, or 
further a ‘development’ (i.e., adjustment) of Plato’s own philosophical views (a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 I believe Robinson (1953) 49-60 has adequately shown this. 
128 This is essentially part of Vlastos’ (1991) thesis. I believe Nehamas would generally agree with it. I 
make no attempt to connect Plato’s Socrates with the historical Socrates. 
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development which is purportedly reflected in the varied personae of Socrates 
witnessed in Plato), relies simply on citing a peculiar limitation of the elenctic method 
and its most famous user: if within the Socratic dialogues Socrates is usually cast as 
questioner to someone else’s role as answerer, then it is inappropriate to ascribe to 
this Socrates a thesis that would surely need to be examined. For this would force 
Socrates to abandon his elenctic role as questioner and take on the role of answerer 
(cf., e.g., Prt. 338cd). A fortiori, it is inappropriate to saddle the elenctic Socrates, in 
his role as questioner to some one else’s role as answerer, with a theory of Forms that 
would surely need to be scrutinized via elenchus.129 My point here is just that there 
may be varied, equally viable answers to (at least partially) account for the contrast. 
 However we (begin to) account for the contrast between these two 
philosophers, I believe the following questions need to be answered:  what is the exact 
philosophical status of the elenctic expert in light of the account of the expert of 
dialektikē in the Republic? What role, if any, does elenchus, and so its expert user, 
have in the aspiring philosopher-king’s personal development in the Republic?130 In 
what follows, I provide my own answers to these questions. I shall answer the second 
question first.  
 As I have shown, what Plato does in the Republic, especially in Book VII, is 
identify philosophy not only as a way of life, but, more specifically, as a science. 
Whilst the reference is not exclusive, ‘philosophy’ may now refer to the superior 
epistēmē of dialektikē that all subordinate technai at best approximate (cf. VII, 533bc). 
Its expert, one of a select few, is a synoptic polymath whose conception of the world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Of course, a thorough version of this answer would have to address Socrates’ self-examination in 
the Hippias Major. 
130 By posing these questions I wish to qualify, in particular, Nehamas’ (1999) treatment of elenchus 
and its most famous user, Socrates, particularly in the Republic. 
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is framed by his comprehension of Forms topped by the Good itself. Elenchus plays 
an essential role in this philosopher’s life. But note that elenchus is used only when it 
comes to either questioning or defending an account regarding something (it is safe to 
say some Form x, particularly the Good itself) that the expert of dialektikē has already 
obtained.131   
 
‘Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything 
else, can survive all refutation [διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων], as if in a battle, striving to judge 
things not in accordance with opinion but in accordance with being, and can come 
through all this with his account still intact you’ll say that he doesn’t know the good 
itself or any other good. And if he gets hold of some image of it, you’ll say that it’s 
through opinion, not knowledge, for he is dreaming and asleep throughout his present 
life, and before he wakes up here, he will arrive in Hades and go to sleep forever.’ 
(Rep., VII, 534b8-d1) 
 
Part of being an expert of dialektikē entails overturning every counter-argument, 
surviving elenchus after elenchus. If you cannot do that, then you are not (at least as 
of yet) a full-fledged expert of dialektikē.132  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 To be clear, by ‘elenchus’ I mean the elenchus as formulaically presented above. Vlastos (1991) 111 
n. 19 claims, without qualification, that the elenctic method referenced at 534bd (quoted below) is not 
proper Socratic elenchus (i.e., elenchus as routinely employed in the Socratic dialogues). Perhaps he is 
right. But the account of elenchus here in Book VII is simply too vague to outright confirm or deny his 
claim. Pace Vlastos, I claim that identifying the elenchus referred to in Book VII with the typical 
elenchus witnessed in the Socratic dialogues is not problematic. The person taking on the adversative 
position need not have knowledge of Form x in order to examine the coherency of the philosopher’s 
purported knowledge of Form x.  
132 Whilst this condition for knowledge ascription may seem demanding, it is surely not ludicrous; 
Plato holds that a necessary condition for truly knowing (Form) x is being able to present a watertight 
account of it. 
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 Nehamas argues that elenchus, by itself, ultimately ‘is not sufficient to 
distinguish clearly between Socratic and sophistic inquiry’.133 He pairs elenchus with 
a different ‘study of the unchanging nature of the world’134- the latter being that 
which, according to Nehamas, supplements elenchus in Plato’s ‘middle-period’ 
conception of philosophy. Shifting Nehamas’ words around a bit, I stress that it is 
elenchus that supplements whatever method it is that the expert of dialektikē first uses 
to obtain knowledge of the Good itself and all the rest of the Forms. To be clear, 
elenchus serves a purpose in the process of verifying this philosopher’s 
comprehension of any Form x. If repeated examination does not cast doubt on his 
thesis concerning Form x, then, and only then, could the expert of dialektikē say that 
he unconditionally knows Form x. The problem with elenchus is that it cannot assist 
this philosopher in first grasping Form x. Simply put, elenchus only tests the 
coherency of an account; it does not initially help form it. This last claim needs to be 
clarified. Ultimately elenchus is a form of argumentation that at best indirectly 
validates an already formulated account regarding some x; surviving an elenctic 
episode signals the coherency of an account regarding x. Otherwise, elenchus yields 
negative results: either Socrates proves that, say, x is not F, or he shows that an 
interlocutor has no good reason to keep his original thesis, that x is F, in light of the 
fact that it conflicts with his other mutually held beliefs (i.e., Socrates brings one to 
acknowledge the untenable nature of the thesis in question).135 Again, the problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Nehmas (1999) 119 
134 Nehamas (1999) ibid. 
135 The options accommodate both the Vlastos and Benson readings of elenchus (cf. n. 124). At 
minimum, both scholars would agree on the negative consequence of elenchus.  
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here is that what the expert of dialektikē needs in order to first grasp the Good itself is 
a method that yields positive results (viz., that Form x is F).136 
  Once more, elenchus, so long as it is properly directed toward the truth of the 
matter (cf. VII, 539cd), is the test used to confirm a philosopher’s knowledge of 
Forms.137  Importantly, it is not essential for the elenctic questioner to possess 
knowledge of Form x in order to refute or confirm the aspiring philosopher’s account 
of Form x; the questioner could simply be a good elenctic artist, eliciting a belief-set 
and highlighting that such a set entails a conclusion that may or may not agree with 
the interlocutor’s original thesis on Form x. In the case of refuting the aspiring expert 
of dialektikē, the good elenctic expert138 elicits a set of beliefs that entail a counter-
thesis. He accordingly befuddles the aspiring dialectician to the point of legitimately 
questioning the latter’s grasp of Form x.  
 All this roughly explains how someone like the elenctic Socrates, who 
purportedly does not know what Form x is, can still scrutinize the account of an 
interlocutor who claims to know Form x. This brings us back to the first question 
posed above: what is exactly the philosophical status of the elenctic expert in Plato’s 
Republic? We have seen that the elenctic Socrates cannot be equated with the expert 
of dialektikē, with Plato’s topmost theoretician in the Republic. But this does not 
mean that the elenctic Socrates is barred from the appellation ‘philosopher’. Far from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 I return to this problem next chapter. 
137 I agree in major part with Marion (2013) that, contra Gregory Vlastos, in the Republic Plato 
maintains a central place in his conception of philosophy for Socratic elenchus; that elenchus is not 
ditched as a viable philosophical tool after Book I (I return to Socrates of Rep. I below). However, 
Marion (2013) 284 is wrong in saying that at 534bc Plato equates understanding the Good itself with 
the ability to engage in ‘dialectical games’ (i.e., proper elenchus). Said ability may be necessary to 
confirm said knowledge, but it cannot help to initially grasp it. 
138 In contrast to those who are skilled in ‘dialectic’ (in context clearly elenchus), but abuse it, and then 
their interlocutors, for the love of victory (cf. VII 537d-539c).  
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it. As the preceding analysis of ‘philosophia’ and cognates in the Republic has 
revealed, Plato is apt to speak of philosophy more as an intellectual trait or positive 
psychic disposition than as a specific science. In other words, ‘philosophia’ is more 
an honorific than a designator of a distinguished theoretician with a unique body of 
knowledge. What it means to be a philosopher, then, in most contexts, is simply to be 
a keen intellectual in pursuit of genuine wisdom. That philosophers individually vary 
with regard to their proximity to what is considered genuine wisdom, that some 
ultimately reach the best amongst the intelligible (sc. the Good itself) whilst others do 
not, does nothing to jeopardize their identification as philosophers.139  
 Of course the epistemic variance alluded to cannot be overlooked. Plato 
dedicates an entire book of the Republic (sc. VII) to highlighting the knowledge gaps 
in the sciences, especially the mathematical ones. Nevertheless, diverse scientists are 
considered philosophers just in so far as their respective investigations gradually 
move them to abandon their reliance on what is perceivable and temporal for what, 
according to Plato, they come to discover is intelligible and eternal. And surely the 
elenctic Socrates fits this description of the philosopher generally construed, even if 
he does not presuppose, let alone consciously seek out, a realm of distinguished 
intelligible objects. This is because his demand for a universal definition, an account 
regarding an x that holds in all scenarios, puts him on the right track toward the Good, 
it moves him, and ideally his interlocutor, away from the instance to the model, from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Cf. 496c3-5, esp. ‘τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων’ at c5, which suggests that Socrates includes himself 
amongst those worthy of associating with philosophy. 
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the perceivable and changeable to the intelligible and eternal, as all legitimate 
philosophical inquiry should (cf. Rep., VII 537cd).140 
This reading is obviously attempting to accommodate the elenctic Socrates 
within a philosophical system topped by a theory of distinguished intelligible objects 
(i.e., Forms). But it is fairly clear that part of Plato’s goal, particularly in Book VII of 
the Republic, is to incorporate a variety of sciences and arts, which individually do 
not presuppose a theory of special beings topped by the Good itself, into a 
philosophical system capped by a unique science. The idea is that, in among the many 
philosophers, there will be a select few that will graduate to the top of philosophy, to 
the science of dialectic. The elenctic Socrates is not one of these select few. But as the 
remarks on ‘dialectic’ (i.e., elenchus, cf. Ch. I pp. 24-5) in Republic VII attest, the 
elenctic Socrates and his art remain immensely important for Plato: they serve as the 
final test for that philosopher intent on knowing the best and happiest amongst those 
which are.  
 
DISTINGUISHING THE PHAEDO AND REPUBLIC SOCRATES FROM THE 
EXPERT OF DIALEKTIKĒ 
 
 Whilst the exemplar of the philosophical way of life in the Phaedo is 
undoubtedly the Socrates depicted therein, I argue that we cannot equate the Socrates 
of the Phaedo with the topmost theoretician of the Republic, the expert of dialektikē. 
To be clear, the ‘topmost theoretician’ is not to be confused with the best possible 
philosopher of the Republic, viz., he who applies his knowledge of dialektikē by way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 That the elenctic Socrates typically acts as questioner does not change anything, because whilst 
interrogating someone else’s thesis he is concomitantly either seeking out or verifying-perhaps he 
already has a belief on the matter-the right answer for himself.   
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of ruling a polis. That being said, by showing that Socrates of the Phaedo and the 
topmost theoretician, the expert of dialektikē, are not identical, I shall indirectly be 
showing that Socrates of the Phaedo cannot be equated with the best possible 
philosopher of the Republic. 
 Now, Socrates of the Phaedo openly believes in Forms, in those special beings 
that are on prominent display in the Republic. Accordingly, this brings him closer 
than the elenctic Socrates featured in the Socratic dialogues to fitting the description 
of the topmost theoretician of the Republic. However, there is a notable epistemic 
difference between the Socrates of the Phaedo and the expert of dialektikē. Unlike the 
latter, Socrates of the Phaedo never claims to know the Good itself. Indeed, this 
Socrates’ connection to Forms is via a rough belief in them: 
 
‘I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this (τοῦτο…ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ 
ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐµαυτῷ), that nothing else makes it beautiful other than he 
presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relation to that 
Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship 
(οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζοµαι), but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the 
Beautiful.’ (Phd., 100d3-8)141 
 
This sketchy defence of such a grandiose theory is surely unbecoming of the 
Republic-style expert of dialektikē.  
 Related to this epistemic difference is an issue concerning methodology. The 
prominent method displayed in the Phaedo, that of hypothesis, is arguably ruled out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 By implication, this applies to his belief in all Forms. This is supported by the subsequent remarks 
on Bigness and Smallness (100e-101a). 
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in the Republic as being the primary method employed for grasping Forms.142 Yet in 
the Phaedo Socrates relies on just this method of hypothesis to defend his belief in 
them (cf. 100a ff.). Given the critique of hypothesizing in the Republic, Socrates of 
the Phaedo must fall short of the expert of dialektikē in his grasp of Forms; whilst 
hypothesizing ostensibly suffices to yield knowledge of Forms in the Phaedo, in the 
Republic it is at best a necessary method for any preliminary investigation into 
specifically the Good itself-all other Forms subsequently being understood 
specifically in light of one’s knowledge of the unhypothetical Good itself. 143 
Accordingly, perhaps in retrospect it is rather telling that in the Phaedo Socrates calls 
the method of hypothesis, which he relies on, confusing: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  Socrates openly says that what distinguishes the expert of dialektikē from particularly the 
mathematicians is his eventual abandonment of hypotheses (VII 533cd, cf. VI 511bc). Granted, it is 
reasonable to posit the use of hypotheses when first setting out to grasp the Good. But the actual insight 
into this special being, and the ensuing move ‘from forms to forms, and ending in forms’, must surely 
rely on another method. Cf. Newton Byrd (1997). 
143 I do not want to come across as unreflectively assuming that the ‘hypothetical method’ of Phaedo 
100a and 101de is a term of an unambiguous contrast, where the other term is the ‘anhupothetos archē’ 
(sc. the Good) of the Republic. I do, however, defer to others who view a single methodology being 
discussed in both the Phaedo and the Republic, where (taken explicitly or implicitly) the Good itself is 
something that is arrived at by means of postulates yet is not itself a postulate: cf. Byrd (1997), as well 
as Robinson (1953) 172-6, and White (1976) 95-9. 
Having said that, one could hold that in the Phaedo the hypothetical procedure is methodological; it is 
Socrates’ best chance at arriving at some sort of understanding of Forms. This openly implies that 
Socrates has nothing better (i.e., more rigorous and precise) to use in its place. However (this person 
adds), the anhupothetos archē of the Republic has to do with what is ontologically fundamental. The 
idea being that you cannot derive anything more fundamental than the Good itself. This contrast 
between methodology and (metaphysical) object of knowledge does not rule out hypothesizing the 
latter; the fundamental first principle could logically be a hypothesis in the methodological sense. Take 
a parallel from modern physics: someone hypothesizes that X is the fundamental force from which all 
matter and the four well-known forces are derived. What he postulates is a postulate (i.e., a hypothesis). 
Yet it is a postulate concerning what is fundamental; what is postulated is postulated as not resting on 
anything else. Cf. Bailey (2006). 
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‘I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why a unit or anything else comes to 
be or perishes or exists by the old method of investigation, and I do not accept it, but I 
have a confused method of my own (κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς µεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν' 
ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω).’ (Phd. 97b4-7, cf. 100a f.) 
 
 It is even difficult to classify Socrates of the Phaedo as an aspiring expert of 
dialektikē. This is because there is no strong indication in the Phaedo that an insight 
into Forms relies on any sort of prior, systematized intellectual conditioning, 
particularly an educative course that is heavily influenced by certain mathematical 
studies. The best indication that mathematics plays a role in grasping Forms in the 
Phaedo is the presumed familiarity with geometry behind the method of 
hypothesis.144 But I struggle to see the immediate connection between this subtle 
familiarity with mathematics in the Phaedo (and Meno) and the prominent role 
mathematics plays in the philosopher’s ascent to the Good in the Republic. 
 Returning to the Republic, I argue that we cannot equate the Socrates of either 
Book I or Books II-X of the Republic with the expert of dialektikē. By showing that 
neither persona of Socrates in the Republic can be equated with the topmost 
theoretician, the expert of dialektikē, I shall indirectly be showing that neither persona 
of Socrates in the Republic can be equated with the best possible philosopher of the 
Republic.  
 Why the separation of Socrates in the Republic into two personae? Socrates of 
Book I is chiefly recognized as the elenctic figure found elsewhere in Plato, 
particularly in the Socratic dialogues (e.g., Euthyphro, Ion, Charmides). Socrates of 
Book I maintains his adversative, interrogative stance; he does not claim to endorse a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




theory of Forms, or set down any other positive thesis regarding, in particular, any of 
the virtues, an ideal state, or the philosophers who should rule the ideal state. There 
are a few other obvious points we could cite, which safely differentiate Socrates of 
Book I from particularly Socrates of Books II-X.145 In general, Socrates of Book I is 
the elenctic figure found elsewhere in Plato. Accordingly, the differences 
aforementioned, which separate the elenctic figure and the expert of dialektikē of 
Republic VII, can be cited again in order to separate the Socrates of Republic I from 
the expert of dialektikē. Hence, Socrates of Book I, qua elenctic figure, falls short of 
being the topmost theoretician. A fortiori, he falls short of being the best possible 
philosopher. 
 Why does Plato present two personae of Socrates in the Republic? Why the 
contrast between the elenctic (Book I) and doctrinal (Books II-X) Socratic figure? 
Recalling my earlier observations on the limitations of elenchus (pp. 86-8), Plato must 
believe that, in order to set down his own positive (albeit still examinable) views 
regarding the plethora of philosophical topics broached in the ensuing books of the 
Republic, a non-elenctic figure must necessarily take the reigns of the discussion. This 
is not to say that Plato in the Republic ultimately ditches the elenctic figure as a 
genuine philosophical figure (I return to this point below). The main idea here is that 
a different philosophical persona is needed for the task at hand (viz., the presentation 
of positive theses). This does not mean, though, that the non-elenctic figure (Socrates) 
is to be equated with the ideal philosopher that awaits us in Book VII . 
 The account of Forms, and so the intelligible plane of reality only the expert of 
dialektikē is privy to, is told by Socrates post-Book I through the use of analogy. 
What is more, this use of analogy, as witnessed with the respective accounts of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Cf. Vlastos (1991) 248-51 
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Sun, Divided Line and Cave, relies on visible props or diagrams: the analogies depend 
on what is patently in the visible plane to approximately allude to that which is truly 
found in the intelligible plane. Accordingly, this Socrates is at best approximating an 
account of Forms, something that obviously would be considered insufficient for a 
genuine expert of dialektikē. And, whilst the reader may interject and claim that the 
approximation account is done especially for Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ benefit due 
to their intellectual limitations, I respond by pointing out that it is particularly 
Socrates who is quick to cite his own limitations. 
 For one, Socrates openly admits ignorance of the Good itself: 
 
‘You know very well now that I am going to say this [i.e., that the Good is that which 
all other things, including other forms, derive their use and benefit from], and, besides, 
that we have no adequate knowledge of it (αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσµεν)’ (VI, 505a4-6).146 
 
In fact, he cannot even muster an account of the Good along the same lines as he did 
the civic virtues in Book IV: 
 
‘By god, Socrates, Glaucon said, don’t desert us with the end almost in sight. We’ll be 
satisfied if you discuss the good as you discussed justice, moderation, and the rest. 
That, my friend, [said Socrates], would satisfy me too, but I’m afraid that I won’t be 
up to it and that I’ll disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying’ (VI, 506d2-8). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Given the evidence of Book VII (519bd), that knowledge of the Good can be seriously pursued 
outside Kallipolis, ‘we’ here may specifically refer to Socrates, Adeimantus and Glaucon. 
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He instead provides an account of the ‘child’ (Sun), the purported offspring of the 
Good. However, note that he all but explicitly admits to never being able to provide 
an account of the Good: 
 
‘{Glaucon} The story about the father [sc. the Good] remains a debt you’ll pay 
another time. {Soc} I wish that I could pay the debt in full, [viz., give an account of 
the Good] instead of just the interest [sc. an account of the Sun]. {But at present [I can 
repay] only the interest} (ἀλλὰ µὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους µόνον) [VI, 506e6-507a2] 
 
 The Divided Line is a continuation of the account on the Good via the Sun (cf. 
509bd). Accordingly, it too at best approximates in account the actual relation 
between the two planes of reality and the objects, including the Good, found scattered 
between them. Further, the Cave analogy relies on visible correlates, as do the 
geometers, to that which the ideal philosopher ‘sees’ (via reason) in the non-sensuous 
plane of the intelligible.  
Incidentally, it is worth highlighting Socrates’ reference to the rather 
‘unSocratic’ (i.e., non-elenctic) theorizing that the depicted philosopher (who will 
ultimately be identified with the expert of dialektikē), now outside the Cave, engages 
in: contemplation of Forms, as the phrase ‘always pressing upwards, eager to spend 
their time above’ implies (ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγονται αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν, 517c9, cf. 
517cd).147 To be clear, this is especially unSocratic in so far as it abandons the 
elenctic Socrates’ raison d'être: to openly cross-examine both himself and others, not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 For sure, elenchus is suggested as playing a direct role in the dialectician’s ascent to the Good (cf. 
514cd). But, again, elenchus can only serve to verify or refute an intellectual effort undertaken 
beforehand by a different method. As the passage in Book VII (514cd) indicates, the individual is 
subjected to elenchus after initially seeing what is in fact reality. 
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contemplate Forms (see below). Granted, the expert of dialektikē does ultimately 
interact with his fellow humans. But he does so only as their unwilling political leader. 
 Beyond the use of analogy and Socrates’ intellectual limitations as implied via 
such use, perhaps the most telling (and explicit) proof of Socrates post-Book I 
missing the mark of the topmost theoretician of the Republic is witnessed when he 
comes up short in explaining the exact methodology of dialektikē. How, in other 
words, dialektikē comprehends Forms: 
 
‘{Glaucon} [W]hat is the sort of power dialectic has, what forms is it divided into, 
and what paths does it follow? For these lead at last, it seems, towards that place 
which is a rest from the road, so to speak, and an end of journeying for the one who 
reaches it. {Socrates} You won’t be able to follow me any longer, Glaucon, even 
though there is no lack of eagerness on my part to lead you, for you would no longer 
be seeing an image of what we’re describing, but the truth itself. At any rate, that’s 
how it seems to be’ (VII, 532d8-533a4). 
 
That is all Socrates has been doing up to this point: showing his interlocutors images 
of the truth itself, approximating the fully educated philosopher and his body of 
knowledge. Again, the limitations emphasized in this quotation are not only those of 
Glaucon, but of Socrates too. Socrates can only provide a likeness of what exists in 
the intelligible realm; it is Socrates who has to get Glaucon to believe with him that 
there is in fact an intelligible plane of reality without being shown it (cf. 533a).148  
 Richard Robinson observes a so-called ‘inconsistency’ in the Republic: 
‘According to what [Plato] says about them [sc. images], he ought never to use them; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Echoing the religious-like belief in Forms that Socrates expresses in the Phaedo.  
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yet his works are full of them.’ 149  My reading above answers this apparent 
inconsistency, at least in the Republic: what Plato is showing us is an approximation 
of the truth (in imagery, analogy) via the mouthpiece of someone reporting on the 
individual most capable of fully understanding it, the expert of dialektikē. Intuitively, 
we should not expect much more.  
Given the effort so far to show why exactly both personae of Socrates in the 
Republic are not to be equated with the expert of dialektikē of Book VII, one may 
naturally turn to ask what stops us from questioning either Socrates’ identification in 
the Republic as a philosopher full stop. This question would actually carry some force 
if philosophy, in whatever environment, were to be understood only as the science of 
dialectic. Yet one of the central aims of this chapter has been to show that Plato never 
makes such a radical claim. Indeed, both personae of Socrates are just as philosophic 
as, say, the geometer (or any other mathematical scientist). Recall this Socrates’ self-
identification as a philosopher (VI, 496ad). A brief glance at the context in which this 
connection is made (496a-497b) clearly reveals that ‘philosopher’ does not refer to an 
expert of dialektikē. Instead, it more generally refers to any non-corrupted intellectual. 
To be sure, to properly pursue wisdom necessitates a natural endowment that certain 
individuals are immediately barred from possessing. 150  A proper upbringing is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Robinson (1953) 220-1. He cites further examples from the Republic in support of his point. 
150 The philosophical traits of a soul that Socrates especially refers to in the Republic are ‘courage’ 
(ἀνδρεία), ‘high-mindedness’ (µεγαλοπρέπεια), ‘ease in learning’ (εὐµάθεια), and ‘good memory’ 
(µνήµη). Accordingly, to be ‘philosophical’ means to possess a certain set of traits that ultimately 
encourages the pursuit of genuine wisdom (cf., e.g., Rep. VI 487a, 490cd). Note that at 487a Socrates 
also considers the naturally philosophic to be ‘graceful’ (εὔχαρις), and virtuous, calling such an 
individual ‘both a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and moderation’ (φίλος τε καὶ συγγενὴς 
ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης). Further note that εὐµαθῆ and µνήµων, along with 
ἀγχίνοος, ‘being of quick wit or mind’, are mentioned in the Laws (747b). These traits, in particular, 
are moulded via mathematical study-a study, as we know from the Republic, which is part of the 
aspiring philosopher-king’s curriculum. 
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required as well, as the remarks between 496a-497b make clear. Socrates, be he the 
elenctic figure or the more doctrinal one, satisfies both criteria: apart from his natural 
endowment, Socrates implies that his upbringing in Athens, particularly disengaged 
from the conventional affairs of the city, has allowed him to become part of that small 
group of individuals who rightfully consort with philosophy. Plato, then, wants to 
make clear that Socrates is a philosopher in the general sense of the word; that, whilst 
not the topmost theoretician, and so candidate for best possible philosopher in an ideal 
city-state, Socrates ought to be recognized as a bona fide philosopher in an actual 
city-state, an endowed mind seeking the truth amidst charlatans. 
Why does Plato make the conscious effort to prevent his character Socrates, be 
he the elenctic figure or the more doctrinal one, from being one of those knowers (and 
in turn appliers) of the Good in the Republic? Again, regarding the Socrates of Book I, 
it must have something to do with what Plato seriously sets down as that Socrates’ 
raison d’être (a raison d’être probably influenced by the historical Socrates): to 
philosophize, and in the process better others, by way of quizzing men on what they 
claim to know.151 Of course, from Book II onwards Socrates is not simply elenctic; 
there is no question that in the middle books he subscribes to the heavy-duty 
metaphysics of Platonic Forms. But we must not forget that this same man cannot 
explain in detail what the Good is, and how it is related to the other Forms, except via 
analogy and metaphor. Nor can he produce anyone else who can do this. Hence he has 
nothing specific here to apply elenchus to: he can only speak in general about the 
Forms and ideal philosopher-kings. But that may very well be his straightforward 
purpose: Socrates of Books II-X in the Republic serves as a sort of herald, as someone 
who is meant to entice the reader of the Republic to the more positive sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 This raison d’être is prominently featured in the Theaetetus. See Ch. V 
 	  
100	  
philosophizing that awaits, to the sort of philosophizing that Plato, certainly by the 
time of writing the Republic, thinks can bring one to understand reality, and in turn 
apply, if the ideal conditions are met, that understanding in the political realm.  
 





















PHILOSOPHY IN THE SOPHIST AND STATESMAN 
 
In this chapter I examine the remarks on the philosopher in the Sophist and Statesman. 
My chief claim is that, in the Sophist and Statesman, Plato deliberately leaves the 
account of the topmost philosopher open so as to allow his topmost philosopher to 
concern himself with asking and answering a variety of questions (e.g., ‘What is a 
sophist?’ ‘What is the relation between Being as such and Non-Being as such?’). In 
doing so, Plato prevents his topmost philosopher from being fixed to any particular 
sub-branch of gnostic knowledge (explained below). In other words, I claim that Plato 
subtly casts the topmost philosopher as someone who transcends the epistemic 
boundaries that mark off the typical statesman, the typical geometer, and so on. 
Ultimately, I argue that the philosopher of the Sophist and Statesman is subtly 
projected as a multi-disciplinary expert, a polymath; that, in the Sophist and 
Statesman, ‘philosopher’, in contrast to ‘sophist’ and ‘statesman’, does not mark off 
an expert found under a specific sub-branch of knowledge.  
 
SOME BRIEF REMARKS ON FORMS IN CERTAIN POST-REPUBLIC 
DIALOGUES  
 
Before turning to examine in detail the philosopher of the Sophist and 
Statesman, I would like to comment on the nature of Forms or Kinds (genē, eidē),152 
as they are presented in these post-Republic dialogues. Melissa Lane, for example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 I shall use the terms interchangeably. 
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rejects equating the Forms of the Sophist and Statesman with the ‘Phaedo- or 
Republic-style explanatory Forms’.153 We may group Lane with, for example, M.M. 
McCabe, Kenneth Sayre, Malcolm Schofield, and Mary Louise Gill.154 These scholars 
generally agree with the thesis that in later dialogues Plato reexamines and, where 
necessary, reformulates essential parts of his middle-period (viz., Phaedo, Republic) 
theory of language, knowledge, and above all Forms.  
Now, I do not wish to take sides on this issue. Nor do I believe I have to. This 
is because arguing for or against a uniform picture of Forms from the Republic to the 
Philebus is ultimately unnecessary for achieving my general task of tracking the 
account of philosophy and its topmost theoretical branch, the science of dialectic, in 
Plato. Whatever changes to Plato’s conception of the nature of these universals 
(‘Kinds’, ‘Forms’) may or may not occur between the Republic and the Philebus (the 
latter safely being one of Plato’s latest dialogues), two things, which I am principally 
concerned with in this dissertation, remain constant. 
Firstly, Forms in general are cast as eternal, invariable and incomprehensible 
via the senses: 
 
‘And beauty itself and good itself and all the things that we thereby set down as many, 
reversing ourselves, we set down according to a single form of each (κατ' ἰδέαν µίαν 
ἑκάστου ὡς µιᾶς οὔσης), believing that there is but one, and call it ‘the being’ (“ὃ 
ἔστιν”) of each…And we say that the many beautiful things and the rest are visible 
but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible (τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας 
νοεῖσθαι µέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὔ)’ (Rep., VI 507b5-10) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Lane (1998) 15 et passim 
154 Cf. McCabe (1994); Sayre (1983); Schofield (2004); Gill (2013) 
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‘[F]or those things that are greatest and most valuable, there is no image at all which 
has been worked in plain view for the use of mankind (τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ µεγίστοις οὖσι καὶ 
τιµιωτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδωλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασµένον ἐναργῶς), 
the showing of which will enable the person who wants to satisfy the mind of an 
inquirer to satisfy it adequately, just by fitting it to one of the senses. That is why one 
must practice at being able to give and receive an account of each thing; for the things 
that are without body, which are finest and greatest, are shown clearly only by verbal 
means (τὰ γὰρ ἀσώµατα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ µέγιστα λόγῳ µόνον…σαφῶς δείκνυται) 
and by nothing else, and everything that is now being said is for the sake of these 
things.’ (Pol., 285e4-286a7) 
 
Secondly, knowledge of Forms as such (i.e., what it means for Form/Kind X 
to be Form/Kind X), or more precisely of a certain set thereof, is strictly ascribed to 
the topmost science of philosophy, dialectic:  
 
‘Then also understand that, by the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that 
which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these 
hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses-but as stepping stones to take off 
from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having 
grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, 
comes down to a conclusion without use of anything visible at all, but only forms 
themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms (ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς 




‘{Socrates} Do we maintain that these kinds of sciences [sc. the mathematical 
sciences discussed] are the most precise? {Protarchus} Certainly. {Soc} But the 
power of dialectic (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναµις) would repudiate us if we put any 
power ahead of her. {Pro} What power do we mean by that again? {Soc} Clearly 
everybody would know what power I am referring to now! For I take it that anyone 
with any share in reason at all would consider the discipline concerned with being and 
what is really and forever in every way eternally self-same by far the truest of all 
kinds of knowledge.’ (Phlb., 57e3-58a5)155 
 
I postpone highlighting the differences between the various accounts of the science of 
dialectic in Plato until the concluding chapter of this dissertation. For the moment, 
suffice it to say that what all the selected dialogues in this dissertation have in 
common is that only the science of dialectic, however precisely it is described in a 
given dialogue, fully understands certain Forms or Kinds qua Forms or Kinds. 
 What about those Forms or Kinds singled out in the Sophist and Statesmen? In 
the Sophist certain Forms are labeled as ‘greatest’ or ‘most important’ (µέγιστα, Sph., 
254d4).156 
 
‘Let’s not talk about every form. That way we won’t be thrown off by dealing with 
too many of them. Instead let’s choose some of those said to be most important (τῶν 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Tr. Frede with slight adjustment on my part. ‘Dunamis’ and ‘epistēmē’ are used interchangeably in 
this passage to refer to the same science. I return to this important passage in Ch. IV. 
156 All five of the greatest kinds highlighted in the Sophist are said to exist, literally ‘have a share in 
that which is’ (µετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, 256e2), regardless of their individual capacity to blend (or not) with 
one another (cf. Sph.  254d ff.). 
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µεγίστων λεγοµένων ἄττα). First we’ll ask what each is like, and next we’ll ask about 
their ability to associate with each other.’ (Sph., 254c2-5)157 
 
Similarly in the Statesman, certain Forms are distinguished as being, amongst other 
things, ‘greatest’ (τοῖς…µεγίστοις, 285e5, µέγιστα, 286a6). This explicit 
identification of certain beings as ‘greatest’ or ‘most important’ in these dialogues 
evidences a rough distinction amongst ‘those which are’ (ta onta) in the later 
dialogues.  
To be sure, a lot hinges on the precise meaning of ‘greatest’ with reference to 
Forms in the Sophist and Statesman; answering what exactly makes a particular Form 
great, and further what in general distinguishes this being from all others, is a 
dissertation in itself. That said, whilst I believe that Plato may have in mind some sort 
of hierarchy of beings, it is unnecessary for my dissertation to account for it in any 
detail. Nor do I feel obligated to argue that the same Forms are consistently identified 
as ‘greatest’ from dialogue to dialogue. What I specifically argue in this dissertation is 
that there exists in certain dialogues a science with exclusive access to universals or a 
particular set thereof (whatever exactly the nature of these universals is); that in a 
given dialogue no other science, apart from one that is typically cast as supra-
mathematical, fully understands Forms or Kinds qua Forms or Kinds.  
All the same, a brief analysis of the following quotation from the Sophist may 
shed some light on what makes a Form great.  
 
‘We’ve agreed on this: some kinds will associate with each other and some won’t, 
some will to a small extent and others will associated a great deal, nothing prevents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 White’s translation, with slight adjustment on my part. 
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still others from being all pervading-from being associated with every one of them (τὰ 
δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκένα) [Sph., 254b7-c1, cf. Sph., 
254bc] 
 
Being as such, for example, is found blended with everything that is. Hence, its 
greatness may be related to the extent to which it pervades (note ‘κεκοινωνηκένα’ 
above) all existent things. To a lesser extent, Statecraft as such, at least the true one 
discussed in the Statesman, hypothetically could be present in all deserving 
communities. So it too is great in this sense.158 I note that comparison of these two 
examples hints at some sort of degree of difference amongst the greatest Kinds. So be 
it. Neither the Sophist nor the Statesman explicitly prohibit thinking of particular 
distinctions amongst the greatest Kinds, especially a distinction of degree of 
pervasiveness.  
Now, it is possible that Plato has another sense of ‘megiston’ in mind. The 
Statesman distinguishes what can be made sufficiently clear by simply pointing to it, 
or presenting a picture (depiction, duplication or copy, etc., etc.) of it,159 from what 
can only be comprehend by means of a logos (definition, account).160 At the very least, 
then, what is so great (read ‘impressive’) about the latter, non-depicted being is that 
its very nature can only be comprehended by reason. Perhaps the number of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Gómez-Lobo (1977) similarly speaks of the distinguishing ‘pervasive’ nature of certain Kinds, 
particularly the greatest ones mentioned in the text. He separates Kinds into two general classes: 
pervasive and non-pervasive. This separation is vital for his reading of the Sophist passage on the 
science of dialectic (253e1-e2). For an argument in support of the Kind Statecraft being a megiston 
genos, see Miller (2004) 69-71; Lane (1998) 71-2. 
159 Though crafting logoi of such beings is important for the sake of bettering one as a dialectician, cf. 
Pol., 286ab. I return to this point below. 
160 Cf. Owen (1973) 353 ff.; Miller (2004) 70 f.; Lane (1998) 71 ff. The three scholars generally agree 
on this point, though see Lane’s (1998) 72-4 revision of Owen’s reading. 
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greatest Kinds may seem uncomfortably large to the reader, as the inclusion of 
statecraft in the Statesman suggests (cf. n. 158). But, I reply, there is no mention at 
Statesman 285e-286a of a specific limit to the number of Kinds that qualify as being 
‘greatest’. I should also point out that to arbitrarily impose a limit to the number of 
kinds which qualify as ‘greatest’ in the Sophist goes against what is said particularly 
therein: the list of greatest Kinds discussed is not exhaustive, the actual limit is not 
specified (cf. Sph., 254c2-5).161  
To briefly review, so far I have identified two distinct ways in which a Kind 
can be megiston: a Kind is great either on account of its pervasiveness in reality, or 
because of its impressiveness, as something so breathtaking upon comprehending it 
via reason alone. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Plato may 
have both in mind. Incidentally, one may ask how weaving, as treated in the 
Statesman, stands in relation to the distinctions just drawn? Surely it (i.e., its Kind) is 
not megiston, yet it does receive an elaborate logos in the dialogue. Roughly put, 
putting together an account of what is depictable, as is the case with weaving, is 
essential prior to turning to craft an account of what is essentially undepictable. 
Surely the latter is more difficult to craft than the former. Yet in order to competently 
understand the latter Kind as such, and in turn craft a logos concerning it, one needs 
to initially fine-tune his rational faculty by way of crafting a variety of logoi on a 
variety of less impressive onta. Hence the seemingly superfluous time and effort 
dedicated to presenting an account of weaving. As Melissa Lane puts it:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 ‘{EV} Let’s not talk about every form. That way we won’t be thrown off by dealing with too many 
of them. Instead let’s choose some of the most important ones (τῶν µεγίστων λεγοµένων ἄττα). First 
we’ll ask what they’re like, and next we’ll ask about their ability to associate with each other.’ 
 	  
108	  
‘[T]he depictable and undepictable things are distinguished with reference to inquiry; 
the importance of practising giving logoi of all things, so as to be able to give them of 
the undepictables, is derived as a conclusion; and the fact that it is easier to practise 
with lesser things is appended…For the Greeks as for us, weaving is manifestly 
depictable. But the interests of the inquiry [sc. the dialogue in the Statesman]-interests 
of practising giving logoi for the sake of the greater things which weaving was 
introduced to exemplify-dictate that the giving of a logos instead of a picture of 
weaving was justified.’162 
 
 On a separate note, given that division is ostensibly applied to every subject 
matter (a topic I discuss in more detail next chapter), one may ask whether every 
discipline studies a Form or set thereof, albeit without that discipline thinking of the 
epistemological and metaphysical implications of doing so (e.g., the Cratylus’ shuttle 
maker). I have no problem accepting the view that Plato believes all genuine 
craftsmen and scientists look, with varying degrees of awareness of the 
epistemological and metaphysical implications of doing so, to an eternal paradigm 
(i.e., Form) in their particular field of expertise.163 I believe that the Cratylus 
evidences this view quite clearly. So too does Francesco Ademollo: 
 
‘in any art or craft there is a (more or less conscious) conceptual component, 
insofar as the craftsman manufactures his product by having a general idea of 
the kind of thing he is producing, the proportions it must embody, the purpose 
it will serve, etc. From Socrates’ (and Plato’s) vantage point, this conceptual 
experience is, as a matter of fact, grounded in the existence of the forms; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Lane (1998) 74 
163 Cf. Ch. I p. 51 with n. 67. I shall return to this point again in the next two chapters. 
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hence his description– a de re description– of the craftsman ‘looking to’ the 
form.’164 
 
All the same, I repeat that no other science apart from the science of dialectic is 
ascribed knowledge (and so full awareness) of Forms as such. Nor, a fortiori, is any 
other science, apart from the science of dialectic, attributed knowledge (and so full 
awareness) of the relation amongst Forms as such. All this will be elaborated on in 
what follows. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE SOPHIST AND STATESMAN  
 
 There are two interwoven aims to this section. The first is to combine the 
account of the philosopher as found in the Sophist (249d-253c) and Statesman (285d-
286b) and accordingly present a more thorough picture of the philosopher spoken of 
therein. The second is to show that ‘philosopher’ (philosophos) in these two dialogues 
refers particularly to the philosopher who has mastered the science of dialectic of the 
Sophist and Statesman. 
Whilst discussing what Kinds are capable of blending, and what expert is 
accordingly adept at both knowing and showing this sort of interaction (Sph., 249d-
253ac), the Eleatic Visitor (hereafter EV) and Theaetetus appear to the stumble upon 
the philosopher. I quote the passage at length. 
 
{EV} So if someone’s going to show us correctly which kinds harmonize with which 
and which kinds exclude each other, doesn’t he have to have some kind of expertise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Ademollo (2011) 127 
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(µετ' ἐπιστήµης τινὸς) as he proceeds through the discussion? And in addition doesn’t 
he have to know whether there are any kinds that run through all of them and link 
them together to make them capable of blending, and also, when there are divisions, 
whether certain kinds running through wholes are always the cause of division? 
{Theaetetus} Of course that requires expertise (ἐπιστήµης) -probably just about the 
most important kind. {EV} What, then, shall we now call this expertise, Theaetetus? 
Or for heaven’s sake, without noticing have we stumbled on the expertise that free 
people have (τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων…ἐπιστήµην)? Maybe we’ve found the philosopher 
(τὸν φιλόσοφον) even though we were looking for the sophist? {Thaetetus} What do 
you mean? {EV} Aren’t we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic (τῆς 
διαλεκτικῆς...ἐπιστήµης) to divide things by kinds and not to think that the same form 
is a different one or that a different form is the same? {Tht} Yes {EV} So if a person 
can do that, he’ll be capable of adequately discriminating a single form spread out all 
through a lot of other things, each which stands separate from the others. In addition 
he can discriminate forms that are different from each other but are included within a 
single form that’s outside them, or a single form that’s connected as a unit throughout 
many wholes, or many forms that are completely separate from others. That’s what it 
is to know how to discriminate by kinds (τοῦτο δ᾽ἔστιν…διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος 
ἐπίστασθαι.) how things can associate and how they can’t. {Tht} Absolutely. {EV} 
Certainly you will not, I take it, grant this activity of dialectic (τό…διαλεκτικὸν) to 
anyone except to one who philosophises purely and justly (πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ 
δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.). {Tht} You certainly couldn’t assign it to anyone else. {EV} 
We’ll find that the philosopher will always be in a location like this if we look for him. 
He’s hard to see clearly too, but not in the same way as the sophist. {Tht} Why not? 
{EV} The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which he’s had 
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practice dealing with, and he’s hard to see because the place is so dark. Isn’t that 
right? {Tht} It seems to be. {EV} But the philosopher, at any rate, always stays near 
the form of that which is via reasoning (ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ 
λογισµῶν προσκείµενος ἰδέᾳ). He isn’t at all easy to see because that area is so bright 
and the eyes of most people’s souls can’t bear to look at what’s divine. {Tht} That 
seems just as right as what you just said before. {EV} We’ll think about the 
philosopher more clearly soon if we want to. But as far as the sophist is concerned we 
obviously shouldn’t give up until we’ve gotten a good enough look at him. {Tht} Fine. 
(Sph., 253b8-254b7)165 
   
Through the course of this passage we are told that the philosopher is someone 
who has the free man’s knowledge (ἐπιστήµης, 253b9, c4; ταύτην [epistēmēn], 253c6, 
τὴν…ἐπιστήµην, 253c7-8,) of dialectic (τῆς διαλεκτικῆς…ἐπιστήµης, 253d2-3): he 
knows (i) what Kinds are capable of blending and which ones are not.166 He also 
knows (ii) just how to divide things by Kinds and put them back together, how to map 
this association. As Theaetetus states, such knowledge (epistēmē) is ‘probably just 
about the most important kind [of knowledge]’ (253c4-5, cf. 253bc).  
Now (ii), otherwise referred to as the ‘activity of dialectic’ (to dialektikon), is 
clearly the employment of division. Yet, reflecting on the philosopher’s expertise as a 
whole, an important point can be inferred given (i) and (ii): the philosopher (iii) 
knows a given Kind as such. (i) and (ii) require (iii): to know both the relation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Tr. White, with some adjustments on my part. 
166 The mention of a free man’s expertise here recalls Socrates calling the philosopher a free man in the 
Theaetetus-see especially 172d. Note as well Socrates’ description of the philosopher as one who 
‘…tracks down by every path the nature of each whole of those which are’ (…πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν 
ἐρευνωµένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου, 173e6-174a1, cf. Sph., 253d5-e2, 254a8-9). In Ch. V I address 
in further detail the similarities between the philosopher in the Theaetetus and the expert of dialektikē. 
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between Kind A and Kind B, and in turn how to map said relation, you must first 
know the respective natures of Kind A and Kind B. What is more, (iv) this detailed 
metaphysical grasp of Kinds can only be possible in light of the philosopher’s 
knowledge of those ‘greatest’ Kinds highlighted in the dialogue. Indeed, mapping the 
relation between Kinds in general presupposes knowledge of the greatest Kinds, 
because all Kinds associate in some sense with the greatest Kinds highlighted in the 
Sophist (256de, 257a, 259ab). The general point is that any thorough account of the 
relation between Kinds in general is made possible only in light of the expert of 
dialectic’s unique knowledge of the nature of the greatest Kinds.  
Recall the line, ‘aren’t we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to 
divide things by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a 
different form is the same?’ It is essential to consider the level at which the 
philosopher with expertise in dialektikē considers Kinds. A comparison with a builder 
may help: a builder, who divides his material into bricks, stones, titles, etc., is not 
going to philosophically reflect on ‘a brick is a stone’.167 But someone who is ‘meta-
thinking’ (i.e., philosophically reflecting) in this way about classifications of Kinds, 
(and accordingly their individual natures), about especially objects like Sameness as 
such, Difference as such, Being as such, can easily fall into certain paradoxes about 
whether, say, the Same is Different, or that Non-Being in some sense is. For that 
reason, the mark of a true expert of dialektikē is to have the requisite knowledge of 
the relevant Kinds as such so as to not be fazed by these paradoxes. In other words, 
the expert of dialektikē must know what it means for Sameness to be Sameness, 
Difference to be Difference, and so on and so forth. With this knowledge, he is able to 
understand the relation between these Kinds, and accordingly avoid or dismiss certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Compare with the remark on ‘the beautifully is ugly’ in the Theaetetus (189c ff.). 
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paradoxes.168 To be clear, the capacity to perform this activity (viz., employing 
division or to dialektikon) to its fullest, to be able to understand the relation between 
any given set of Kinds, is made possible by the philosopher’s prior understanding of 
the respective natures of a select group of ‘greatest’ Kinds.169 
Moving on, in the Statesman, the EV, whilst describing the role and import of 
measurement, particularly as employed by any legitimate art or science (283b-285c), 
turns to describe, and further stress the importance of to dialektikon (285d5-286b2): 
 
{EV} What then about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it been set before us 
more for the sake of that very thing, or for the sake of our becoming better 
dialecticians in relation to all subjects (ἕνεκα…τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις 
γίγνεσθαι;)? {Young Socrates} That’s clear too-for the sake of our becoming better 
dialecticians generally. {EV} I certainly don’t suppose that anyone with any sense 
would want to hunt down the definition of weaving for the sake of weaving itself. But 
I think the majority of people fail to recognize that for some of the things there are 
(τοῖς…τῶν ὄντων), there are certain perceptible likenesses which are there to be 
easily understood, and which it is not at all hard to point out when one wants to make 
an easy demonstration, involving no trouble and without recourse to verbal means, to 
someone who asks for an account of one of these things. Conversely, for those things 
that are greatest and most valuable, there is no image at all which has been worked in 
plain view for the use of mankind (τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ µεγίστοις οὖσι καὶ τιµιωτάτοις οὐκ ἔστιν 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Some of these paradoxes are addressed in the very discussion of the Sophist, most notably that Non-
Being is.  
169 I generally agree with Notomi (1999) 246 that the inquiry by the EV and Theaetetus in the Sophist 
into the association amongst certain kinds is meant to demonstrate a proper philosophical (i.e., 
dialectical) handling of the issue, in contrast to what would be classed as the improper (i.e., eristic, 
non-truth seeking) handling of such an issue by a sophist. 
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εἴδωλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασµένον ἐναργῶς), the showing of which 
will enable the person who wants to satisfy the mind of an inquirer to satisfy it 
adequately, just by fitting it to one of the senses. That is why one must practice at 
being able to give and receive an account (λόγον …δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθα) of each 
thing; for the things that are without body, which are finest and greatest, are shown 
clearly only by verbal means (τὰ γὰρ ἀσώµατα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ µέγιστα λόγῳ 
µόνον…σαφῶς δείκνυται) and by nothing else, and everything that is now being said 
is for the sake of these things. But practice in everything is easier in smaller things, 
rather than in relation to the greater. {YS} Very well said. 
 
Here the use of division on ‘small things’ (i.e., subject matter that is 
perceivable) is important practice in preparation for hitting upon and discussing the 
‘greatest and most valuable things’ that are image-and-bodi-less. Division, in other 
words, must be used for easier investigations when an individual is first starting out 
his philosophical education. To be clear, ‘dialektikē’ is not used in the passage above. 
Nor, for that matter, do we find any term for expertise or science (viz., ‘technē’, 
‘epistēmē’). Yet the sort of ‘practicing’ alluded to by the EV, which again is clearly a 
reference to the employment of division, implies mastering a particular expertise by 
means of division. And even though a term for this expertise or science is not used, 
reference to bettering oneself as a dialectician for the sake of understanding ‘all things’ 
(περὶ πάντα, 285d5), coupled with the explicit mention of this expertise’s ultimate 
goal, knowledge of greatest Kinds,170 suggests that the expertise in question is none 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 The EV may not have the exact same entities in mind here in the Statesman as he does in the Sophist. 
Nonetheless, in both dialogues those entities that the EV calls ‘greatest’ are safely identifiable as 
universals. The nature of these universals in and of themselves is expressly what the expert of 
dialektikē has as his special subject matter in these connected dialogues. 
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other than a science of dialectic. Accordingly, the philosopher who masters this super 
science must be the philosopher par excellence. 
When we conjoin the two passages from the Sophist and Statesman, we have 
the following rough account of the highlighted philosopher: most generally, he is an 
expert in dialektikē, in the thorough discriminating/discerning/judging (διαισθάνεται, 
Sph., 253d7, διακρίνειν, 253e2) of Kinds as such, which is informed by his unique 
grasp of greatest Kinds. More precisely, in light of his knowledge of the greatest 
Kinds, this philosopher knows in general what Kinds are capable of blending and 
which ones are not. He also knows just how to divide things by Kinds and put them 
back together.171 With this body of knowledge in hand, the philosopher par excellence 
is able to address any number of issues that arise in discussion about Kinds (more on 
this activity below).  
 
ON GILL’S PHILOSOPHER (OF THE SOPHIST AND STATESMAN) 
 
Of course, not every scholar reads these admittedly difficult and rather cryptic 
passages of the Sophist and Statesman exactly as I do. Mary Louise Gill, for example, 
similarly maintains that the Sophist and Statesman reveal a rough insight into the 
nature of Plato’s philosopher, an expert distinguished in major part by his skill in 
‘dialectic’ (i.e., division).172 Yet Gill distinguishes herself by claiming that the Sophist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 This is not to say that this philosopher fully knows all Kinds in the universe, or that Plato even 
expects a full-fledged philosopher to know everything that there is to possibly know. 
172 Cf. Gill (2013) 211-14, 223-27. Note, though, that Gill (2013) sees a single professional philosopher 
in the selected group of dialogues (primarily the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman), who 
is ascribed a distinguished knowledge (epistēmē); she holds that there is only one scientist who 
technically merits the appellation ‘philosopher’: the scientist of Being qua Being (see above). I 
disagree with Gill; whilst there is a topmost philosopher, whom I identify as the expert of the science 
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and Statesman only give us pieces of a greater puzzle regarding the philosopher’s 
‘object’ (Gill’s term): the Form of Being.173 According to Gill, these dialogues are 
meant to be read as part of a greater group (along with the Parmenides and 
Theaetetus). The true, complete account of the philosopher is revealed only when all 
of the puzzle pieces regarding Being as such are put together correctly (i.e., when the 
problem particularly regarding the metaphysical status of Being as such is solved).174 
Ultimately, Gill argues that the problem regarding Being is solved when we 
understand that Being as such both changes and is at rest (i.e., Being includes both 
things that change and things at rest).175 
The philosopher ‘is interested in all beings’,176 according to Gill, in contrast to 
other specialists who carve off a part of Being for their respective domains of 
expertise. Accordingly, she ascribes knowledge of Being as such solely to her expert 
philosopher. As Lloyd Gerson, remarking on Gill’s portrayal of the philosopher, has 
observed, ‘Plato’s philosopher is thus, as it turns out, an Aristotelian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of dialectic, he is not the only scientific philosopher. Additionally, Gill (2013) 242-4 acknowledges 
that the philosopher is not the only expert who uses division; she compares and contrasts the 
philosopher’s use of division with the true rhetorician’s use of it in the Phaedrus (a comparison I 
analyze as well next chapter). Yet she argues that the philosopher, in contrast to the true rhetorician, 
uses division to better others, namely by stimulating them to find out what truly is. In passing, Gill 
(2013) is not clear about (i) the number of experts who are not philosophers yet who use division. Nor 
is she clear about (ii) whether only the philosopher uses division to better others. 
173 On Being as such being the philosopher’s ‘object’, see Gill (2013) Introduction. 
174 The problem, according to Gill, stretches across the selected group of dialogues. Starting in the 
Parmenides, the first four hypotheses regarding Unity in the second half of the dialogue are meant to 
serve as a dialectical template for the problem regarding Being as such that Plato places across the 
related dialogues (cf. Gill (2013) Ch. 2). A summary of the way in which the pattern is taken up in each 
of the related dialogues is found in Gerson (2013). 
175 More generally, it is a ‘necessary external attribute [of object X] (a feature an entity must have, 
though the feature stands outside its nature)’ (Gill (2013) 208, cf. 152-3). Gill calls Being as such a 
‘structural kind’ that is always filled in with the contents of some ‘categorical kind’, cf. Gill (2013) 230, 
241. 
176 Gill (2013) 241 
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metaphysician.’177 I shall not focus here on the contentious characterization of Plato’s 
philosopher post-Republic as ‘Aristotelian’.178 I shall, nonetheless, voice two issues I 
have with Gill’s account of the philosopher post-Republic.  
Firstly, Gill says that ‘we will find him [sc. the philosopher] by investigating 
the subject-matter he studies, the form of being.’179 This remark is based upon what is 
said at Sophist 253e-254b. Now, in the Sophist the philosopher is indeed said to ‘stay 
near the form of being’ (τῇ τοῦ ὄντος…προσκείµενος ἰδέᾳ, 254a8-9), in contrast to 
the sophist, who hides near that which is not. Yet this remark, by itself, cannot serve 
as convincing evidence for a single ‘object’ attributable to a single scientific 
philosopher. This is because it strongly echoes what is said in Republic V: any 
genuine intellectual is a philosopher so long as he aims to stay close to ‘that which is’ 
(cf. Rep. V, 476a-480a). More precisely, the passage in Republic V tells us that the 
real philosopher is distinguished from your typical craftsman and common man, your 
general ‘lover of sights’, in virtue of his close connection to ‘that which is’. This 
broad distinction between philosopher and non-philosopher is based on the former’s 
unique pursuit of ‘the things themselves that are always the same in every respect’ 
(αὐτὰ ἕκαστα…καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα, 479e7-8). Given what is said in 
Book VII, that all approved studies aim at what is intelligible and eternal (cf. 527b, 
529b), Plato arguably does not have a single science in mind at this point in Book V; 
all intellectuals, scattered across various disciplines, are genuine philosophers if they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Gerson (2013); Gill (2013), see esp. 9-10 and 241 with n. 90, could hardly deny the characterization. 
178 Gerson (2013) raises some salient criticisms, which ultimately question the appropriateness of this 
characterization. 
179 Gill (2013) 6 
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look (with varying degrees of awareness of the epistemological and metaphysical 
implications) to what is eternally self-same.180 
Taken by itself, then, the remark in the Sophist about the philosopher staying 
near ‘the form of being’ could just as reasonably be taken to refer to the philosopher 
in general, where ‘philosopher’ broadly marks off any intellectual who seriously 
pursues the truth (i.e., what is eternal and self-same), in contrast to the sophist.181 To 
understand what actually distinguishes the philosopher of the Sophist and Statesman 
from all other philosophers (intellectuals), we have to look at what is said about his 
unique philosophical activities, which are not strictly limited to arriving at some sort 
of positive account regarding the nature of Kinds as such.  I shall say more about the 
philosopher par excellence’s unique activities next section. Ultimately, I shall argue 
that the philosopher par excellence has an ‘epitactic’ or directive side that Gill does 
not consider. In the interim, it is important to note that Sophist 253e-254b does not 
serve as convincing evidence for Gill’s account of the philosopher; all bona fide 
philosophical disciplines study ‘that which is’ in some sense. What is more, the 
account so far compiled of this philosopher of the Sophist and Statesman reveals that 
Being as such constitutes just one member of the indeterminate set of greatest Kinds 
that the philosopher consults when considering both the individual nature of a given 
Kind and that Kind’s relation to any given set of Kinds. 
This brings me to the second issue I have with Gill’s account of Plato’s 
philosopher. I find it rather strange that, even after Gill purportedly puts all the puzzle 
pieces together correctly, her account of the philosopher reveals nothing substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 This passage has also been discussed in Ch. II (pp. 73-4). 
181 So the Sophist passage in fact complements the Republic V passage: A true philosopher is 
distinguished from the person who is guided by opinion, of what is between truth and falsehood (cf. 
Rep. V 478be), as well as from the sophist, who overlooks truth and opinion for falsehood. 
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about the philosopher’s connection to the Form of the Good.182 We know that the 
Good as such is openly cast in the Republic as the greatest of Forms. It is said to be  
‘beyond being, superior to it in rank and power’ (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ 
δυνάµει ὑπερέχοντος, Rep. VI, 509b9-10). In general, the Good as such is cast as a 
Form surpassing even Being’s epistemological and metaphysical importance (cf. Rep. 
VI, 504e-505b, 508e-509b).183 
Now, it is true that Gill acknowledges in passing the preeminent status of the 
Good in the Republic. Yet she says that the Good ‘does not figure prominently’ in the 
dialogues under consideration in her book.184 She does claim that the Statesman 
(particularly 296d-297b) alludes to the role of the Good itself: ‘any art concerned with 
human well-being aims to bring about and preserve the good of those in its care’.185 
Yet the Statesman passage in question hardly elucidates the topmost philosopher’s 
unique connection to the Good as such-a connection that presumably would be 
distinguished from the other scientists’ and craftsmen’s respective connection to the 
various subordinate types of goods. Gill promises to elucidate the role of the Good, as 
well as the philosopher’s connection to it, in the last section of her book (Gill’s 
7.9).186 Yet all Gill actually says in the concluding page of her book is that ‘Plato’s 
philosopher aims for the good in two spheres: to understand the nature of things and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 In general, Gill has suspiciously little to say on the metaphysical status of the Good itself in the later 
dialogues. This may have something to due with the fact that Gill (cf. (2013) Ch. 1, as well as p. 202 n. 
1, eschews the metaphysics of the Phaedo, Republic and Timaeus, embracing from the start of her book 
the view that in the later dialogues Plato has renounced the separateness of Forms. On the metaphysics 
of the Timaeus, which considers the role of the Good itself as a separate (i.e., non-immanent) universal, 
see, e.g., Broadie (2012) Ch. 3 esp. 80-2.  
183 This is inferred from the text at 509b. The ‘objects of knowledge’ (τοῖς γιγνωσκοµένοις) mentioned 
in this passage are surely Forms.  
184 Gill (2013) 30 n. 30 
185 Gill (2013) 193 
186 Gill (2013) 30 n. 30, 193 n. 36 
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to help others find it (Stm. 285d5-8, 286d4-287a6). He hunts, he weaves, he often 
distorts, but always with the good in view: to stimulate the audience to discover 
things.’187 This remark hardly illuminates the philosopher’s connection to the Good as 
such. Nor, moreover, does it explain the relation between Being as such, which is 
purportedly the philosopher’s unique ‘object’, and the Good, what in the Republic is 
cast as that which is ‘beyond being in rank and power’. The aforementioned 
oversights are surely detrimental to Gill’s project of putting together a thorough 
account of the philosopher post-Republic. 
Of course, it is anyone’s guess where (knowledge of) the Good of the 
Republic stands particularly in the Sophist and Statesman. There is at least one viable 
explanation for Plato’s silence on the Good, which, pace Gill et al., incidentally does 
not rely on any supposed change to Plato’s metaphysics post-Republic. In the Sophist, 
Plato is not so much concerned with highlighting the nature of the Good as such and 
its relation to other kinds, as he is shedding light on how sophistry might distort that 
account of the Good (of anything that really is, for that matter). Accordingly, a 
detailed discussion on what really constitutes the Good as such, and what really is its 
relation to other Kinds, is simply out of place in context.  
Having said that, I must register my view here that the silence regarding the 
Good as such in the Sophist suggests a shift in Plato’s view of what his topmost 
science, and so topmost philosopher, ought to be focusing on (a point returned to in 
my concluding chapter). For sure, the Sophist, like the Republic, identifies a unique 
philosophical science with a special subject matter. Yet surely when discussing this 
science’s special subject matter (sc. the greatest Kinds) in the Sophist, at least a hint 
of the Good’s nature and corresponding role would be expected. This is especially so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Gill (2013) 244 
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if in fact the Good as such retained the same status ascribed to it in the Republic. As is, 
there is not a hint of said status present in the Sophist. At minimum, then, the silence 
on the Good as such in the Sophist serves as evidence for a difference between the 
science of dialectic of the Republic and the similarly called ‘science of dialectic’ of 
the Sophist: the latter is not ascribed knowledge of the Good as such as its special 
subject matter. 
Regarding the Good as such in the Statesman, perhaps Plato, from the point of 
view of the human context, replaces the Good as such with the more specific good of 
the Kind of Statesmanship (i.e., the inherent goodness in Statesmanship), which 
manifests itself in a well-ordered city-state. This is the type of goodness that Plato 
wants us to focus on in this dialogue. This explanation need not entail a change to 
Plato’s metaphysics after the Republic; the central themes of both dialogues naturally 
preclude detailed discussion on the nature of the Good as such. However, if the Form 
of the Good of the Republic, which is an essential part of the account of the ideal ruler 
therein, is absent from the Statesman, then this proves to be a big (non-metaphysical) 
difference between the Republic and the Statesman regarding proper statesmanship: 
the latter dialogue considers it unnecessary to have knowledge of the Good as such in 
order to be a good political leader. But this silence regarding the Good so intimately 
connected with the theoretically minded philosopher-king of the Republic should not 
seem out of place in a dialogue (sc. the Statesman) that clearly portrays its ideal 
statesman as practical, that is as city-and-citizen-oriented.  
As Malcolm Schofield observes: 
 
‘Crucial to the Republic’s treatment of ruling is the thought that the reason 
that a good person or the philosopher will rule only reluctantly is 
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awareness of a better life than politics. The Statesman gives us no reason 
to suppose that anyone who commanded the political knowledge it 
describes would feel the least reluctance about exercising rule. Its 
statesman is identified not as a philosopher (who would rather be doing 
philosophy), but as a political manager (whose expertise consist precisely 
in the ability to orchestrate the activities of a whole range of other experts, 
all contributing to the life and prosperity of the city). The philosophers of 
the Republic have to escape from the city-imaged by Socrates as the Cave-
if they are ever able to rule it as it should be ruled. The Statesman’s 
statesman is “defined in terms of his relation to the city” [quoting Melissa 
Lane]’.188 
 
Admittedly, not every scholar would agree that the Good as such is missing 
from the statesman’s knowledge. Charles Kahn, for example, says that ‘it seems 
clear…that the τέχνη of the Statesman is, or presupposes, the knowledge constituted 
by dialectic [sc. knowledge of the Good and the rest of the Forms], just as it does in 
the Republic’.189 Kahn cites Statesman 295e and 296d4 in support of his claim.190 
However, the language in these passages at most relays a concern with what is 
objectively morally true. In other words, whilst it is safe to say that the lawgiver who 
sets down ‘what is just and unjust, fine and shameful, good and bad’ (295e) has a 
grasp of what is really just and unjust, good and bad, and so on, this description of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Schofield (2006) 178. See Schofield’s (2006) Ch. 4, particularly 164-85, for a deeper analysis of the 
differences between the Republic and the Statesman on the subjects of politics, political theory, and the 
conception of the statesman (politikos). 
189 Kahn (1995) 51 
190 Kahn (1995) 51 n. 5 
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statesman’s concern with what is right and wrong surely underdetermines the 
metaphysics of Platonic Forms, especially the Good as such of the Republic. 
 
ON THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE 
SOPHIST AND STATESMAN  
 
In what follows, I produce a short diagram of the genuine statesman of the 
Statesman, highlighting in particular that knowledge of statesmanship is found under 
the directive branch (to epitaktikon) of what I term ‘gnostic knowledge’ (gnōstikē 
epistēmē).191  I then show that the philosopher par excellence of the Sophist and 
Statesman can also be ascribed directive or ‘epitactic’ expertise. After that, I turn to 
compare and contrast the epitactic description of the philosopher with the more 
explicit ‘critical’ or judgment-making description of him in the Sophist and Statesman. 
My chief claim is that, in the Sophist and Statesman, Plato deliberately leaves the 
account of the topmost philosopher open so as to allow his topmost philosopher to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Rowe in the Hackett translation has ‘theoretical knowledge’ for ‘gnōstikē epistēmē’. Yet this is a 
dubious translation, particularly given the Aristotelian associations of ‘theoretical’ (see n. 192). 
Accordingly, I translate ‘gnōstikē epistēmē’ as ‘gnostic knowledge’. I feel that this literal translation 
reflects what is said about this epistēmē in the Statesman (258de, 259e-260a), whilst avoiding any 
Aristotelian associations in the process: gnostic knowledge is a knowledge that does not rely on using 
one’s hands, but rather one’s mind.  More precisely, gnostic knowledge is generally an advanced 
understanding of concepts. The arithmetician, for example, strictly speaking discerns the nature of 
numbers (e.g., the two itself) and in turn notes the inherent differences between numbers (viz., the 
general difference between the odd and the even). Any practical application which involves numbers 
(imagine any task that involves arithmetic in order to bring about some product or goal) is left for 
someone else to do; practical application (as per the Statesman) is that activity which applies the 
gnostic expert’s findings for the sake of making something separate from anything initially discovered 
by the theoretician (cf. Pol, 258de). Leaving practical expertise to one side, for it does not concern us 




concern himself with asking and answering a variety of questions (e.g., ‘What is a 
sophist?’ ‘What is the relation between Being as such and Non-Being as such?’). In 
doing so, Plato prevents his topmost philosopher from being fixed to any particular 
sub-branch of gnostic knowledge.192 In other words, I claim that Plato subtly casts the 
topmost philosopher as someone who transcends the epistemic boundaries that mark 
off the typical statesman, the typical geometer, and so on. The philosopher par 
excellence is indeed an expert of dialektikē, a full-fledged ‘kritikos’ or judgement-
maker. Yet he is also something more than this. 
 Below is a short diagram reflecting the EV’s and Young Socrates’ (hereafter 
YS) divisions toward the accurate account of the true statesman in the Statesman. I 
stop at the division of gnostic knowledge into ‘directive’ and ‘judgement-making’, 
because at no point during the course of their investigation do the EV and YS retract 
their initial categorization of the statesman’s knowledge as directive-gnostic. The true 
statesman, an expert (Pol., 258b, 292b), has: 
 
            Knowledge (epistēmē) [258b] 
                  (/)    \ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Perhaps it is worth highlighting at least two notable differences between Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
respective conceptions of knowledge (epistēmē). Importantly, political science would be considered a 
type of ‘practical knowledge’ (phronēsis), not epistēmē, for Aristotle (cf. EN VI, 1141b23-1142a30). 
Aristotle’s conception of epistēmē is reserved for that epistemic state (hexis) concerning what is 
universal, (i.e., unconditional, unchangeable and eternal). By contrast, phronēsis concerns all actions 
resulting from deliberation, which could have turned out differently, that immediately affect human 
agents (cf. EN VI, 1139b14 ff.). Accordingly, Aristotle’s epistēmē excludes any expertise that would be 
placed under Plato’s branch of ‘practical knowledge’ (praktikē epistēmē), e.g., house building. Instead, 
such expertise, according to Aristotle, would be considered ‘art’ (technē), or the know-how of 
producing something (cf. EN ibid.). Yet more importantly, Aristotle’s epistēmē excludes Plato’s true 
statesman’s knowledge, which is considered a type of epitaktikē (a branch of gnostic epistēmē) for 
Plato (see above). 
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                        Practical (praktikē)    Gnostic (gnostikē) [259cd] 
                      (/ )             \  
       Judgement Making  (to kritikon)    Directive (to epitaktikon) [260c, 292bc] 
 
As an expert with directive-gnostic knowledge, the statesman is capable of discerning 
the differences about his subjects (e.g., one soul that is too rash in contrast to another 
that is too timid). The statesman acts upon these noted differences by handing down 
instructions to his subordinates (souls who, through the statesman’s blending and 
education, have obtained a virtuous balance), ultimately for the sake of achieving a 
virtuous equilibrium throughout the city-state and thereby preserving it. 193 
Note that one may possess the epitactic knowledge of statesmanship without 
further playing the active role of statesman; one may advise the ruler and still be 
considered an expert of statesmanship: 
 
‘{EV} If someone who is himself in private practice is capable of advising a doctor in 
public employment, isn’t it necessary for him to be called by the same professional 
title as the person he advises? {YS} Yes. {EV} Well then, won’t we say that the 
person who is clever at giving advise to a king of a country, although he is himself a 
private individual, himself has the expert knowledge (ἔχειν αὐτὸν τὴν ἐπιστήµην) that 
the ruler himself ought to have possessed? {YS} We will.’ (Pol., 259a1-9) 
 
Here the reader may interject: but surely the epitaxis in a city-state immediately arises 
from the ruler, not the advisor. Is it correct, then, to place the advisor under the branch 
of epitactic knowledge? I believe that in so far as the advisor is versed in political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 I shall address below the role of instruction as it is described in the Statesman. 
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management, then he too is rightly called an expert of statesmanship.194 Yet I also 
believe that it would be misguided to say that only the ruler who barks the orders to 
his subordinates is responsible for the epitaxis of the city-state. Instead, in a scenario 
where both an advisor and ruler arise, it must be the conjoined effort of the advisor 
and the ruler that is responsible for said epitaxis. Hence, the difference between the 
ruler and the advisor need not imply that the advisor ought to be classified under a 
different branch of knowledge, for he too is responsible for the epitaxis of a city.  
 Where does the philosopher par excellence fit into this picture? Let us accept 
that it is the expert of dialektikē who establishes what it truly means to be a 
statesman.195 It is the statesman who should listen to what this philosopher says and 
rule accordingly. If this philosopher ‘controls’ the statesman by portraying what the 
statesman truly is, if he guides the statesman on how to be a statesman by way of 
defining his expertise, does it follow that this philosopher is epitactic (given that the 
statesman is)? I say that he is. We just saw that someone can be epitactic without 
directly issuing orders to subordinate workers who use their hands. Accordingly, we 
can see the philosopher par excellence providing what is surely the most important 
kind of advice to the statesman: telling him how to be a statesman. If we accept this 
description of the way in which the philosopher advises the statesman, then the 
philosopher, like the statesman, is ‘kingly’, and if this entails epitactic, then the 
philosopher who employs dialektikē to arrive at a definition of the statesman, and is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Cf. Rowe (1995) 15 n. 11 
195 The Statesman shows a bona fide philosopher (sc. the EV) employing division for the sake of 
achieving just that. Indeed, what other expert has the capacity to define, particularly via division, what 
it generally means to be a statesman? On the philosophical nature of the EV, see Blondell (2002) 318-
26. Though see Gonzalez (2000), for a critical analysis of recent attempts to identify the EV as the 
endorsed mouthpiece for Plato. 
 	  
127	  
thus correctly identified as a kritikos, is also correctly identified as an ‘epitaktikos’ 
(more on this below).196 
The rest of the Statesman (259c ff.) speaks of the possessor of the knowledge 
of statesmanship as being the one and only active ruler, thereby simplifying the 
scenario in which the correct constitution comes about in a city-state: for one city 
there is one correct constitution under the supervision of one statesman (no mention 
of any private advisor). Yet this need not jeopardize the identification of the 
philosopher as an epitactic expert. This is because the statesman qua statesman must 
still look to the definition of what it means to be a statesman in order to correctly rule 
a polis. And this can only occur if the philosopher is there to point him in the right 
direction in the first place. This must be so whether or not the philosopher directly 
advises a particular statesman on practical matters affecting a city-state at any given 
moment.  
Now, there is at first blush a problem with this description of the philosopher 
as epitaktikos in the Statesman: it appears to conflict with the description of the 
philosopher in the Sophist and elsewhere in the Statesman as a kritikos (judgement-
maker).197 Let us compare this general description of the philosopher’s expertise in 
the Sophist with the EV’s remarks in the Statesman on the judgement-making branch 
of theoretical knowledge, to kritikon. In the Statesman, the EV says that an expert 
falling under to kritikon, ‘recognized [and recognizes]’ (γνούσῃ, 259e5) certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 I use the term ‘kritikos’ to refer to an expert judgment-maker. Yet I should point out that ‘kritikos’ 
does not occur in the Sophist passage. All the same, the description of judgment-making in the passage 
clearly distinguishes the judgment-maker from the epitactic expert (as the latter is described in the 
Statesman). 
197 The tension is between, on the one hand, the description of the philosopher at Sophist 253b8-254b7 




theoretical distinctions (e.g., differences between numbers, cf. 259e). The expert in 
turn judges (note ‘κρῖναι’ at 259e7) the differences amongst the objects he has 
recognized. In the Sophist (253de), we see that the philosopher’s discerning or 
discriminating  (diakrinein) kinds amounts to recognizing the differences amongst 
Forms, ‘[discriminating] by Kinds how things [that are different] can associate and 
how they can’t.’198 In neither the Statesman nor the Sophist is the judgment-making 
expert said to prescribe functions or duties to others with the knowledge he has.199 So 
the philosopher of the Sophist and part of the Statesman (285d5-286b2) as kritikos 
does not ‘prescribe’. And if he does not prescribe orders to others, yet he is a gnostic 
expert, then his knowledge must be found under the judgement-making branch of 
gnostic knowledge (where this entails not-directive, ‘not-epitaktikos’).  
Thus the aforementioned tension: how can the philosopher of the Sophist and 
Statesman be described as both a judgement-maker and an epitactic expert, as 
someone found in both branches of gnostic knowledge? Ideally a definitive account of 
the Kind (genos) Philosopher, along the lines of those of the Sophist and Statesman, 
would clarify things. Yet in general all we have from Plato is an incomplete and at 
first blush conflicting insight into the philosopher scattered across two dialogues. Put 
differently, after the Sophist and Statesman, we should expect the Philosopher, and 
with it an informative and definitive account of the philosopher par excellence. But 
Plato never wrote this dialogue. Accordingly, he never set down the precise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Compare what is said at Sph. 254e1-2, ‘ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ µή, διακρίνειν κατὰ 
γένος ἐπίστασθαι’, with what is said at Pol. 295e5-7, ‘γνούσῃ δὴ λογιστικῇ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθµοῖς 
διαφορὰν µῶν τι πλέον ἔργον δώσοµεν ἢ τὰ γνωσθέντα κρῖναι;’ 
199 Prescription here specifically refers to the application of knowledge as attributed to the directive-
gnostic expert: to prescribe is ‘to assign whatever is the appropriate task to each group of workers until 
they complete what has been assigned to them (προστάττειν δὲ ἑκάστοις τῶν ἐργατῶν τό γε πρόσφορον 
ἕως ἂν ἀπεργάσωνται τὸ προσταχθέν)’ (Pol., 260a6-7, cf. 259e-268a, 311ab). 
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differences and similarities between the sophist, statesman and topmost philosopher. 
To complicate things, from the scattered remarks on the philosopher in the Sophist 
and Statesman it seems as if Plato intentionally chose not to fix the philosopher to a 
specific branch of knowledge (epistēmē). Why not?  
My conjecture here is that, in the Sophist and Statesman, Plato is hinting at 
what he sees as the multi-disciplinary nature of his philosopher par excellence. More 
precisely, Plato is subtly projecting his topmost philosopher as a polymath that 
masters above all the topmost science of dialectic, yet who is not restricted to being 
identified only as someone who ‘judges’ things in the sense described in the Sophist 
and Statesman.200  Why did not Plato explicitly say this? Why did he choose not to 
compose the Philosopher, a dialogue that would presumably inform us once and for 
all who is the philosopher par excellence?  
I believe that Plato never wrote the Philosopher because he intended us to see 
for ourselves that the project of defining the philosopher would require a different 
dialectical path than the one used to define the sophist and statesman.201 The latter 
path, exemplified by the Sophist and Statesman, uses division to track down each 
expert to a specific branch of knowledge; to define the sophist or statesman via 
division is to pinpoint what precise expertise each figure has.202 Yet the philosopher 
par excellence cannot be defined in the same way. In the Sophist and Statesman, 
‘philosopher’, unlike ‘sophist’ or ‘statesman’, does not mark off an expert of a single 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 He’s not simply ‘some sort of spectator’ (τινὰ θεατήν), a phrase used to describe the kritikos in the 
Statesman (260c1-4). 
201 Here I am in agreement with, e.g., Notomi (1999) and Gill (2013) on the conjecture that Plato never 
intended to compose the Philosopher; that Plato left to his readers the task of putting together an 
account of the philosopher. 
202 Assuming that the sophist’s skill is rightly classified as an expertise (technē), pace Brown (2010) 
and Gill (2013) 170-72. 
 	  
130	  
technē or epistēmē.203 The philosopher par excellence is interested in knowing (and so 
mastering) all things: 
 
‘{EV} What then about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it been set before 
us more for the sake of that very thing, or for the sake of our becoming better 
dialecticians in relation to all subjects (περὶ πάντα)?’ (Pol., 285d4-6) 
 
Granted, the conditional remark about pursuing this philosopher in the Sophist 
(254b3-6), and the remarks at the start of the Statesman (257a3-5, c2-5) that an 
account of the statesman and philosopher, respectively, is still to come, naturally 
prepare us for the Philosopher, for the EV to continue the same investigation 
ultimately for the sake of defining the philosopher. Yet to expect the continuation of 
this investigation is to miss the point that Plato is rather subtly making in the Sophist 
and Statesman: a perusal of these dialogues reveals the philosopher par excellence, in 
contrast to the statesman and sophist under investigation, is not your ‘typical’ expert 
(i.e., someone found under a specific branch of knowledge). Accordingly, we should 
not expect to track him down in the same way we did the sophist and statesman. The 
general idea is that the multi-disciplinary nature of philosophy, of the pursuit of 
wisdom in general, is reflected in the multi-disciplinary nature of the philosopher par 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 In context (sc. the Sophist and Statesman), ‘sophist’ and ‘statesman’ are terms ultimately used to 
refer to a specific expert found under a specific sub-branch of knowledge. All the same, nothing in the 
dialogues prevents the terms from having multiple referents (e.g., ‘sophist’ may refer to a rhetorician, 
an eristic speaker, a purportedly omniscient teacher, etc., etc.). In fact, Plato does not appear very 
concerned with settling once and for all on a term for a specific object (cf., e.g., Sph., 220d, 227bc, Pol., 
261e-262a). What matters most to him is arriving at the correct account of the object in question. 
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excellence.204 Yes, the topmost philosopher in the Sophist and Statesman is an expert 
of dialektikē, a distinguished knower of the greatest Kinds. Yet this is not all he is, 
thus the space in the Statesman to identify the philosopher as both a kritikos and an 
epitaktikos, as someone who can define the statesman and in turn act as his advisor.205  
Of course, we are not told much about the contrast between the philosopher as 
kritikos and the philosopher as epitaktikos; the epitactic role of the philosopher 
described above is a conjecture. Is the contrast (to consider just one relevant question) 
more precisely based on a difference between the objects that can be brought into 
being versus those which never change? If so, then we should see the philosopher’s 
task of dealing with the paradoxes concerning Kinds necessary for division (I am here 
thinking of especially the five ‘greatest’ or ‘pervasive’ Kinds of the Sophist) is the 
mark of a kritikos, even though his work on the notion of the genuine statesman is 
epitactic.206 However, I think there is more to the story here.  
So far I have only considered (what I would call) a ‘narrow’ sense of the 
philosopher’s epitactic function: the philosopher par excellence is epitactic insofar as 
he uses his knowledge of, say, statesmanship to direct someone on how to be a proper 
statesman.207 Yet I believe that there is space in the Sophist and Statesman for a 
‘wider’ sense of expertise in epitaktikē, which is ascribable to the philosopher par 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 This may go some way to explain the reported unequal distribution of value ascribable to the sophist, 
statesman, and philosopher (Pol. 257a1-b4): the philosopher is considerably more valuable than the 
others because of his distinguished multi-disciplinary capacity. 
205 Compare with the point raised in Ch. II about the philosopher of the Republic: the philosopher’s 
nature is at its most developed only when his theoretical expertise is used to turn him into a political 
expert (viz., by way of ruling Kallipolis). 
206 His work on the statesman may be indirect, of course, as the philosopher par excellence may be 
only an advisor to the genuine statesman. 
207 We may surmise that the philosopher’s epitactic role, in the ‘narrow’ sense described above, is not 
limited to instructing others on statesmanship; that the philosopher can instruct others on any number 
of disciplines.  
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excellence. The account of the philosopher in the Sophist and Statesman suggests a 
concern with paradoxes regarding Kinds. Accordingly, the philosopher’s work of 
putting an end to dialectical paradoxes about Kinds could be seen as primarily 
intended to correct clever people’s thinking, thereby defending the practice of 
division as an instrument in every field. Plato’s rationale could very well be that, 
since division is essential in every discipline (a claim considered in more detail next 
chapter), experts in every discipline ought to know how to properly use division. And 
what better way to help achieve the correct use of division then by having the 
philosopher par excellence address certain ‘meta-issues’ (e.g., paradoxes) on the 
relevant subject matter.  
Surely the Sophist and Statesman themselves constitutes prime examples of 
the sort of corrective activity I have in mind. Note, for example, the EV’s remarks in 
the Statesman on the erroneous way in which most Greeks divide the human race into 
‘Greek’ and ‘Barbarian’, and accordingly how we should be more mindful of dividing 
things into their natural ‘classes’ (eidē) and ‘parts’ (merē)  (cf. 262a-263a).208 This 
corrective activity can be viewed as trying to change things, in particular how people 
think and argue about their subject matter. In this light, the philosopher par excellence 
can be seen as having a more interactive and passionate interest in division as such, 
paradoxes on Kinds, and the subject matter specific to each field.209  
The main idea is that Plato, far from simply having a detached concern with 
Being and the rest of the ‘greatest’ Kinds as subjects of a positive scientific 
exploration of what exists in reality, may also be interested in using division to correct 
the way we reflect on things just to the extent of being interested in protecting the 
way we think from basic mistakes which undermine all possibility of any sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 On the eidos/meros distinction mentioned in this passage, see, e.g., de Pinotti (1995). 
209 In Ch. IV, I argue that the same could be said about the philosopher par excellence of the Philebus.  
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intellectual discipline.210 Accordingly, in this way Plato may view the work on Being, 
Difference, and so on as epitactic. Thus, the philosopher par excellence can be viewed 
as both a kritikos (viz., in virtue of his study of what it means for Kind X to be Kind 
X,) as well as an epitaktikos in the two senses described (viz., in virtue of instructing 
others how to function in accordance with a particular Kind, as well as in virtue of 
correcting the way people reflect and argue about Kinds in general).  
On a separate note, viewing the philosopher’s epitactic activity in the wider 
sense of the term allows for a broad comparison with Socratic elenchus: the latter is 
not a ‘positive’ discipline (i.e., it does not yield positive scientific knowledge of what 
Kind X is; what it means for Kind X to be Kind X), yet it too is in a way corrective. 
Indeed, Socratic elenchus (whose corrective nature is mentioned by the EV in the 
Sophist)211 ultimately complements the work of the philosopher par excellence: the 
elentic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to 
sending them off to work on the most important questions with the philosopher par 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 By the by, this suggested ‘corrective’ dialectical activity has its natural descendant in Aristotle’s 
Topics (I. 2) and Sophistical Elenchi (11), rather than in the Metaphysics (cf. the remarks on ‘first 
philosophy’ as the science of Being as such in Γ). Whilst the Topics and Sophistical Elenchi are 
traditionally classed as part of Aristotle’s Organon, this title reflects a post-Aristotelian controversy 
about whether logic is part of philosophy (this is the Stoic view) or simply a tool used by philosophy 
(the post-Aristotelian view, hence ‘Organon’ or ‘Instrument’), cf. Smith (2012). As such, the Topics 
and Sophistical Elenchi do not fall neatly into Aristotle’s distinction (understood in this way) between 
theoretical, practical, and productive/technical knowledge (cf. EN VI, 1139b14 ff.). As far as I can see, 
Gill (2013) does not address this point. Yet surely she should. For, if the classification of the Topics 
and Sophistical Elenchi does not matter for Aristotle (i.e., if ‘dialectic’ is not specifically placed in one 
of the classes aforementioned), then why should the comparable point matter for Plato? On dialectic in 
Aristotle, see, e.g., Owen (1968) and Hamlyn (1990). 
211 Surely the sixth definition of the sophist (Sph. 227a-231b) is a not so thinly veiled account of the 




excellence.212 Here we are reminded once more of the multi-disciplinary nature of 
philosophy itself: ‘philosophy’ in Plato does not mark off just one thing; its referent is 
not just one art or science. We should also highlight the point that neither is 
philosophy portrayed as wholly ‘positive’; the corrective activities discussed above 
show a ‘negative’ side to the pursuit of wisdom.213  
Now, we saw in Ch. I and II that ‘philosophia’ in the Republic does not refer 
to just one discipline, that philosophy is multi-disciplinary. This notion of philosophy 
as a generic kind, as a set of various disciplines, also appears in the Timaeus: 
 
‘…our ability to see the periods of day-and-night, of months and of years, of 
equinoxes and solstices, has led to the invention of number, and has given us the idea 
of time and opened the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe. These pursuits 
(ἐξ ὧν)[viz., astronomy, arithmetic and calculation, physics, and probably what we 
would call metaphysics as well] have given us the genus of philosophy (φιλοσοφίας 
γένος), a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value [lit. good (ἀγαθὸν)] neither 
has been nor ever will be surpassed.’ (47a4-b2, with minor adjustments on my part; cf. 
Tim. 46e-47b)  
 
One thing we can infer from this passage in the Timaeus is that the best philosopher is 
the best polymath, a man who seeks to embrace the whole of the gods’ gift.214  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 In Ch. V I argue that we can see a similar relationship between Socrates the intellectual midwife 
and the philosopher of Socrates’ digression in the Theaetetus. 
213 The positive-negative fashions of philosophy are easily seen in philosophy as depicted in the middle 
books of the Republic (viz., as the relation between dialektikē, or any ‘positive’ science, for that matter, 
and Socratic elenchus). In Ch. V, we shall see both fashions reappear in the Theaetetus. 
214 Could Plato have in the back of his mind at this point in the Timaeus a hierarchy of philosophical 
enquiry, with what we would call metaphysics (i.e., the study of Forms as such) surpassing even 
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I believe that the account drawn of philosophy in the Sophist and Statesman in 
this chapter, which in particular promotes the idea of the philosopher par excellence 
as a polymath, harmonizes well with Plato’s remarks elsewhere on philosophy as such. 
In fact, in light of the recurring multi-disciplinary depiction of philosophy in Plato,215 
it should come as no surprise that the philosopher par excellence of the Sophist and 
Statesman is himself cast as multi-disciplinary. This philosopher is indeed an expert 
of a supreme science called ‘dialectic’, yet he is also much more than that. In general, 
he is the seeker after the truth in the most important and difficult questions ranging 
across all domains of knowledge. 
 
 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mathematics and astronomy? If so, I take it that the reason why he does not mention it is simply due to 
the fact that any remarks on a distinguished metaphysical science would take him beyond the 
immediate aim of roughly describing this cosmos and everything in it 
215 This point about the multi-disciplinary nature of philosophy also appears in the Phaedrus, Philebus 




PHILOSOPHY IN THE PHAEDRUS AND PHILEBUS 
 
This chapter is generally concerned with the depiction of philosophy in the Phaedrus 
and Philebus. In particular, it analyzes how both dialogues distinguish philosophy: in 
the Phaedrus, a contrast is drawn especially, though not exclusively, between 
philosophy and proper rhetoric (my term, explained below). Plato distinguishes the 
two by highlighting the different aims each seeks to satisfy via the same method: 
division. The philosopher is distinguished not on account of any unique method, or 
specific domain of knowledge, but by being someone who always seeks to grasp and 
in turn reflect with others on the truth of the matter, always accepting that his account 
may not be absolute. In the Philebus a hierarchy of sciences, reminiscent of the one in 
the Republic, is alluded to toward the end of the dialogue. The science of dialectic is 
found at the top of this hierarchy. Accordingly, the Philebus shows us that Plato 
continues to cast a supra-mathematical science as the theoretical pinnacle of the 
philosophical life. 
 
PROPER RHETORIC AND DIVISION IN THE PHAEDRUS 
 
A close analysis of key parts of the Phaedrus will show us that there are 
especially two distinct figures (philosopher, proper rhetorician) compared and 
contrasted by Socrates. These figures are both correctly called ‘dialektikoi’ 
(dialecticians), just in so far as both expertly employ an art (technē) of division for the 
sake of crafting speeches (logoi). However, the two dialektikoi highlighted in the 
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dialogue ultimately use the same method for fundamentally different aims. The 
overarching aim of the philosopher is to use a logos to implant the seed of knowledge 
into a proper soul, something that ultimately benefits both master and pupil after 
additional reflection. This aim contrasts with the overarching aim of the proper 
rhetorician: to craft a logos as absolute for the sake of persuading an audience (i.e., 
‘produce conviction’) at the cost of telling the complete truth.216 
 
 ‘{Socrates} Well, everything else in it [sc. Socrates’ second speech on Love] really 
does appear to me to have been spoken in play. But part of it was given with 
Fortune’s guidance, and there were in it two kinds of things the nature of which it 
would be quite wonderful to grasp by means of a systematic art (εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν 
δύναµιν τέχνῃ λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις).’ (265c8-d1) 
 
The art (technē) highlighted in the quotation is division: broadly put, the art collects 
the related parts encompassed by a given genus (e.g., Madness), which is essential for 
defining that genus (cf. 265d). It also divides the collection for the sake of elucidating 
a particular species (e.g., Divine Madness) or subspecies of said genus (cf. 265e-
266a).  
Phaedrus accepts Socrates’ description of the ‘kind dialectic’ (τὸ 
εἶδος…διαλεκτικὸν, 266c7-8), in turn differentiating it from the so-called ‘art of 
speaking’ (hē logōn technē) that typical orators like Thrasymachus use to produce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Proper rhetoric is a projected art of persuasion. It is contrasted in the dialogue with what I call 
‘conventional rhetoric’, which is principally distinguished from proper rhetoric by its lack of 
knowledge regarding its speech’s subject matter and the audience to which a speech is directed (cf. 
Phdr., 266d-269c). I focus on proper rhetoric. 
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their speeches (266c).217  This brings Phaedrus to declare that rhetoric (τὸ ῥητορικὸν, 
266c8, τῆς ῥητορικῆς, 266d4) has yet to be defined. Socrates appears surprised to 
hear this: 
 
‘{Soc} What are you saying? Could there be anything valuable which is independent 
of {these} (τούτων) [sc. collection and division] I mentioned and is still grasped by 
art?’ (266d1-2) 
 
Phaedrus suggests the material found in rhetorical textbooks, ‘in the books on the art 
of speaking’ (ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις…περὶ λόγων τέχνης, 266d5-6)- examples thereof follow 
(266d-268a). This moves Socrates to point out that at best all of this material serves as 
‘necessary preliminaries to proper rhetoric’ (τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα µαθήµατα, 
269b7-8); that the true nature of rhetoric has hitherto eluded the typical orators and 
speechwriters recognized by Phaedrus (268a-269c). The reason for this? As Socrates 
openly declares, ‘they are ignorant of dialectic’ (µὴ ἐπιστάµενοι διαλέγεσθαι, 
269b5),218 grasping and in turn teaching only the preliminaries of proper rhetoric.  
The bottom line is that, without knowledge of ‘conversing’ (dialegesthai), in 
context clearly division, no one is employing proper rhetoric. 
 
‘{Soc} It follows that whoever wants to acquire the art of rhetoric must first 
(πρῶτον…δεῖ) make a systematic division and grasp the particular character’ (263b6-
7).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Could the distinction between proper and conventional rhetoric in this passage be viewed as an 
application of division? On the application of division in the Phaedrus, see, e.g., Santa Cruz (1992) and 
Piccone (1992) 
218 Literally, they do not know how to converse (dialegesthai). Yet context indicates that knowledge of 
dialegesthai means knowing how to apply division to form speeches (logoi). See below. 
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Phaedrus subsequently requests ‘how, from what source, could one acquire the art of 
the real rhetorician, the really persuasive speaker?’ (τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ 
πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἄν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι, 269c9-d1).   What follows 
(269d-274a) is Socrates’ reply. Let us now turn to expound the account of proper 
rhetoric. In the process, we shall elucidate how division is used by it.  
Proper rhetoric is based upon natural talent coupled with ‘knowledge and 
practice’ (ἐπιστήµην τε καὶ µελέτην, 269d5). Yet understanding the format of a given 
speech (i.e., preamble, summation, and everything in between) is just preliminary 
knowledge (cf. 269b). Mastery of proper rhetoric involves knowing how to deceive an 
audience (261d-263c). Yet it is important to note that the aim of deception (as 
deception is described in the dialogue) is not necessarily to inculcate false conclusions 
(i.e., what the speaker believes to be false) as such, but rather to deceive people into 
thinking that they have been led to the conclusion by logical steps, and/or by steps not 
of a sort to lead equally ‘cogently’ to the opposite conclusion. The conclusions may 
be imprecisely or approximately true; the deception is principally in the audience’s 
belief that they have been shown the precise or absolute truth of the matter. Put 
somewhat more formulaically, deception is generally the act of taking advantage of 
the (close) similarity between things. To deceive is to convince an audience, say, that 
X is precisely just, when in fact it might not be precisely just. This is not to say that X 
is in fact wholly unjust; to deceive in this case may just mean to present an account of 
X as being unconditionally just, when in fact there may be more to the story.219   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 The more similar one thing is to another, the easier it is to deceive an audience (262a). Using the 
example above, the closer X is to being just, whilst not necessarily being precisely just, the easier it is 
to persuade an audience that X is precisely just. The idea is that it is more difficult to spot where 
exactly X fails in being just, if X is otherwise quite close to being just. 
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To be able to tinker with the account of X, to properly ‘persuade’ (i.e., 
deceive) an audience that X is precisely just (when it might not be), the proper 
rhetorician must have prior understanding of both the nature of X and Justice (cf. 
262ab). For it is only in light of understanding these two respectively that the 
rhetorician is able to ‘discern precisely’ (ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι, 262a7) the actual 
difference and similarity between the two, to spot where exactly X fails in being just, 
and where exactly X is in fact close to being just. Only after obtaining this knowledge 
is the proper rhetorician able to tinker with the relation between X and Justice for the 
sake of crafting a persuasive speech directed at those who do not know the individual 
natures of X and Justice and so the relation between them.220 Importantly, to tinker 
with the truth does not restrict the proper rhetorician to crafting ignoble speeches, as 
we shall see ahead.221  
Note, in the interim, that the knowledge ascribed to proper rhetoric is obtained 
by means of division: 
 
‘{Soc}…whoever wants to acquire the art of rhetoric must first make a systematic 
division (ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι) and grasp the particular character of each of these two kinds 
of thing, both the kind where most people wander in different directions and the kind 
where they do not [the former being key to deceiving an audience]…Second, I think, 
he [sc. the proper rhetorician] must not be mistaken about his subject; he must have a 
sharp eye for the class to which whatever he is about to discuss belongs (περὶ οὗ ἂν 
µέλλῃ ἐρεῖν ποτέρου ὂν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους).’ (263b6-c5) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Further ahead in the text it is suggested that understanding the nature of the subject matter of one’s 
speech can, and indeed ought to be, reviewed and, when need be, adjusted; that one need not have an 
absolute grasp of X in order to properly craft a speech on X. I return to this important point below.  
221 On the deception used by the proper rhetorician, cf. Scott (2011) 184-5, 197-8.  
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Additionally, the proper rhetorician must understand his audience. Indeed, it is 
essential that the proper rhetorician know the nature of the soul listening to a given 
speech in order to make that speech most persuasive (271a).222  Generally speaking, 
knowledge of the soul is somehow intimately connected to grasping ‘the nature of the 
whole’ (τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως, 270c2).223 Knowing a soul involves understanding 
whether the soul, as the object to which a speech is applied (270e-271a), is ‘simple or 
complex’ (ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν, 270d1-2); what capacity (dunamis) it has to act 
and be acted upon; what causes act upon either the simple or complex entity; how 
many forms (eidē), if the entity is found to be complex, an entity takes on.224 The 
importance of knowing the nature of your audience cannot be overstated: without 
knowledge of the soul, proper rhetoric cannot instill in an audience ‘reasons and 
customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues {you} 
want’ (τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νοµίµους πειθὼ ἣν ἂν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν 
παραδώσειν, 270b7-9).  
We should note the divisions implied here. For proper rhetoric the use of 
division, albeit not explicitly called so between 271d-272a, must occur more precisely 
on a case by case basis as follows: beyond knowing the nature of the subject matter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 The proper rhetorician ‘must know (ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι) how many kinds of soul…’ (271d1). Yunis 
(2011) 12 says that ‘psychagogic rhetoric’ (what I call proper rhetoric) is comprised of two disciplines: 
dialectic, which ‘provides the rhetorical speaker with the requisite knowledge of his subject matter, 
which in turn enables the speaker to create the arguments that constitute the content of his discourse’, 
and psychology, which ‘enables the rhetorical speaker to cast the content of his discourse in the 
particular form that will persuade a particular soul…’. To qualify Yunis’ description of proper rhetoric, 
the psychological knowledge, which Yunis speaks of, must be itself obtained via division. See below.  
223 On the varied interpretations of this enigmatic phrase, see Ryan (2012) 295-6. I need not commit 
myself to one interpretation over another, because no particular interpretation directly influences the 
present argument. 
224 I agree with Rowe (2007) 268-70 that, by ‘simple’, Socrates is referring to a rational and self-
controlled soul, and, by ‘complex’, an appetite-driven one. 
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which is obtained via division, the proper rhetorician divides the greater genera of 
soul and speech, respectively, in accordance with the particular soul (individual, 
audience member) present for the sake of understanding both the exact nature of the 
particular soul and in turn what speech and topic is best suited to persuade said soul. 
More precisely, he collects all the kinds of soul there are (x-number existent, of y-sort 
or quality, which account for individuals of this z-character or disposition) and with 
such knowledge of soul, he turns to collect all kinds of speeches (l-number existent, 
of m-sort or quality). Putting to use his knowledge of soul and speech, the proper 
rhetorician discerns that a certain soul is best persuaded by a certain speech in 
connection with a certain topic.  
This argument of 271d-272a is supported by what Socrates says between 
273d-274a in response to the proponents of ‘the likely’ (i.e., no need for knowledge) 
conception of conventional rhetoric (cf. 272d-273c): 
 
‘No one will ever possess the art of speaking, to the extent any human being can, 
unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the sorts of characters to be found in any 
audience, to divide everything according to its kinds, and to grasp each single thing 
firmly by means of one form. And no one can acquire these abilities without great 
effort - a laborious effort a sensible man will make not in order to speak and act 
among human beings, but so as to be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the 
gods as much as possible.’ (273d8-e8) 
 
Wanting to defend the account of proper rhetoric in the Phaedrus, Christopher 
Rowe maintains that Socrates (Plato) seriously ascribes to proper rhetoric the function 
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of imparting virtuous convictions. 225  I agree with Rowe here (more below). 
Nonetheless, I wish to highlight the fact that, whilst nothing in the Phaedrus prohibits 
the proper rhetorician from presenting a very close approximation of the truth, in 
order to persuade a given audience, the proper rhetorician must tinker with the truth; 
he must present a given topic in such a way, say by using similes, metaphors, and so 
on, in order to make a speech appealing to the crowd:226 
 
‘{Soc} In fact, by chance, the two speeches [i.e., Lysias’ and Socrates’ initial speech] 
do, as it seems contain an example of the way in which someone who knows the truth 
can toy with his audience and mislead them (ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν 
λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας)’ (262c10-d2).227 
 
On a related note, Rowe says that 273d-274a informs us that the proper 
rhetorician ought to aim for the ‘right ends’, and do so for the gratification of the 
gods; ‘in so far as [persuasion] is identified with scientific rhetoric, this will mean 
persuasion for the right ends.’228  
 
‘Wiser people than ourselves, Tisias, say that a reasonable man must put his mind to 
being pleasant not to his fellow slaves (though this may happen as a side effect) but to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225  Rowe (1989) 180 
226 This point is obviously consistent with Rowe’s (1989) 179-83 account of the proper rhetorician. All 
I am doing here is emphasizing this one aspect of it. 
227 A description of a rhetorician which is curiously evocative of the expert in ‘informed mimicry’ 
(historikē mimēsis) in the Sophist (267b7-12, cf. 267de): 
‘Some imitators know what they’re imitating and some don’t…Wasn’t the imitation that we just 
mentioned the kind that’s associated with knowledge? Someone who knew you and your character 
might imitate you, mightn’t he?’ 
228 Rowe (1989) 180-1 
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his masters, who are wholly good [sc. the gods].229 So, if the way round is long, don’t 
be astonished: we must make this detour for the sake of great things 
(µεγάλων…ἕνεκα), not <do> as you think one should.’ (Phdr., 273e8-274a3)230 
 
I agree with Rowe that the proper rhetorician seeks to gratify the gods by speaking 
well. To be precise, the proper rhetorician seeks to please the gods whilst indirectly 
benefitting his mortal audience, satisfying what Rowe calls ‘the right ends’. And this 
rhetorician does so without having to impart the whole truth to his mortal audience.  
Similar to the ‘noble lie’ of the Republic (III, 414bd),231 a proper rhetorician’s speech 
can bring about moral ends, namely improved moral comportment, without relaying 
the whole truth.232 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Cp. ‘homodouloi’ with the same notion in the Theaetetus (173e5-6, cf. 173d-173b): ‘The talk is 
always about a fellow-slave (περὶ ὁµοδούλου), and is addressed to a master, who sits there holding 
some suit or other in his hand.’ 
230 Tr. Nehamas and Woodruff, with some adjustments on my part. Here in the Phaedrus, the referents 
of ‘great things’ are apparently certain eidē and ideai, any given eidos ostensibly filing under a 
particular idea (cf. 273d8-e3). Perhaps most immediately, given the context, the referents concern an 
overarching genus and subgenera of soul, though surely this eidos under one idea relationship 
concerning soul is not the sole referent of all ‘great things’ in the world (cf. 273d-274a, 277e-278b). 
231 A fabricated story, on the class structure of the ideal city-state, whose aim it is to move people to 
care more for the state and each other. 
232 Perhaps Rowe’s (1987) 125-37 earlier identification of Socrates’ second speech in the Phaedrus as 
an example of the rhetoric promoted in the Statesman (303e-304e) is misguided (cf. Heath (1989) 154-
60; Rowe (1989) 181). More recently, the case for the proper rhetorical nature of Socrates’ second 
speech is made by, e.g., Scott, (2011). By contrast, Werner (2012) Ch. 7 argues that Socrates’ second 
speech exemplifies conventional rhetoric; that the proper rhetoric spoken of by Socrates in the 
Phaedrus is unobtainable by man. I do not wish to enter into this debate regarding the purported 
rhetorical nature of Socrates’ speeches. That being said, I do maintain that the description at 273d-274a 
of the proper rhetorician’s activity does harmonize with the account of rhetoric in Statesman. Above all, 
neither account suggests that the approved art of rhetoric imparts the whole truth on virtue. Yet both 
may apply their skill for virtuous ends. 
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Moving on, ‘[proper] rhetoric in the Phaedrus’, according to Rowe, ‘is 
defined exclusively in terms of persuasion (as opposed to teaching, which is the 
function of dialectic).’233 Rowe has a very specific sense of teaching in mind, which I 
generally have no issue with: broadly put, to properly teach subject matter X is for A 
to intend to relay the truth (as much of it as A grasps) of X to B via a speech whose 
epistemic status is purposefully left open so as to invite further scrutiny on the part of 
both A and B of the account of X (more on this action below).234 That the author is 
present when broadcasting his account of X, and that he is able to defend the content 
therein in person, are important criteria for teaching. However, Rowe stresses that the 
author’s intention to relay the truth of X, with the public acknowledgement that his 
speech on X is not definitive, are ultimately what distinguish ‘dialectic’ (i.e., 
philosophical exchange) from proper rhetoric. In general, this is what ultimately 
separates proper rhetoric from philosophy: in contrast to the open-ended nature of a 
philosophical speech, the speech of a proper rhetorician is always cast as definitive. 
For proper rhetoric, there is no invitation to question the speech. Indeed, the success 
of the proper rhetorician is gauged principally on whether his speech on X is accepted 
by his audience without question. 
I shall quickly return to speak about this contrast between proper rhetoric and 
philosophy. In the interim, a brief remark on teaching in the Phaedrus is in order. I 
note that the activity of ‘teaching’ (i.e., instruction) is attributed to the proper 
rhetorician, albeit as a secondary task: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Rowe (1989) 180. By ‘dialectic’ Rowe means the philosophical exchange discussed between 276e-
277a. I return to this below. 
234 Cf. Rowe (1989) 183 
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‘{Soc}…whoever studies anything on the basis of an art must never be compared to 
the blind or the deaf. On the contrary, it is clear that someone who teaches another to 
make speeches as an art (τῴ τις τέχνῃ λόγους διδῷ) will demonstrate precisely the 
essential nature of that to which speeches are to be applied. And that, surely, is the 
soul’ (270e2-5, cf. 270de). 
 
The proper rhetorician takes on the role of instructor when teaching others how to 
become proper rhetoricians. To be clear, I still stand in general agreement with Rowe: 
what it principally means to be a proper rhetorician is to employ division for the sake 
of presenting a persuasive speech on some X, which is in turn accepted by a particular 
audience as the whole story about X. Crafting and in turn presenting persuasive 
speeches is the rhetorician’s primary task. Passing on to aspiring rhetoricians the tools 
of the trade, division clearly being one of (if not the) most important, is surely an 
auxiliary task. All the same, I must point out that the proper rhetorician in the 
Phaedrus is ascribed a teaching role.  
 
DISTINGISHING THE PHILOSOPHOS OF THE PHAEDRUS 
 
Let us now turn to examine the contrast drawn between the proper rhetorician 
and the philosopher in the Phaedrus. The contrast begins indirectly within the 
dramatic setting of the dialogue, by way of critiquing all written speeches (274b ff.). 
The criticism is that written speeches have certain intrinsic faults: (1) they can only 
repeat the same argument; written speeches cannot amend themselves. (2) They are 
prone to misinterpretation, and so unfair abuse, because they are published for 
everyone (i.e., informed and uninformed readers) to read. (3) Because of (1) and (2), 
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they require the active voice of their authors to defend them; written speeches serve as 
passive media transmitting arguments that require qualification on the part of the 
author (cf. 275de). What is more, written speeches provide only the ‘appearance of 
wisdom’ (σοφίας…δόξαν, 275a6), because they facilitate taking the arguments 
transcribed at face value, as absolutely true. This discourages needed critical analysis 
of the arguments, thereby rendering readers only apparently wise themselves, only 
capable of regurgitating the arguments verbatim (275ab). 
In contrast to, and preferred over, written speech in the Phaedrus is what we 
may call ‘psychical speech’ (sc. Rowe’s ‘dialectic’): a speech formatted by an 
informed author, which is vocally transmitted235 to an active listener, and which, 
importantly, is open to analysis and adjustment (276a,e and 277a). Only psychical 
speech is singled out as being that which ‘renders the man who has it as happy as any 
human being can be’ (τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιµονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν 
µάλιστα, 277a3-4). This sort of speech is selectively broadcast; it is only transmitted 
by the informed author to someone capable of critically engaging with the argument 
(276be, 277a). For the man who truly knows what is ‘just, noble, and good’ (i.e., what 
is truly worth knowing),236 the written word serves at best (apparently when old age 
approaches) to remind one of his past insights and views on these topics (276d, 277e-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 It is an argument figuratively ‘written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener’ (276a5-6). 
236 Nothing in the Phaedrus prohibits the author of psychical speeches from passing on informed 
content regarding non-moral subjects. In fact, the exact range of informed discourse that he may 
possess, and in turn pass on, is never specified: 
‘{Soc}…take a man who thinks that a written discourse on any subject (περὶ ἑκάστου) can only be a 
great amusement…He believes that at their very best [sc. written speeches] these can only serve as 
reminders to those who already know (εἰδότων). And he also think that only what is said for the sake of 
understanding and learning, what is truly written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good 
can be clear, perfect, and worth serious attention’ (277e5-278a5). 
 	  
148	  
278a).237 Such a pastime pales in nobility compared to the activity of instilling in 
promising intellectuals psychical arguments that will hopefully blossom into full 
knowledge of the given subject matter after due scrutiny (278ab).  
This last point is worth emphasizing. Apart from the time needed to implant 
the seeds of knowledge (cf. 277e-277a), the remark on the author’s own informed 
accounts undergoing maturation (278ab) suggests that repeated reflection, theoretical 
activity in general, is part of what makes this composer of psychical speeches who he 
is. This implies that, prior to crafting a given speech for a given audience, he does not 
have an absolute understanding of the relevant subjects; what one ‘knows’ about X at 
a given point in time may not be all that can be known about it. The composer of 
psychical speeches is aware of that, and further open, unlike the proper rhetorician, to 
notify his audience of that too. 
To backtrack a bit, how does one go about instilling psychical speeches? Via 
division or the art of dialectic (note τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώµενος, 276e6). Before we 
progress any further in the text, though, a word or two on the use of ‘dialektikē’ in the 
Phaedrus is in order. In earlier chapters I spoke of ‘dialektikē’ as referring to either 
the science of the Good as such of the Republic, or to the science of the greatest Kinds 
in the Sophist and Statesman. Yet here in the Phaedrus we have a clear use of the 
term referring to the method or art (technē) of division that is apparently used by a 
variety of disciplines (cf. 276a-277c, as well as 265d-266c; more on remarks 
concerning division in the Phaedrus follows). This varying use of ‘dialektikē’ in Plato 
poses no problem to my overall project. Up till now, the most I have committed 
myself to is the claim that ‘dialektikē’ may refer to a particular science in a given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 This is not to say that writing serves no purpose for the philosopher; written speeches, like all other 
speeches, psychical ones included, supplements the philosopher’s life-long desire for inquiry. Cf. Rowe 
(2007) Ch. XI for a similar interpretation of the use of speech (written or oral) in the Phaedrus. 
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dialogue; I have not argued that ‘dialektikē’ only refers to (i) a science, (i*) especially 
one and the same science in the whole of Plato. Accordingly, I take no issue with the 
fact that Plato, in a given dialogue, chooses to use ‘dialektikē’ to refer either to a 
method or science (not simultaneously, of course). Again, context in the Phaedrus 
clearly tells us that the technē of dialektikē is the art or method of division, not a 
science with unique access to intelligibles as such.238 
Now, this dialektikos who applies psychical speech (unnamed as such at 276e-
277a, though obviously identifiable as a dialektikos because of his use of dialektikē), 
must have knowledge of both the nature of the content and speech (logos) fit for a 
particular soul, as well as knowledge of the recipient soul. This body of knowledge, as 
we have already seen is the case with the proper rhetorician, is obtained via division: 
the informed author of psychical speeches must know how to define the subject 
matter of his speech, ‘how to delimit’ (ὁρισάµενός) it [sc. the content of one’s speech] 
into kinds until he reaches something indivisible (277b, cf. 263bc, 265d-266a). 
Further, he must know the nature of the soul listening to the speech, offering a 
complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul, and a simple speech to a simple soul 
(277c, cf. 270d-271e, 273de). 
So what exactly separates this dialektikos between (roughly) 276a-278b from 
the proper rhetorician described earlier? The difference between the two obviously 
does not lie with the chief method employed; both use division for the sake of 
obtaining the aforementioned knowledge, which is needed for crafting any sort of 
artful speech.  To thoroughly distinguish the two dialecticians we must turn to their 
respective speeches.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 On evidence elsewhere in the dialogues that Plato has a secondary interest in fixing a specific term 
to a particular object, cf. Ch. III p. 130 n. 203. 
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The dialectician described between 276a-278b is distinguished by his use of 
psychical speeches. What is unique about psychical speech is its philosophical 
feature: it primarily serves to move author and listener to reflect on the subject matter, 
to pursue the matter further. In other words, it is left open-ended, its author never 
presenting the argument therein as absolute. It is important at this juncture to 
highlight the educative nature of psychical speech. As was briefly discussed above (p. 
145), to teach subject matter X is for A to intend to relay the truth (as much of it as A 
grasps) of X to B via a speech whose epistemic status is purposefully left open so as 
to invite further scrutiny on the part of both A and B on the account of X. There is no 
hint that a psychical speech ought to instil unreflective conviction, no suggestion that 
the teacher is dogmatic. Again, how unlike the proper rhetorician: the proper 
rhetorician uses his knowledge specifically to craft oral speeches or written prose for 
the sake of persuading an audience, of professing an absolute grasp about any given 
subject matter (cf. 271d-272b), not for the sake of rendering it happy (i.e., leading it 
toward the whole truth).  
All that being said, what grounds do we have to identify the dialektikos 
between 276a-278b with the philosophos explicitly mentioned ahead? 
 
‘{Soc} If any one of you has composed these things [sc. oral and written speeches] 
with a knowledge of the truth, if you can defend your writing when you are 
challenged, and if you can yourself make the argument that your writing is of little 
worth, then you must be called by a name derived not from these writings, but rather 
from those things that you are seriously pursuing…To call him wise, Phaedrus, seems 
to me too much, and proper only for a god. To call him wisdom’s lover-a philosopher 
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(φιλόσοφον)-or something similar would fit him better and be more seemly. (278c4-
d6)’ 
Starting at 277e the philosopher (at this stage unnamed as such) is described as 
someone who does not put his faith in written or oral set speeches (i.e., those 
rhetorical speeches cast as professing the absolute truth, whose chief aim is 
persuasion). At best, these set speeches serve as reminders, starting points for more 
serious critical reflection on the given subject matter (278a).  For the philosopher, the 
only serious speeches are those psychical ones that serve primarily an educative (i.e., 
reflective, investigative) purpose, particularly regarding what is just, noble and good 
(ibid.). For sure, all of this between 277e-278a does not explicitly link the philosopher 
to the art of dialectic (dialektikē). However, the preceding lines (276a-277c) show that 
psychical speeches can only be properly crafted and applied by means of division. 
Again, the philosopher expressly uses psychical speeches. Accordingly, we may infer 
that the philosophos described between 277e-278d is that type of dialektikos 
described between 276a-277c, a user of division whose chief aim by means of the art 
is the production and application of psychical speeches.239 
To review, in the Phaedrus Plato marks off the philosophos by a combination 
of two characteristics: (A) the philosopher does not take rhetorical set speeches as 
worthy of critical reflection regarding what truly ought to be known. (B) Preferring 
the open-ended nature of psychical speeches, the philosopher continuously pursues 
knowledge of what is truly valuable by means of the art of dialectic (division). For 
sure, the philosopher shares in the use of division with, in particular, the proper 
rhetorician. But, to be clear, what separates the former from the latter is the 
overarching aim: unlike the proper rhetorician, the philosopher seeks to transmit only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 By the by, the conversational connotation of ‘dialektikos’ goes better with the open-ended nature of 
psychical speeches than with persuasive set pieces.  
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the truth (as much as he has of it) of a given subject matter to gifted individuals via 
psychical speeches, leaving the argument open-ended for further critical reflection. 
Bottom line: there is almost always more to be said about something; philosophy is 
first and foremost a perpetual inquiry into what is truly worth knowing. 
On a different note, Malcolm Heath finds the account of the proper rhetorician 
philosophically problematic:  
 
‘if the scientific rhetorician has adopted philosophical ends, why will he engage at all 
in non-teaching discourse, to which (on my [sc. Heath’s] view) the philosopher 
attaches no positive value?...I believe that this is a problem for Plato…’240 
 
By ‘non-teaching discourse’, Heath means persuasive set speeches, in contrast to what 
I call ‘psychical speeches’, which are used by the philosopher.  
Granted, the same person could take on both roles at different times; A could 
engage in rhetoric at T1 and in philosophy at T2. Hence (I take it) Heath’s concern: 
why would A engage in rhetoric at all (assuming he can philosophize), when 
engaging in rhetoric is always inferior to engaging in philosophy? My response is that, 
whilst the actual philosopher may not attach much value on non-teaching (i.e., 
rhetorical) discourse for his (and his pupil’s) philosophical progression, this certainly 
does not rule out said discourse’s usefulness for directing non-philosophers toward 
moral ends. Put differently, the philosopher is only interested in psychical speeches 
for his and his pupil’s intellectual betterment. Regarding all other speeches, 
specifically when considering his and his pupil’s intellectual betterment, the 
philosopher does indeed ‘say goodbye’ to them (278b2). Yet this does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Heath (1989) 190 n. 3 
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immediately rule out non-philosophical set speeches being beneficial to non-
philosophers. Accordingly, rhetorical speeches, whilst not conveying the whole truth 
of the matter, could still serve an admirable purpose: the promotion of good moral 
conduct for the masses (cf. pp. 142-4). There is, then, no real problem; you can 
engage in non-teaching discourse and seek a moral goal, at least up to a point. The 
philosopher ultimately realizes that these rhetorical speeches can only take you, both 
intellectually and morally, so far. 
Perhaps one may wonder why Plato presents a picture of philosophy in the 
Phaedrus so broad in scope that it simply cannot be equated with a specific art or 
science.241 In reply, I say that the depiction of philosophy, broad as it may seem, is 
definitely not unique to the Phaedrus. In Ch. I we saw that in several of the so-called 
Socratic dialogues philosophy is not spoken of as exclusively one art or science. We 
also saw that the majority of instances of ‘philosophia’ and cognates in the Republic 
refer not to an expert of a unique science of the Good as such, but rather to a desire 
for study in general, or a psychical disposition to pursue what is really worth knowing. 
Last chapter, we saw that in the Sophist and Statesman the philosopher par excellence 
is subtly cast as a polymath, as someone not to be a fixed to any specific discipline 
(i.e., branch of knowledge). The general message is that the multi-disciplinary nature 
of the topmost philosopher is meant to reflect the multi-disciplinary nature of 
philosophy itself. Hence, seldom does Plato go out of his way to highlight (what he 
sees as) the hierarchical division within philosophy-a division that requires identifying 
certain sciences and experts as more philosophical (i.e., with a closer grasp of reality) 
than others. Instead, what Plato is usually concerned with doing is distinguishing 
philosophy in general from that which runs counter to it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Recall the momentary identification of ‘philosophia’ with the science of dialectic at the end of 
Republic VII (cf. Ch. II p. 74-5). 
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What the Phaedrus contributes to Plato’s project of distinguishing philosophy 
from all that is generally construed as non-philosophical is a certain type of 
argumentation (sc. psychical speeches), which is crafted by means of division, that 
only the true philosopher employs, in whatever scientific field he finds himself, for 
the sake of his and his pupils’ intellectual development. Indeed, the strictures against 
writing in the Phaedrus, specifically in connection to the philosopher’s development, 
can be exhibited as the result of a philosophical employment of division. Hence, the 
philosophical question ‘written or psychical logos?’ is a disjunction meant to mark off 
the philosopher more precisely. This disjunction would be applied after the 
disjunction of aims between rhetoric and philosophy, namely after the question ‘to 
persuade or to teach?’ had been sufficiently addressed. The central idea conveyed by 
the Phaedrus on philosophy, then, is that true philosophical instruction depends on 
the constant backward and forward movement of a live reflective discussion between 
an established philosopher and an aspiring one (i.e., the former’s pupil).242 
 
SOME BRIEF REMARKS ON THE UNIVERSAL APPLICABILITY OF 
DIVISION AND THE SILENCE ON MATHEMATICS IN THE PHAEDRUS 
 
Between 270ab Socrates tells Phaedrus that there is a certain similarity 
between the art of medicine and that of rhetoric: both seek to determine the nature of 
something:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 This notion of philosophy as a constant process of critical reflection on what is thought of as truly 
worth knowing, of a perpetual contemplative movement concerned with matters considered really ‘just, 
noble, and good’, connects quite well with the remarks in the palinode myth on the philosophical soul 
(cf. esp. 248e-250c). There, we are told that the philosophical soul is very inquisitive. It is constantly 
fluttering, desperately seeking ‘to rise up’ and see Justice itself, and Beauty itself, and so on. Such a 




‘Ἐν ἀµφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώµατος µὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ [sc. medicine] ψυχῆς 
δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ [sc. proper rhetoric].’ (270b4-5)  
 
’διελέσθαι φύσιν’ could be translated as ‘dividing or cutting up the nature (of 
something)’. This must be alluding to the use of division for both arts. Accordingly, 
the arts’ respective use of division reveals that the same method can be used for 
different ends by different arts: expertise and corresponding treatment of the body for 
medicine, expertise and corresponding ‘treatment’ (persuasion) of the soul for rhetoric.  
The importance of the method for any genuine art is confirmed further ahead 
in the dialogue. After reviewing how the method is used to understand the nature of 
practically anything (270cd),243 Socrates iterates that  
 
‘proceeding by any other method (µέθοδος) would be like walking with the blind. 
Conversely, whoever studies anything on the basis of an art (τέχνῃ) must never be 
compared to the blind or the deaf’ (270d9-e2). 
 
That a wide class of arts and sciences is expected by Plato to employ division is, I 
argue, confirmed in the Philebus. We shall discuss this point below.  
Before turning to the Philebus, though, I would like to briefly consider what 
role mathematics has in the philosopher’s intellectual progression in the Phaedrus. 
The answer is seemingly straightforward enough: mathematics has no prominent role; 
there is no suggestion that mathematical methods, like hypothesizing, are essential to 
the crafting and transmitting of psychical logoi. Yet, with so much ink spilled in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 ‘Consider then, what both Hippocrates and true argument say about nature. Isn’t this the way to 
think systematically about the nature of anything (περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως)?’ (270c9-d1). 
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Republic about mathematics, particularly concerning the philosopher’s use of 
hypothesizing leading up to knowledge of the Good itself, we are entitled to ask why 
nothing is said about mathematics in the Phaedrus. 
 Indeed, why does Plato choose not to single out mathematics in the Phaedrus, 
as in the Republic, as the penultimate stage of the philosopher’s intellectual 
development? Why make mathematics seem no more remarkable than proper 
rhetoric? My conjecture, which I only roughly develop here, is that with the 
promotion of division in the Phaedrus Plato is signalling that he is not tied to 
mathematics as his prime model for intellectual discipline. More substantially, he 
shows that a distinct, versatile and ultimately superior method substitutes any 
mathematical one as that which will assist in making someone into a genuine 
philosopher.  
 
‘{Soc} First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or 
writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, 
you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible’ 
(277b4-8). 
  
Moreover, I surmise that Plato noted that division was used a lot (consciously 
or not) already in mathematics: e.g., numbers are generally separated into odd and 
even; geometers distinguish certain kinds of triangles, five regular solids, and so on. 
Accordingly, Plato saw a technique used in mathematics as applicable to every topic. 
This would explain the remarks in the Phaedrus on the use of division by natural 
sciences like medicine, physics and psychology: division is a method which is not tied 
down to any one discipline, even though all disciplines (ought to) use it. Ultimately, 
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Plato believed that the apparent universal applicability of division made it superior in 
praiseworthiness and intellectual importance to any particular mathematical method. 
To be sure, the Philebus affirms that mathematics and its discipline-specific methods 
are still important for Plato’s conception of philosophy (see below). Yet the Philebus 
likewise confirms that the art most important to master is division. 
 
DIVISION IN THE PHILEBUS 
 
‘It is not very difficult to describe it, but extremely difficult to use. For everything in 
any field of art that has ever been discovered has come to light because of this’ (Phlb., 
16c2-3) 
 
Does ‘dialectic’ have multiple referents in the Philebus? Dorothea Frede suggests that 
‘dialectic’ refers just to division.244 By contrast, I argue that there are two ‘dialectics’ 
in the Philebus: one indeed being the method of division,245 the other being cast as the 
science par excellence of philosophy.246  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Frede (1993) lx-lxiii and 70 
245 Frede (1993) xxv ff. sees division in the Philebus as a more rigorous version of the method found in 
the Phaedrus, Sophist and Statesman. Similarly, Benson (2010) 19-24 argues that division in the 
Philebus is ‘roughly identical’ (20) to division in the Phaedrus. By contrast, Gill (2010) 36-46 argues 
that there are two types of division at play in the Philebus; there is a ‘divine’ method of division 
alongside the ‘ordinary (dichotomous)’ division (also called ‘standard division’): ‘the divine method 
differs from standard division in that the target investigated is the kind divided, not something that kind 
divides into.’ (41) I am inclined to agree with Frede and Benson, and see a single method of division in 
the Philebus, which is roughly identical to division particularly in the Phaedrus. 
246 Again, a science is marked off by its special subject matter, whilst a method may be used by the 
science to obtain said subject matter.  
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Before we begin our examination of dialectic in the Philebus, I should state 
that I avoid accounting for the exact nature of Forms or Kinds in the dialogue.247  It 
suffices for the moment (though a bit more is said below) to simply identify them as 
universals. All Kinds, from Weaving to Being, are ontologically the same just in so 
far as all Kinds are something with determinate, static natures.248 In what follows we 
shall see that what particularly distinguishes the science of dialectic in the Philebus 
from any other science is the former’s strict focus on universals as such. This science 
is marked off as having knowledge of what it means for Kind X to be Kind X. Its 
expert, the philosopher par excellence, is also distinguished by way of its inquiries 
into the relation between Kinds (e.g., how Being as such relates to Non-Being as 
such). Whilst not explicitly called ‘hē epistēmē dialektikē’ in the Philebus, the 
superior epistēmē mentioned by Socrates (cf. 57e-58a), which explicitly concerns 
itself with universals that no other science has direct access to, is certainly evocative 
of (though to be sure not identical with) both the science of dialectic of Republic VI-
VII, and the similarly called science of dialectic of the Sophist. 
Let us turn to review what is said about ‘dialectic’ (τό…διαλεκτικῶς, 17a3-4), 
that is division, in the Philebus between 16c-18d. Division generally works by first 
collecting many commonly perceived or conceptualized objects (e.g., a red thing, a 
cow, a courageous man) and ultimately discerning how these objects respectively 
relate as parts to an integral, abstract whole (e.g., Colour as such, Animal as such, 
Virtue as such), as well as understanding how that whole relates to its parts.249 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 On the controversial topic concerning Platonic Forms in the Philebus, see, e.g., Mohr (1983) 165-
70; Shiner (1979) 71-77 and (1983) 171-83; Sayre (1983) Ch. 3 
248 Cf. Frede (1993) xxix 
249 This may be termed a ‘bottom up’ use of division, cf. Frede (1993) xxvii-xxviii. Socrates suggests a 
‘top down’ use of division (viz., starting from the one, eternal and invariable genus and systematically 
working down via the species toward the potentially infinite instantiations of said genus, cf. 18a). That 
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other words, division is employed for the sake of knowing a common object’s 
taxonomical relation to a particular abstract genus (the One), which is revealed to be 
impressed on said object and all similarly classified objects (the Many). It results, 
simultaneously, in gaining insight into the very eternal and unchanging nature (cf. 
15a) of the genus or kind (eidos) that is impressed on the common object.250  
For example, starting from the unlimited variety of spoken sound, an 
investigator discerns that all instances of spoken sound can be filed under three 
species (vowel, consonant, semivowel), and that these kinds contain the subspecies of 
letters (e.g., α, δ, υ). Upon discovering this, he is able to see what binds the unlimited 
variety of sound (viz., what connects the three kinds), the genus ‘letter’; the unlimited 
variety of spoken sound are identifiable as (the many) letters, the (one) genus letter is 
what is impressed on the unlimited variety of spoken sound.  
The prior example, explicating 17ab and 18ad, is meant to illustrate not only 
the power of division, but also how ubiquitous it is: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
being said, the examples in the text (examined below) are examples of a ‘bottom up’ use of the method. 
Accordingly, I focus on the ‘bottom up’ use of the method. 
250 This rough description of division is influenced by Reshotko’s (2010) 92-7 interpretation of division 
in the Philebus. Her interpreation is based on her translation of 16c9-10, which I generally accept: 
‘Understanding tōn aei legomenōn einai as "those things always spoken of as existing" is a 
straightforward rendering of the Greek at Philebus 16c9-10. When we take this "aei" as an exclusive 
always, the subject of the sentence refers to all of the things that everyone in the past has always 
spoken of as existing; the things that everyone in the past has agreed exist. These are the physical 
objects. Understanding this phrase to refer to those objects that come-to-be and pass-away allows for 
16c9-18b7 and 23e3-26a4 to cohere with one another [sc. it allows us to make sense of how division 
works]. It also gives us the cleanest picture of the role played by abstract objects in the method of 
division at Philebus 16d-18b [viz., they are the objects (the abstract genera) discovered at the end of a 
division that starts with ‘physical objects.’].’ (97) In passing, I question Reshotko’s identification of the 
initial set of objects compiled during a given division as ‘physical objects’. Surely everyone speaks of 
virtues or vices, for example. These objects are not technically physical. 
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‘It [sc. division] is not very difficult to describe, but extremely difficult to use. For 
everything in any field of art that has ever been discovered has come to light because 
of this (πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόµενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε).’ 
(16c2-3) 
 
Socrates’ other example with the music theorist (17bd)251 enforces the idea that all 
arts similarly use division. It is specifically via division (‘the gods’ gift’) that men 
grasp how ‘to inquire and learn and teach one another’ (σκοπεῖν καὶ µανθάνειν καὶ 
διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους, 16e3-4). In fact, ‘every investigation {must} search for the one 
and many’ (δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν, 17d7), if its investigators wish 
to become true experts (17e). What Socrates is saying, then, is that full knowledge, be 
it of astronomy, music or what have you, can never be obtained so long as (i) division 
is not used, or (ii), if it is used, it is imperfectly applied  (cf. 17e, 19b). 
Do all disciplines actually employ division? At first blush it is rather difficult 
to produce evidence for this claim.252 Yet let us assume that all disciplines use 
division. This need not entail that all disciplines are (fully) aware of using division. 
This brings us to reflect on (ii) and ask, ‘what does it mean to imperfectly apply 
division?’ 
Between 16c-17a Socrates claims that hitherto whenever actual scientific 
discoveries were made (note ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε, 16c2-3), all of them (πάντα…ὅσα, 
16c2) were made specifically ‘by means of this’ (διὰ ταύτης, 16c3), ‘the gods’ gift’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώµατος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόµενα, ἃ δὴ δι' ἀριθµῶν 
µετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασι ῥυθµοὺς καὶ µέτρα ἐπονοµάζειν (17d4-6). Perhaps Socrates may be referring 
to two distinct experts (note αὖ [‘moreover’? Frede (1993) 10 has ‘again’], the latter being someone (a 
dance instructor?) who applies his understanding of music theory (cf. Frede (1993) 10 n. 2) specifically 
to the rhythmic motions of the body.  
252 See, e.g., Frede’s (1993) xxvi-viii effort to explain how music theory employs division. 
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(Θεῶν…δόσις, 16c5), i.e., division  (cf. 16ce). But nowadays (δὲ νῦν, 16e4), the 
method is often mishandled; many so-called experts use the method haphazardly, 
typically for the sake of winning arguments, not for the sake of making scientific 
progress.253 As Frede observes: 
 
‘that he [Socrates] calls it [division] a venerable tradition does not mean it 
has been consciously and conscientiously observed by mankind all along. 
He finds his contemporaries delinquent in that respect: They do not 
proceed methodically but skip the important ‘middle part’ in their 
divisions and therefore do not really practice dialectic but remain on the 
level of mere eristic argumentation [16e-17a].’254 
 
We can formulate this way in which division is imperfectly applied as follows: 
 
(A) Division is employed to some conscious yet hardly conscientious extent. It is 
improperly used as an eristic tool (viz., imprecise or ‘unnatural’ divisions of genera 
and species are made), ultimately for the sake of victory in argument (where this 
entails choosing not to arrive at the truth concerning the relevant topic). 
 
Yet eristic troublemakers cannot represent the entire intellectual community; 
not everyone who imperfectly uses division intentionally engages in eristic debate. 
Accordingly, we need to get a clearer picture of the ways in which division is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Compare Philebus 14c-16a with the EV’s remarks in the Sophist on how confusion concerning one 
and many have ‘prepared a feast for young people and for old-late-learners’ (cf. Sph., 250e-251c). 
254 Frede (1993) xxviii-ix 
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imperfectly applied.255 We can infer from the following quotation how someone, who 
does not wish to engage in eristic debate, still falls short of completeness in his use of 
division: 
 
‘{Socrates} Sound is also the unit in this art, just as it was in writing. {Protarchus} 
Yes, right. {Soc} We should posit low and high pitches as two kinds, and equal pitch 
as a third. Or what would you say? {Pro} Just that. {Soc} But you could not yet claim 
knowledge of music if you know only this much (Ἀλλ' οὔπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν 
µουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα µόνα), though if you were ignorant even about that, you would 
be quite incompetent in these matters, as one might say. {Pro} Certainly.’ (17c1-10) 
 
There are at least two possible ways to flesh out the imperfect use of division 
here. 
 
(B): Division is used intuitively, yet without any real awareness or understanding of it, 
which is consistent with someone missing points in a typical investigation where 
division ought to be used but is not. 
 
(C): Division is used in a particular discipline with some reflective grasp of it qua 
method aiming at completeness. This still leaves open the possibility of someone 
missing points in a typical investigation where division ought to be used but is not. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 The aim in what immediately follows is to expand on Frede’s (1993) ibid. remarks on the imperfect 
use of division. 
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I am inclined to say that the text at 17c alludes to (C). All the same, what I want to 
focus on is the point that both (B) and (C) can account for an inexact grasp of the 
subject matter.  
Of course, we are still left asking what exactly does it mean to consciously and 
conscientiously use division? In particular, how can we avoid falling into eristic 
debate when employing division? Philebus 17a suggests that to properly use division 
means to never skip the sequential steps in a given division (be it going ‘bottom up’ 
or ‘top down’, cf. n. 249). This must mean understanding what justifies the order of 
the divisions and the criteria for said ordering as they pertain to a given discipline. As 
Frede puts it, ‘the critical scientist will have to ask how many kinds are on each level 
and whether and why there should be these and only these. The important issue is that 
there should be no omissions.’256 In general, then, to properly employ division in a 
particular discipline involves constantly checking to see whether the steps taken in an 
instance of division are in fact picking out the right branches [species, subspecies] (ii) 
in the correct sequence, (iii) before ultimately arriving at an understanding of where 
the main object of inquiry (e.g., Weaving) is located in the taxonomical tree.257  
What about reflection on the method as such? Surely one can systematically 
employ division (viz., without skipping steps in the taxonomical hierarchy) yet never 
reflect on it as a method as such. Here is where, I submit, the philosopher par 
excellence and his use of division come in: reflection on the method as such is part of 
the distinguishing mark of Plato’s topmost philosopher.  The attention given to the 
analysis of the method as such in Plato is certainly noteworthy. Aside from the 
Philebus, the Sophist and Statesman are filled with passages that reflect on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Frede (1993) xxviii 
257 Note, for example, the constant checking and adjusting of the divisions in the Sophist and Statesman 
- see below with n. 258. 
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method qua method.258 This amount of attention is no doubt motivated by Plato’s 
effort to systematize division within a unique conception of philosophy grounded in a 
particular metaphysics and epistemology. We can see how, in reflecting on the 
method as such, the philosophical problems and paradoxes regarding, say, the One 
and Many, or Being and Non-Being arise in discussion in post-Republic dialogues 
like the Sophist, Statesman, Parmenides and Philebus. Accordingly, we can also see 
how the philosopher concerned with division as such would be differentiated from 
other experts by way of his concern with those particular problems and paradoxes that 
result from his reflections on division as such.259  
To highlight just one example, the remarks in the Philebus (14b-15c) on the 
puzzles concerning the One and Many speak of a close connection between these 
puzzles and division: ‘zealous concern with divisions of these unities [sc. Man as one, 
Ox as one, Beauty as one, Good as one] and the like gives rise to controversy’ (15a6-
7).260  We can surmise that a distinguishing feature of the philosopher par excellence 
is his concern with putting an end to these puzzles.261 I shall return to say more on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Whilst the following list is not exhaustive, see Sph., 217c-218d, 227ac, 253b-254a and Pol., 261e-
263b, 264b, 265ab, 266d, 283ab, 285c-287b. Incidentally, the Phaedrus also talks a lot about division 
(cf. esp. 265d-266e), but it does not use the method to the extent that we find it being used in the 
Sophist and Statesman. Frede (2004) treats the extent to which division is used in the Philebus. In 
particular she argues that the Socrates witnessed in the Philebus, who plays the part of the ‘noble 
sophist’ of the Sophist, employs only a limited version of the method; that Socrates is not an expert 
user of division due in major part to the limited scope of his elenctic art. Sidestepping the exact role of 
Socrates in the Philebus, I defer to Frede in showing how Socrates’ use of division falls short of what is 
expected of a master of the method. 
259 This was also discussed last chapter (cf. esp. pp. 131-3). 
260 These puzzles are to be contrasted with the ‘commonplace’ ones that, we may infer, should not 
concern the philosopher par excellence (cf. Phlb. 14ce). 
261 I am here seeking to connect the philosopher par excellence of the Philebus with the philosopher 
par excellence of the Sophist and Statesman. 
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philosopher par excellence of the Philebus further below. In the interim, let us turn to 
reflect further on the use of division in all the arts and sciences. 
 
ON THE ULTIMATE AIM OF DIVISION 
 
In the Philebus, we are told that the ultimate aim of division for anyone in any 
field who correctly employs division is knowledge both of what is invariable and one, 
the all-encompassing genus or kind, and how that kind relates to all of its parts (cf. 
15ab, 16ce). But should not the philosopher alone possess knowledge of what is 
invariable and one? Whilst Plato identifies the philosopher par excellence as someone 
who aims to comprehend Forms or Kinds as such, he believes that any craftsman or 
scientist classifies as such when he too looks toward an eternal, intelligible paradigm 
(i.e., Kind) before turning to spot or produce an approximation of said paradigm. The 
major difference between the philosopher par excellence and the typical craftsman or 
scientist is that the latter may have a grasp of the nature of a specific Kind X that 
concerns him, yet he fails to fully grasp how to answer such questions as ‘what does it 
mean for Kind X to be a Kind as such?’  Nor, moreover, does the typical craftsman or 
scientist understand what it means for a Kind as such to be related to any other Kind 
as such (more on this below). All the same, it is important to reiterate that a true 
expert in any field is expected to grasp, particularly by means of division, the nature 
of an everlasting and invariable Kind for direction in his line of work (even if this 
expert fails to understand the epistemological and metaphysical implications). 
The Republic, for example, attributes to abstract mathematics an insight into 




‘{Socrates} And mustn’t we also agree on a further point? {Glaucon}What is that? 
{Soc} That their [sc. geometers’] accounts are for the sake of knowing what always is, 
not what comes into being and passes away (Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ 
ποτέ τι γιγνοµένου καὶ ἀπολλυµένου). {Glaucon} That’s easy to agree to, for 
geometry is comprehension of what always is (τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωµετρικὴ 
γνῶσίς ἐστιν).’262 (VII, 527b5-8)  
 
Furthermore, in the Timaeus it is said that any genuine craftsman produces a 
beautiful copy of something only if said copy is produced in accordance with an 
eternal and changeless paradigm: 
 
‘Whenever the craftsman keeps in view what is always changeless (ὁ δηµιουργὸς 
πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί), and using a thing of that kind as his paradigm 
reproduces in his work its form and meaning (τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναµιν αὐτοῦ), 
everything that he completes in this way is, of necessity, beautiful. But whenever <the 
craftsman has in view> something that has come to be, using a paradigm that has been 
generated, beautiful his work is not.’ (28a6-b2)263 
 
One last example: in the Statesman, the grasp and according use of a universal 
paradigm is not restricted to any science, particularly equated with philosophy, as the 
example of the grammarian instructing the alphabet to young pupils indicates (277e-
278c): 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Replacing Grube’s ‘knowledge’ with ‘comprehension’ for ‘γνῶσίς’. I restrict use of ‘knowledge’ to 
translate ‘ἐπιστήµη’, for, as already highlighted in this dissertation, the latter term in the Republic 
comes to be especially associated with the science of dialectic. 
263 See Broadie (2012) 28-9, on the reference to any legitimate craftsmen (i.e., not just the cosmic one) 




‘Well then, have we grasped this point adequately, that we come to be using a model 
when a given thing (ὂν), which is the same in something different and distinct, is 
correctly identified there, and having been brought together with the original thing, 
brings about a single judgment about each separately and both together?’ (278c4-7) 
 
In general, then, the quotations above help to show that various experts aim, to some 
conscious extent, toward understanding the respective nature of universals. What is 
more, we may infer from the remarks in the Philebus and Phaedrus on division that 
these experts hit upon the nature of these universals particularly by means of 
division.264  
 
DRAWING DIVISONS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
PHILEBUS 
 
Yet the use of division for the sake of reaching insights into the nature of 
universals does not make these experts full-fledged philosophers. All experts are 
subordinate to the philosopher par excellence particularly on account of their limited 
epistemological and metaphysical insight into their subject matter. To take just one 
example, let us go back to what is said about abstract mathematics in Republic VII.  
 
‘{Socrates} And mustn’t we also agree on a further point? {Glaucon}What is that? 
{Soc} That their [sc. geometers’] accounts are for the sake of knowing what always is, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Surely division can applied in tandem with other methods to arrive at knowledge. We can think of 
geometers, for example, who use division in tandem with hypothesizing to arrive at their theorems, 
constructions, etc. (more on this below). 
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not what comes into being and passes away (Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ 
ποτέ τι γιγνοµένου καὶ ἀπολλυµένου). {Glaucon} That’s easy to agree to, for 
geometry is comprehension of what always is (τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωµετρικὴ 
γνῶσίς ἐστιν).’ (VII, 527b5-8)  
 
Mathematicians do not understand mathematical objects in the way the 
philosopher par excellence does; mathematicians do not think of their idealized 
shapes and numbers in rigorous metaphysical terms.265 Yes, their objects are most 
generally understood as universals, they are ideal paradigms. Yet to think of an ideal 
square, for example, is different from positing a Platonic square itself. For the 
mathematician, the mathematical object need only be understood as ‘an ideal 
exemplification of the relevant definition.’266 Further, the mathematician’s reliance on 
hypotheses prevents him from engaging in the sort of metaphysics that ultimately 
distinguishes the philosopher par excellence from all other scientists. The 
mathematician’s theorems and constructions, which ultimately do not (according to 
Plato in the Republic) amount to ‘knowledge’ (epistēmē), come about by taking for 
granted certain principles at the start of a given investigation (cf. Rep. VI 510c-511d, 
VII 533c).  
This is not to say that Plato criticizes mathematics for its reliance on 
hypotheses, that he finds fault with mathematics as such. As Burnyeat explains, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 My understanding of the remarks on mathematics in Republic VI-VII is influenced by Burnyeat 
(2000) 33-42. I should note that the exact metaphysical status of mathematical objects, particularly in 
the Republic, is a controversial topic. See, e.g., Burnyeat (2012) 145-72. 
266 Burnyeat (2000) 37 
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‘To demand that the mathematicians give an account of their initial 
hypotheses…would be to make them stop doing mathematics and do 
something else instead. The best and brightest of the Guards will indeed do 
that later. They will stop treating mathematical hypotheses as starting-
points [511b]…and try to account for them in terms of Forms (511bc, 
533c)….But this activity is dialectic, not mathematics reformed to meet a 
criticism. Socrates expressly says that only dialectic can do the job (533c), 
the soul engage in mathematical thought cannot (511a5-6)...’267 
 
All the same, Plato is keen on putting mathematics in its place. It is the limited 
epistemological and metaphysical grasp of its subject matter, influenced in major part 
by a reliance on hypotheses (be they derived from perceivable things or not),268 which 
situates mathematics in a subordinate position to the science of dialectic. It is the 
latter that the philosopher par excellence ultimately masters which makes him who he 
is. 
So, the abstract mathematician (amongst other experts) is not the philosopher 
par excellence. Yet he is still very much a philosopher. And the Philebus, just like the 
Republic, takes pains to distinguish the philosopher in general from the non-
philosopher in general. In the Philebus, Socrates and Protarchus agree that there exist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Burnyeat (2000) 37-8, my italics, cf. Burneat (2000) 41 
268 Not all mathematical principles are derived from perceivable diagrams. In fact, there is a lot of 
mathematical subject matter that cannot be illustrated by any diagram (e.g., the concept of unity, being, 
etc.). It is hard to tell whether Plato fully acknowledges this different type of mathematical principle in 
the Republic, though his general remarks on the epistemic limitations of hypotheses qua hypotheses 
can be applied to all principles that are not derived from perceivable objects. 
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certain philosophical arts and sciences (technai or epistēmai),269 that the arts and 
sciences used by genuine philosophers ([ὄντως] φιλοσοφούντων, 56d6, 57c2, d1; 
κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, 57e8) are superior to those used by ‘the masses’ (τῶν πολλῶν, 56d5, 
cf. 56d-57e). The general point in this part of the text is clear enough: not all arts and 
science are on equal footing; the philosophers’ arts and sciences, distinguished by 
way of their ‘precision’, that is their application of abstract mathematics for the sake 
of obtaining theoretical insights (cf. 56be), are ultimately closer to comprehending 
reality than any of the empirical arts and sciences.270 For example, building, in light of 
its use of certain instrumentation, is said to be a craft with more precision than music 
(cf. 56bc)-building’s greater precision is due to its use of calculation and 
measurement. All the same, its insights pale in comparison to those of the 
philosopher: the former’s use of mathematics achieves precision and accuracy in the 
crafting of physical structures, the latter’s use of mathematics achieves insights into 
the natures of shapes and numbers. 
Note how every theoretical expert in this passage of the Philebus is classified 
as a philosopher. Again, this distinction between philosophy and non-philosophy is 
not unique to the Philebus. Here we need only recall the evidence for such a 
distinction in the Phaedrus (cf. pp. 153-4). What is more, the Philebus in no uncertain 
terms affirms a central message of Republic VI-VII: a true philosopher is someone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Both ‘epistēmai’ and ‘technai’ are used interchangeably to refer to arts and sciences in the Philebus. 
At 58e-59a, Socrates is highlighting the epistemic distinctions between the disciplines. He is not 
distinguishing epistēmai from technai:  
‘{ΠΡΩ.} Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν οἶµαι συγχωρῆσαί τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήµην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἀντέχεσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην. {ΣΩ.} Ἆρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ 
τέχναι, καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται, πρῶτον µὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι 
συντεταµένως;’ (58e1-59a2) 
270 Not closest, however. I return to comment on the hierarchy of the theoretical (‘philosophical’) 
sciences below. Cf. Gosling (1975) 222-3. 
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who pursues knowledge of what is determinate and changeless, particularly by means 
of abstract mathematics. And yet, what the Philebus also affirms is that mathematics 
can only take you so far into understanding reality. This brings us to reflect further on 
the divisions internal to philosophy.  
For Plato, mastery of abstract mathematics is essential in order to master the 
whole of philosophy. However, in the Philebus, just like in the Republic, Plato wishes 
to make it clear that the pinnacle of philosophy is supra mathematical:  
 
‘{Socrates} Do we maintain that these kinds of sciences (ἐπιστήµας) [sc. the 
mathematical sciences discussed] are the most precise? {Protarchus} Certainly. {Soc} 
But the power of dialectic (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναµις) would repudiate us if we put 
any {power} ahead of her (εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιµεν). {Pro} What {power} 
do we mean by that again? {Soc} Clearly everybody would know what {power} I am 
referring to now! For I take it that anyone with any share in reason at all would 
consider the discipline concerned with being and what is really and forever in every 
way eternally self-same by far the truest of all kinds of knowledge.’ (57e3-58a5)271 
 
We have seen that all proper philosophical sciences in some sense study what 
is eternal and changeless; all intellectual sciences have some sort of grasp of Kinds. 
So what in this passage ultimately distinguishes the science of dialectic in the 
Philebus?272 Surely it must be this science’s unique concern with (what we would 
call) the concept of being X, with what it means for Kind X to be Kind X as such. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Apart from ‘ἐπιστήµας’ at 57e3, there is no additional use of epistēmē in the quoted passage; Frede 
has ‘science’, where I use ‘power’. That being said, it is important to note that dunamis and epistēmē 
are used interchangeably to refer to the same thing. 
272 To avoid confusion, I refrain from calling this science ‘dialektikē’ in the Philebus, in light of the 
fact that  ‘dialektikē’ never occurs in the Philebus. 
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speak here of a science of dialectic, not a method (i.e., division). Note that when a 
‘power of conversing’ (tou dialegesthai dunamis),273 correlatively described as an 
epistēmē, is mentioned in this passage, it comes across as something apparently new 
to the discussion (note ‘γε νῦν’, 58a1).  
Of course, what is novel at this juncture may reasonably be understood as a 
change to the account of division discussed earlier in the text. As Frede observes: 
 
‘Since the divine method was applicable to all disciplines [earlier in the 
text], he [sc. Plato] might have in mind here an even higher employment 
(strictly limited to philosophers), or he might be indicating that the method 
when properly employed deals with unchangeable beings (cf. Introd. P. 
lviii-lix). A distinction might also be intended between applied and 
philosophical dialectic (cf. the ‘Prometheus’ at 16c).’274 
 
Yet it is difficult to see what the precise distinction would be between ‘applied’ and 
‘philosophical’ dialectic.275 Surely it cannot allude to the distinction Socrates draws 
between the empirical and philosophical arts and sciences (cf. 56d-57e); at 58a 
dialectic is contrasted particularly with abstract mathematics. On the suggestion that 
the method, when properly employed, deals with ‘unchangeable beings’, we have 
already seen that Socrates has, albeit rather obliquely, informed us of this earlier in 
the text; all disciplines use division ultimately to hit upon the nature of kinds, which 
are in essence ‘unchangeable beings’. Accordingly, it is difficult to see why Plato 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Frede (quoted above) translates ‘power of dialectic’; Gosling (1975) 60 ‘dialectical ability’ 
274 Frede (1993) 70 n. 1 
275 As far as I can see, at no point does Frede (1993) explain the terms. The reference back to 
Prometheus at 16c does not clarify things. 
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would have Socrates repeat this point, yet cast it as something apparently new to the 
discussion. On the suggestion that the text refers to a ‘higher employment’ of division, 
whilst I think that Plato in the Philebus indirectly speaks of a higher employment of 
division (viz., the science of dialectic’s use of the method), that is not what is 
primarily at stake in this part of the text.  
Pace Frede, I believe that the contrast between dialectic and other branches of 
knowledge at 57e-58a only makes sense if we see Socrates distinguishing sciences 
and their respective subject matter. All sciences use division, yet only the science of 
dialectic uses division to study Kinds as such, that is as intelligibles in and of 
themselves. Whilst conjectural, in light of the remarks in the Sophist on the science of 
dialectic, surely this study of Kinds as such is possible only on account of some prior 
understanding of an indeterminate set of distinguished Kinds. The philosopher par 
excellence’s thinking, for example, about how Being can non-absurdly combine with 
Non-being is not reaching conclusions that are or can even conceivably be ‘applied’ at 
some lower (empirical) level in the way, say, engineering applies abstract 
mathematics. Reflection on Kinds as such, which (presumably) is informed by 
knowledge of a distinguished subset thereof, is truly in a league of its own.  
One may say that hitherto my treatment of the science of dialectic in the 
Philebus is frankly too charitable to Plato; that it tries too hard to smooth things out 
for Plato when it comes to distinguishing the super science from all other subordinate 
philosophical sciences. In many ways the criticism is spot on, because Plato does 
leave much to conjecture. Nonetheless, in what follows, I attempt to further elucidate 
and in turn expand on Plato’s brief, and arguably cryptic, remarks concerning the 
science of dialectic in the Philebus. Again, I maintain that what distinguishes the 
science of dialectic from all other philosophical sciences in the Philebus is that only it 
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grasps the nature of distinguished Kinds. With this knowledge, the science of dialectic 
rigorously investigates by means of division the metaphysical status of Kinds in 
general. And it does so particularly irrespective those Kinds’ variable and temporal 
instantiations (cf. 58e-59b).276   
The expert of this most powerful science concerns himself, not with instances 
of justice, but with Justice as such (αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, 62a2)-we may infer all 
the virtues in abstracto. He deals with mathematical and astronomical objects strictly 
in metaphysical terms too; he studies ‘the circle and the divine sphere itself’ 
(κύκλου…καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς, 62a7-8) - we may assume without relying on 
hypotheses. Generally speaking, the philosopher versed in the epistēmē of dialectic is 
in no way concerned with  ‘subject matter that comes to be and perishes’ (τὰ 
γιγνόµενα καὶ ἀπολλύµενα, 61e1). Instead, he always searches for that which is 
‘external and self-same’ (κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί, 61e2-3). To 
distinguish the science of dialectic from all subordinate philosophical sciences - 
sciences that also study what is eternal and self-same in some sense - we must take 
this reference to searching for what is  ‘external and self-same’ to be alluding to the 
study of Kinds as such irrespective all temporal and sense-based instantiations.  
This at once sets the science of dialectic apart. For even abstract mathematics 
is dependent in certain ways on what is temporal and sense-based. Abstract 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276A different, although surely connected claim, is that the science of dialectic uses thought (reason, 
intellect) without appeal to any of the senses in order to study its subject matter (cf. Rep., VII, 532ab; 
Pol., 285e-286a). This feature separates it from all other sciences, even the mathematical ones, which 
are constrained at times to look to or rely on, say, perceivable diagrams to comprehend their subject 
matter.  Kahn (2010) 66-7 similarly holds that there is a distinct sort of ‘dialectic’ witnessed toward the 
end of the dialogue. This dialectic ‘is an exercise of nous, its objects are all noêta -intelligible through 
and through. It is, as it were, the function of nous to see things sub specie aeternitatis. So to this extent 
its objects are all eternal beings, existing in unchanging logical space, in the noêtos topos of Republic 




mathematics is reliant, for example, on diagrams and perceivable shapes and motions 
in its field. What is more, it simply assumes certain concepts, like Being as such, 
Sameness and Difference as such, and so on, which the expert of the science of 
dialectic does not. 
Here the echoes of the Republic come through the loudest: 
 
‘{Socrates} Then also understand that, by the other subsection of the intelligible, I 
mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic (τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
δυνάµει). It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as 
hypotheses-but as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the 
unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses 
itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without 
use of anything visible at all, but only forms themselves, moving on from forms to 
forms, and ending in forms (ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς 
εἴδη).’ (Rep. VI, 511b3-c2) 
 
A closer look at the connection between Republic VI-VII and the Philebus will lend 
further evidence to the argument that the Philebus is likewise referring to a supra-
mathematical science which caps the whole of philosophy. 
  In the Republic the discussion regarding mathematics is immediately followed 
by the account of the ‘science’ (epistēmē), earlier called ‘power’ (dunamis, 511be, cf. 
Phlb., 57e), of dialegesthai, which in context is clearly different from any 
investigative method ascribable to a given science (531d ff.). The general point being 
made is that no other science is better than the science of dialectic, because no other 
science studies universals in and of themselves. Likewise in the Philebus, Socrates 
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moves from speaking about the mathematical sciences, to speaking directly about and 
in turn asserting the superiority of a ‘science of dialectic’. This science, like the 
supreme one of the Republic, similarly concerns itself with universals as such.  
Having said that, there are some notable differences between the two sciences 
to point out here. The science of dialectic of the Republic is explicitly ascribed 
knowledge of ‘Platonic’ Forms as such. The Philebus, by contrast, is rather unclear as 
to the exact metaphysical/ontological status of the universals which its supreme 
science comprehends (cf. n. 247). What is more, the Philebus does not explicitly 
distinguish its epistēmē of dialectic as an epistēmē of the Good as such. Nor, on a 
related note, is the Good as such openly singled out in the Philebus as the topmost 
Form or Kind.  
This is not to say that there is no evidence in the Philebus pointing to a 
description of the Good reminiscent of the one in the Republic. Socrates in the 
Philebus explicitly refers to ‘the idea of the Good itself’ (ἀγαθὸν…ἰδέαν αὐτὴν, 64a2), 
broadly distinguishing it from human good and cosmic good (cf. 63d-64a). The Good 
itself is said to be in a way comprised of ‘beauty, proportion and truth’ (κάλλει καὶ 
συµµετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, 65a2, cf. 65a). Note the parallel with the Republic. There, 
Socrates says the Good ‘gives truth to the things known’ (τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον 
τοῖς γιγνωσκοµένοις, 508e1-2), it is the cause of knowledge and truth (things essential 
to the good life in the Philebus, cf. 65c-66c), whilst being ‘other and more beautiful’ 
(ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον, 508e5-6) than they are (cf. Rep. VI, 508e-509b).277 All the same, 
these remarks hardly serve to confirm once and for all that the Good of the Republic 
returns as is in the Philebus. Nor, more to the point, do these remarks on the Good as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Gerson (2010) gives a more thorough account of the connection between the Good of the Republic 
and the Good of the Philebus. However, I do not endorse his Unitarian conclusions. 
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such in the Philebus show us that the Good is the ultimate subject matter for the 
science of dialectic.  
To be clear, the accounts in the Republic and Philebus regarding their 
respective supreme science, albeit not the same, are consistent. Both dialogues affirm 
that at the top of the philosophical hierarchy sits something supra-mathematical; that 
there exists a science with exclusive access to universals (however they are described 
dialogue to dialogue) which no subordinate science has access to. Note, for example, 
the close parallel from talk of the subordinate mathematical sciences to the supreme 
science of ‘dialectic’ in both dialogues: 
 
‘{Socrates}…don’t you know that all these subjects [sc. mathematical sciences] are 
merely preludes to the song itself that must also be learned? Surely you don’t think 
that people who are clever in these matters are dialecticians. [Discussion of the 
science of dialectic ensues].’ (Rep., 531d7-531e1) 
 
‘{Socrates} Do we maintain that these kinds of sciences [sc. the mathematical 
sciences discussed] are the most precise? {Protarchus} Certainly. {Soc} But the 
power of dialectic would repudiate us if we put any science ahead of her. {Pro} What 
{power} do we mean by that again? {Soc} Clearly everybody would know what 
{power} I am referring to now!’ 
 
Why is there no explicit mention of investigations into the Good as such in the 
Philebus, particularly in light of the fanfare given to it in the Republic? One might say 
that Plato chooses not to emphasize the Good as such in light of the context of the 
dialogue, for focus therein is expressly on what constitutes the happy life for mankind 
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(cf. Phlb.11d), what assortment (as we ultimately discover) of kinds of knowledge 
and pleasures make any given person a happy one (eudaimōn).278 Accordingly, 
detailed discussion on the esoteric theoretical investigations into the Good would take 
the discussion simply too far off track.  Another possible answer is that the Philebus 
discussion itself is meant as an example of what philosophical work is singled out for 
its supreme science. Indeed, the last lines of the dialogue may be meant to remind us 
of the unfinished nature of a genuine philosophical discussion (as per the Phaedrus, cf. 
pp. 151-2). The Philebus discussion employs division, for sure, but it does a great 
deal else. It feels as if it takes up the enigma of the Republic, the Form of the Good, 
and tries to say a bit more about what it is. In particular, it hints at what direction the 
philosophical conversation needs to move beyond the terminus of the Philebus 
discussion in order to fully comprehend the Good as such.279 
Yet the highlighted differences between the dialogues regarding their 
respective supreme science cannot be overlooked here. For they could plausibly be 
taken to suggest that Plato has shifted focus regarding what exactly his topmost 
science and related topmost philosopher ought to be concerned with post-Republic. If 
the Republic’s Good maintained its superior status when Plato wrote the Philebus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Frede (2010) 13-4: ‘If all kinds of knowledge are needed and worthwhile, and all pleasures that 
harmonize with them are welcome, then such a life is not confined to the philosopher, but it is open to 
everyone with a modicum of rational capacities. This is, of course, in conformity with the discussion’s 
overall aim. The audience does not consist of philosophers, but of upper class young Athenians with a 
penchant for a hedonist life….Socrates’ aim is, then, a “life for everyone” whose mind is not closed 
against all argument, as was Philebus’ right from the beginning of the discussion.’ 
279 If we accept Frede’s (1993) lxvii-xi & (2004) claim that Socrates’ employment of division in the 
Philebus falls short of what is expected of a master of the method, then the Philebus may very well be 
indicating that further consideration particularly regarding the Form of the Good requires (i) a more 
rigorous application of division (ii) undertaken by one or more investigators that are, unlike Protarchus 
or Philebus, and possibly even Socrates, capable of seriously inquiring into the Form of the Good, not 
just the sort of good needed for man to be happy. 
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then why no mention of it? We should naturally expect a few words on what would 
presumably be the ultimate subject matter for philosophy’s topmost science, 
especially given the fact that the topmost science of philosophy is singled out as such 
in the dialogue. Perhaps, then, the Philebus indirectly reveals that the Republic’s 
Good is no longer that same superior entity, hence Plato’s silence on it in the Philebus. 
What this implies, on a related note, is a shift in Plato’s metaphysical and 
epistemological views in general post-Republic.  
Now, to argue thoroughly for (or against) the apparent shift in Plato’s 
metaphysical and epistemological views is an ambitious task, and one that remains 
outside the scope of this dissertation. My task is to compare and contrast the different 
sciences called ‘dialectic’ in the Republic and certain post-Republic dialogues. In 
general, I argue that these dialogues’ presentations of their respective supreme science 
are consistent (even if, admittedly, they pick out different objects), insofar as they 
assert in common that at the top of the philosophical hierarchy is a supra-
mathematical science that is strictly concerned with universals as such. Particularly in 
this chapter, I have sought to present a positive account of what the science of 
dialectic is in the Philebus, and how in turn this science distinguishes itself as being 
the topmost philosophical science.  We should be mindful of the differences between 
the accounts of the science of dialectic in Plato, yet any detailed discussion on the 
related topic regarding the apparent change in Plato’s metaphysical and 
epistemological views post-Republic must be set aside here.  
By the by, even if Plato fails to thoroughly show in his own words just how 
the science of dialectic differs from every other philosophical science, his concern in 
the Philebus may be-as it certainly is in some other dialogues-to show that various 
contenders are not the supreme science. Hence rhetoric is not, even after being 
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rehabilitated in the Phaedrus, and abstract mathematics is not, certainly in the 
Republic and Philebus, depicted as the pinnacle of philosophy. The idea is that one 
can get rid of rival contenders for being the topmost science of philosophy by 
showing how they fall short of the mathematical precision and epistemological and 
metaphysical prowess that is needed to study Kinds as such. 
Something else to consider, if the close of the Philebus is any indication (62b 
to the end), is that Plato believes that a life spent theorizing about Kinds as such 
comprises just one part of what it means to lead the good life. Why is Plato not 
content exclusively promoting the life of a pure theoretician? Philosophical 
knowledge of the sort cannot by itself guarantee man a happy life, especially if it 
cannot direct him home! (Phlb., 62b)  A happy man, then, would need practical, non-
philosophical knowledge as well, coupled with the approved pleasures associated with 
both types of knowledge. We should note that this description of the Philebus’ 
philosopher par excellence as not strictly a pure theoretician harmonizes well with the 
description of the topmost philosopher of the Sophist and Statesman. The general 
message of the Philebus, then, (as we may infer it is in certain other dialogues) is that, 
on its own, formal knowledge of Kinds as such will not make man totally happy. Of 
course, it is safe to say that, without a decent grasp of this knowledge, Plato would be 
the last person to call any one of us truly happy.  
In sum, whilst not the primary task of the dialogue, the Philebus nonetheless 
draws an important contrast particularly internal to philosophy: a hierarchy of 
sciences, reminiscent of the one in the Republic, is alluded to toward the end of the 
Philebus. As I have shown, a science exclusively concerned with universals as such is 
found at the top of this hierarchy. Whilst there is more to leading a good life than 
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theorizing about Kinds as such, Plato maintains that the theoretical aspect of the 
























PHILOSOPHY IN THE THEAETETUS 
 
In this chapter I consider the connection between three portraits of the philosopher 
found in Plato: the expert of the science of dialectic (hereafter ‘dialektikēE’),280 
Socrates the intellectual midwife of the Theaetetus, and the philosopher of Socrates’ 
digression in the Theaetetus (hereafter also called ‘the pre-eminent philosopher’).  A 
particular aim of this chapter is to show how Socrates the intellectual midwife is not 
to be equated with the philosopher of the digression. This chapter further shows that 
the philosopher of Socrates’ digression is not straightforwardly identifiable with the 
expert of dialektikēE, as the latter is found elsewhere in Plato, particularly the 
Republic. What is Plato’s reason for not presenting a uniform philosopher, a uniform 
conception of philosophy? In keeping with remarks made in each preceding chapter, 
philosophy, according to Plato, is not one art or science. Philosophy is not just 
intellectual midwifery. Nor is it strictly a supra-mathematical science, dialektikēE. 
Indeed, the Theaetetus shows us that there exist various philosophoi corresponding to 
various branches of philosophia, all of which come together under one general aim: 
betterment of self through intellectual activity. To the end this chapter, I critically 
assess Sandra Peterson’s reading of the Theaetetus. Ultimately, I show that her 
reading is misguided; that, in particular, we have no good reason to doubt Socrates’ 
(Plato’s) endorsement of philosophy as it is variously depicted in the dialogue. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 So as not to confuse the science of dialectic showcased in the Republic with the method of 
collection and division, the latter openly called ‘dialektikē’ in the Phaedrus (cf. Ch. IV pp. 148-9), I 
shall use ‘dialektikēE’ to refer to the science throughout this chapter. 
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EXAMINING SOCRATES THE MIDWIFE AND THE PRE-EMINENT 
PHILOSOPHER 
 
To start, let us briefly go over the depiction of Socrates the intellectual 
midwife in the Theaetetus: he attends to young men; he applies all possible tests in 
order to determine whether a mind is being delivered of a ‘phantom’ (εἴδωλον) or a 
‘fertile birth’ (γόνιµόν τε καὶ ἀληθές) (cf. 150b7-c4). He delivers offspring in 
conjunction with divine help (150d9-e1). He can bring on or stop the pangs of labour 
of those that associate with him; he chants incantations in order to bring forth a belief 
from the mind of those he supervises in order to see if it is fertile or not (151a7-10, 
157d1-2).  He also engages in match-making (151b1-7). And yet, he claims to be 
‘barren’ (ἄγονός) of wisdom (150c4). 
  Now, it may be difficult to square Socrates’ disavowal of wisdom with his 
declared expertise in intellectual midwifery.  
 
‘But I do [have this art of midwifery], believe me. Only don’t give me away to the 
rest of the world, will you? You see, my friend, it is a secret that I have this art 
(ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην). That is not one of the things you hear people saying about 
me, because they don’t know; but they do say that I am a very odd sort of person, 





To hopefully clarify, Socrates’ disavowal of wisdom or knowledge 281  in the 
Theaetetus, just as in other dialogues (e.g., Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Charmides), is a 
disavowal of positive wisdom regarding specific questions (e.g., whether knowledge 
is perception). The midwife personally does not know whether knowledge is, or is not, 
perception. Notwithstanding, [1]: Socrates is capable of refuting a belief.282 Given [1], 
Socrates demonstrates that he is proficient in his elenctic art, which is a sort of second 
order expertise. His art cannot give him any positive certainty on any first order 
claims, although it can give him negative certainty that certain first order claims are 
either false or inconsistent with some common belief. Socrates knows that a given 
thesis, say ‘that x is F’, is untenable, for, beyond the original thesis, he has elicited 
from his interlocutor a set of additional, mutually-held beliefs, say {p, q}, which 
entails a counter-thesis to the interlocutor’s original.283  
Moreover, [2]: Socrates has the capacity to help an individual articulate his 
beliefs and in turn approve them if they survive the examination.284 Given [2], his 
midwifery allows him to give some limited approval to answers that he tries to refute 
but which stand up to his attempt, which explains how he is capable of praising 
beliefs that are qualified as ‘true’ without implying that he knows that they are true. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Sophia and epistēmē are explicitly equated in the Theaetetus (145de). On knowledge as such, as 
discussed in the Theaetetus, see, e.g., Fine (1979). 
282 ‘Refuting’, with regard to Socratic elenchus in general, can mean proving that A’s x is false, cf. 
Vlastos (1983a) 27-58, and (1991). Alternatively, it could mean showing that A’s x is inconsistent with 
his other mutually held beliefs, cf. Benson (2000 & 2011). There is no need to argue for one meaning 
over the other in this chapter, that we grant that ‘x is F’ is at minimum shown to be untenable by 
Socrates suffices. 
283 This rough formula is based on Vlastos’ (1991) 266. Again, whether Socrates proves x to be false, 
or rather shows x just to be inconsistent with the interlocutor’s other mutually held beliefs, is beside the 
point here.  
284 It is outside the scope of this chapter to thoroughly compare the account of Socrates the midwife, as 
hereby established by [1] and [2], with any account drawn up of the elenctic Socrates of the Socratic 
dialogues-for such comparisons, see, e.g., Burnyeat (1977); Sedley (2004); Vlastos (1991) 266. 
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Of course, there is no example in the Theaetetus to support [2]; no belief is ultimately 
considered true, none of Theaetetus’ ‘infants’ survive. Yet the account of Socratic 
midwifery, I believe, allows us to posit [2] inferentially. Hence, notwithstanding 
Socrates’ voiced denial of wisdom, the preceding exposition of Socrates’ proficiency 
in his elenctic art, coupled with the closing remarks of the dialogue (210bd),285 leave 
us with little doubt that the intellectual midwife is adept at pointing out that all of 
Theaetetus’ beliefs regarding knowledge per se are at minimum untenable. We leave 
the Theaetetus, then, with the settled depiction of Socrates qua expert in the art of 
intellectual midwifery. 
Now, Plato ultimately writes at length about a ‘pre-eminent’ (koruphaios, 
173c) philosopher in the Theaetetus. And the way he has Socrates speak of this 
philosopher leads us to believe that the latter is not just an ideal projected by Socrates. 
He is, instead, a philosopher living in the same world as Socrates and his interlocutors. 
And when we compare the account of Socrates the intellectual midwife with that of 
the philosopher of the digression, we are left to ponder what the exact connection is 
between these two active and, as I shall now argue, distinct types of philosophers. 
With whom is Socrates now sharing the spotlight? To be clear, the Socrates of the 
Theaetetus is still some version of the inquisitor also found in dialogues like the 
Euthyphro, Ion and Laches. He is still, essentially, identified by his use of elenchus.286 
What I want to show is just how Socrates’ elenctic philosophy differs from the sort of 
philosophy described by Socrates during the digression in the Theaetetus. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 I return to this passage below. 
286 Sedley (2004) 34, whilst identifying ten essential features of Socrates the midwife, notes that 
‘[refutation, i.e., elenchus] is actually the most important of [Socrates’] maieutic skills (150b9-c3).’ 
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The claim that Socrates and the philosopher of the digression are not identical 
is not novel. Melissa Lane, for example, observes that the intellectual midwife and 
philosophical leader are distinct figures based especially on their diverse civic roles:  
 
‘Si l’indifférence du philosophe [sc. the philosopher of the digression] 
aux soucis ordinaires de la vie publique n’interdit pas en principe 
quelque espèce de rôle civique alternatif, la teneur de la description de 
cette indifférence n’invite guère à ce genre de pensée. Socrate, le “taon” 
d’Athènes, ne cadre pas avec ce modele, même s’il est également 
distinct des “hommes pratiques” que la Digression denigre. Ce portrait 
du philosophe n’est pas, quoi qu’il puisse être par ailleurs, un portrait de 
Socrate.’287  
 
Nonetheless, I feel that not enough has been done by any commentator to show 
exactly how Socrates and the philosopher of the digression differ; that, particularly 
directed at Lane, there is more than a difference in civic duties between the two 
intellectuals to account for.288  
Let us accordingly turn to examine the philosopher of the digression. The 
account of this philosopher runs roughly from 172c-177c.289 I summarize below the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Lane (2005) 331 
288 Lane’s (2005) argument differentiating Socrates and the philosopher of the digression is certainly 
more nuanced. All the same, she focuses on the different civic roles ascribed to Socrates and the 
philosopher of the digression. Above I maintain that there are numerous intellectual differences 
between the two philosophers that we must also bring to the foreground. 
289 What follows between 176a-177c is the moral of the whole story: echoing Socrates’ mission in the 
Apology, a man ought to acknowledge that evil is an inescapable feature of this world. Accordingly, he 
should do his best to engage in virtuous activity and so become as godlike as is humanly possible. 
Moreover, it is suggested that the unjust man is remotely bettered by elenchus (cf. 177b). It is rather 
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main aspects of this philosopher: (I) he focuses his energy on theoretical activity (e.g., 
mathematics, astronomy and morality), where (I*) said activity concerns particularly 
the nature of things. (I**) Where, most generally, the nature or ‘whole’ of some thing 
(i.e., some being) refers to the model of something, irrespective of any 
instantiation.290 In other words, the nature or whole of something roughly refers to 
what we may call an abstract universal (e.g., the polyhedron itself, the Just itself, 
etc.). 291  (II) He rejects deriving most knowledge from what is immediately 
perceivable (literally, ‘nearby’ (ἐγγὺς, 174a2). (III) He seeks to become as godlike as 
possible, to engage in virtuous activity with knowledge (phronēsis) of the virtues. 
(IV) His pursuit of knowledge, especially his pursuit of the virtues, is the only sort of 
‘genuine wisdom and goodness’ a human can obtain; his profession is the most 
valuable. (V) Seeking to become most godlike, his accounts of the divine and 
daemonic aspire to be truthful above all. He has no tolerance for those ignorant of the 
truth, whose own orations and stories are patently false. Above all, (I)-(V) are 
supported by (VI) leisure. 
This philosopher is notably distinguished from his conventional counterpart, 
the typical man of the courtroom and political forum, as one who is said to have only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
difficult to see how the philosopher, as presented between 172c-176a, fits the description of the 
elenctic agent at 177b. I shall return to this point below. 
290 ‘The question he [sc. the philosopher] asks is, What is Man? What actions and passions properly 
belong to human nature and distinguish it from all other beings?’ (174b) 
291 Cf. Rep., VII 525a-531e on the sort of mathematics Plato probably has in mind in the digression of 
the Theaetetus. See Burnyeat (1990) 37-9 for a general presentation of both the pro and contra reading 
of Plato’s ‘theory of Forms’ allusion during the digression. At this juncture I do not feel the need to 
commit myself to one reading or another. For what concerns me most here is not so much 
understanding the exact nature of these entities, but rather noting that such entities are objects of 
inquiry that Socrates the intellectual midwife does not investigate primarily for his own intellectual 
enrichment (see below). That being said, I return to this topic on the nature of these entities up ahead, 




his corporeal self in the city. Far from worrying about presenting orations to his 
fellow citizens, his mind has departed to deliberate on the nature of things in the 
abstract. A brief word on this mind/body separation is in order here. For sure, it is 
explicitly said that that the philosopher as such does not engage in the conventional 
political affairs of the polis. Yet this still allows for the same individual to engage in 
virtuous (moral) activity. This brings us to Socrates’ enigmatic claim that the pre-
eminent philosopher ‘knows not even that he knows not’ (οὐδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν). 
What Socrates is saying at 173e is that the philosopher as such, so indifferent to the 
affairs and assemblies of mortals, of what is in keeping with a non-divine (and 
accordingly non-knowledge based) standard, finds all talk on such things frivolous.292  
Nonetheless, I argue that the philosopher as such is committed to morally engage with 
certain other people; that part of what it means to be the pre-eminent philosopher is to 
seek to better certain other people.293 
This brings me back to comment on something Melissa Lane says (already 
quoted above) on the role of the pre-eminent philosopher in the polis.  
 
‘Si l’indifférence du philosophe aux soucis ordinaires de la vie publique 
n’interdit pas en principe quelque espèce de rôle civique alternatif, la 
teneur de la description de cette indifférence n’invite guère à ce genre 
de pensée.’  
 
I agree that the philosopher of the digression is given no typical political role; in an 
environment that ridicules the philosopher when confronted with the task of speaking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Nightingale (1995) 51-2 has a similar interpretation of this passage. 




before the Assembly or law court this pre-eminent philosopher is not to be identified 
as any sort of conventional politician. Yet I submit that Plato must recognize a sort of 
alternative ‘political’ function for this philosopher. ‘Political’ here in the sense 
described by Socrates in the Gorgias (521d-522a): ‘to practice politics’ (πράττειν τὰ 
πολιτικὰ, Grg., 521d7-8) is to philosophically engage with certain people (see below), 
ultimately for the sake of morally bettering them.294 
What proof is there to support this in the Theaetetus? For the moment (more is 
said below), I point out that the philosopher’s pursuit of wisdom immediately unfolds 
into the pursuit of knowing, for example, Justice per se. Yet the pursuit itself 
constitutes a virtuous act of being just. As ‘Protagoras’ (via the mouthpiece of 
Socrates) implies in the Theaetetus, proper philosophical argumentation is itself a just 
act: 
 
‘It is the height of unreasonableness that a person who professes to care for {virtue} 
(ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιµελεῖσθαι) should be consistently unjust (ἀδικοῦντα) in 
discussion. I mean by injustice, in this connection, the behavior of a man who does 
not take care to keep controversy distinct from discussion; a man who forgets that in 
controversy he may play about and trip up his opponent as often as he can, but that in 
discussion he must be serious, he must keep on helping his opponent to his feet again, 
and point out to him only those of his slips which are due to himself or to the 
intellectual society which he has previously frequented.’ (167e1-168a2)295 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Note that this activity is called a political art (πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ, 521d7) in the Gorgias. It is unclear 
whether this art would still be called politikē technē in later dialogues like the Theaetetus, particularly 
in light of the account of politikē technē in the Statesman. 
295 Neither Socrates nor the use of elenchus is singled out in this passage, cf. 167d-168a. Accordingly, 
this statement is meant to apply to all proper philosophical argumentation. 
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Accordingly, in properly engaging in philosophical discussion with someone, the pre-
eminent philosopher is performing a virtuous act with a view to bettering that person. 
All of this will be elaborated on below. 
 
CONTRASTING SOCRATES THE MIDWIFE AND THE PRE-EMINENT 
PHILOSOPHER 
 
In the interim, I would like to point out that both Socrates the midwife and the 
philosopher of the digression share in leisure (cf. 172d5-8). The sort of leisure that 
Socrates has in mind in the Theaetetus generally refers to a particular moment in time 
afforded for the purpose of philosophical inquiry-‘It is so with us now’ (ὥσπερ ἡµεῖς 
νυνὶ, 172d5-6), just as Socrates says. However, leisure does not equate Socrates and 
the philosophical leader. As we shall now see, Socrates and the philosopher of the 
digression use their respective free time in different ways and for different aims, apart 
from one general overarching aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity.  
Let us begin contrasting Socrates and the philosopher of the digression by first 
noting one extremely important qualification made by Socrates regarding his art of 
intellectual midwifery:  
 
‘And so, Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should attempt to conceive or should 
succeed in conceiving other theories, they will be better ones as the result of this 
inquiry. And if you remain barren, your companions will find you gentler and less 
tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what you don’t know. This is all 
my art can achieve-nothing more (τοσοῦτον γὰρ µόνον ἡ ἐµὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ 
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οὐδέν). I do not know of any of the things that other men know-the great and inspired 
men of today and yesterday.’ (210b11-d1)  
 
The limits of Socratic midwifery (and so Socrates) are unequivocally established: as 
an intellectual midwife, and so ‘barren’ of beliefs to be scrutinized, Socrates can do 
nothing more than scrutinize another’s belief (or set of beliefs) and in the process 
temper that individual. 296  When we acknowledge this limitation, we should 
immediately recognize certain acute differences between the intellectual midwife and 
the philosopher of the digression. 
 The philosopher of the digression is said to philosophize  ‘throughout the 
universe, “in the deeps below the earth” and ‘in the heights above the heaven”; 
geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing in the heavens; 
tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are’ 
(173e5-174a2). In particular, the philosopher is said to inquire into ‘happiness [itself] 
and misery [itself]’ (ὅλως εὐδαιµονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος, 175c5-6). So, in general the 
pre-eminent philosopher is seeking a synoptic view (i.e., knowledge) of the cosmos. 
Not once does Socrates the intellectual midwife claim to be seeking this synoptic 
view. How could he? He has been explicitly barred from obtaining such knowledge 
by claiming to be incapable of ‘procreating’ (150c), i.e., producing new beliefs of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 This was already made clear earlier in the dialogue:  
 
‘You are forgetting, my friend. I don’t know anything about this kind of thing myself, and I don’t claim 
any of it as my own. I am barren of theories; my business is to attend you in your labor.’ (157c7-9). 
 
‘The arguments never come from me; they always come from the person I am talking to. And I do not 
know anything more than this small thing (ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταµαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος): how to take 
an argument from someone else-someone who is wise-and give it a fair reception. So, now, I propose 
to try to get our answer out of Theaetetus, not to make any contribution of my own’ (161b1-6). Levett’s, 
rev. Burnyeat, translation with minor adjustment on my part.  
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own.297 Again, Socratic midwifery is fixed to take care of other individuals; Socrates 
cannot practice this art in the abstract and lofty heights of the universal features of 
nature.  
But, the reader may ask, does not Socrates personally engage in theoretical 
activity? Does he not inquire into the nature or whole of, say, knowledge itself in the 
dialogue?  (cf. (I), (I*), (I**)). Yes, I reply, but only indirectly. The closest Socrates 
can get to examining knowledge itself is through the beliefs others have regarding 
knowledge itself. And even then, the most Socrates could do with those beliefs is see 
if they survive a given elenchus (cf. 161b, quoted at n. 296). Now, if Socrates is 
barred from (I) [and its qualifications, (I*) and (I**)], then he fails to satisfy (II), for 
he will always remain personally ignorant (at least knowledge-less) of the nature of 
any universal. Remember all that Socrates the intellectual midwife claims to 
proficiency in is his elenctic art of intellectual midwifery.  
To be clear, the account of intellectual midwifery in the Theaetetus strongly 
suggests that the art can only psychically (i.e., intellectually, morally) benefit the 
patient, not the agent. The reader may point to the Hippias Major, where Socrates is 
ultimately shown engaging in a personal elenchus (cf. 298c ff.). This reader may ask 
whether, in such a situation, Socrates could eventually produce his own beliefs to in 
turn self-scrutinize. My response is that the Socrates of the Hippias Major never 
explicitly claims to have the same intellectual limitation as the midwife: the former 
never says that he is incapable of producing new beliefs of his own. Accordingly, I 
am inclined to say that the Socrates of the Hippias Major is not the intellectual 
midwife of the Theaetetus; that the former is an example of a different version of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Compare with Socrates’ repudiation of cosmological inquiry (for himself) in the Phaedo (98a ff.), 
along with the Apology remarks (18ae) about the damage unfairly done to his image by, in particular, 
Aristophanes in the Clouds.  
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elenctic Socrates. I am presently only concerned with examining the account of 
Socrates the expert of intellectual midwifery. 
A different question: Does not this account of Socrates the midwife entail that 
Socrates does not know the virtues and so how to act virtuously? According to this 
reading, he does not know the virtues, so he does not know how to act virtuously. But 
this should not strike the reader as especially contentious. In not a single dialogue 
does Socrates claim to know any of the virtues. Nonetheless, clarification regarding 
Socrates’ exact epistemic relation to the virtues may be had by looking to the 
Statesman. There, Plato explicitly distinguishes one who really knows virtue per se 
from one who just has a true opinion of it, or at least of courage and self-control, two 
parts of virtue per se (308e ff.). Ad hoc, we can place Socrates in the latter category, 
as someone who may have true opinion of virtue and so act virtuously in accordance 
with said opinion. Knowledge of virtue and so knowledge of how to act virtuously is 
reserved for the genuine statesman of the Statesman and the philosopher as 
dialectician of the Sophist and Statesman (keeping the two distinct, as argued for in 
Ch. III).298  
What about the philosophical leader of the Theaetetus? Does he know the 
virtues? I hesitate to attribute knowledge of the virtues to this philosopher. This is 
because throughout the digression he is reported to be pursuing said knowledge, he is 
not explicitly attributed such knowledge already (a point that I shall return to later): 
 
‘The question he asks [sc. the philosopher] is, What is Man? What actions and 
passions properly belong to human nature and distinguish it from all other beings? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




This is what he inquires into and seeks to track down (ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγµατ' ἔχει 
διερευνώµενος).’ (174b3-6)299 
 
Nonetheless, the very fact that he is said to pursue said knowledge separates him from 
the intellectual midwife; Socrates the midwife at best can only approximate facets 
(III) and (IV) of the pre-eminent philosopher. Socrates may have already gathered a 
series of opinions regarding the virtues, but he can never fully (i.e., with full 
knowledge) act virtuously for, qua intellectual midwife, he will never strictly pursue 
positive knowledge of the virtues.  
 To be clear, in denying Socrates the midwife the pursuit of knowledge of 
virtue per se, I want to rule out the possibility that Socrates can somehow pursue 
positive knowledge by means of elenchus, that he could indirectly come to know the 
virtues precisely by examining others’ views about them. This is because, whilst his 
art may be able to praise an interlocutor’s belief that has withstood examination (cf. 
aspect [2] of his art), the most that this praising amounts to is tentative confirmation 
that the belief (i.e., thesis) is tenable. For sure, this thesis has withstood this instance 
of elenchus, but there is no guarantee that it will be able to withstand the next one; 
surviving one elenchus surely does not unconditionally confirm that the interlocutor’s 
thesis on, for example, virtue per se is in fact knowledge of virtue per se. Indeed, the 
survival of a belief/thesis after a given elenchus only encourages Socrates to further 
scrutinize that belief/thesis. Problematically, though, there is potentially no limit to 
the number of elenchoi needed to absolutely confirm that someone has knowledge of 
virtue per se; Socrates may be able to affirm the tenability of a thesis and in the 
process rule out a multitude of unsatisfactory counter-theses, but how can he be sure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Levett’s (rev. Burnyeat) translations, with minor adjustments on my part. 
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that he has ruled out all of them? Surely Plato must be aware of this epistemic 
limitation of elenchus; the pre-eminent philosopher’s ‘astronomizing’ and 
‘geometrizing’ (173e-174a), and whatever it is that we may infer qualifies his pursuit 
of the virtues, cannot rely on elenchus in seeking out knowledge of things in 
themselves.300 Accordingly, Socrates’ art of midwifery cannot be considered the most 
valuable, because it generally does not, indeed it cannot directly and confidently seek 
out positive knowledge of things in themselves.  
Nor can Socrates be attributed aspect (V) of the pre-eminent philosopher. 
During the digression it is said that this philosopher has no concern for ‘practical 
tasks’ (e.g., cooking, orations, etc.). And the practical man who can do such tasks, and 
further emphasizes said tasks’ purported higher importance, is considered a slave. For 
he cannot, ‘tune the strings of stories (λόγων) to the fitting praise (ὀρθῶς ὑµνῆσαι) of 
the life of gods and of the happy among men’ (175e9-a2). To fittingly speak of the 
gods is to speak truthfully of the gods. It follows that one who knows the truth of the 
divine should not deceive others via sensational and false accounts.301 Granted, the 
pre-eminent philosopher may not immediately have the requisite knowledge of the 
divine in order to craft stories that are completely accurate. However, he is constantly 
pursuing such knowledge. By contrast, Socrates does not pursue such knowledge of 
the divine, particularly for the sake of crafting stories of the divine. Again, his art is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Let us grant that elenchus is still important when used to test the coherency of a philosopher’s thesis. 
The point here is that more is needed actually to possess knowledge of, say, the virtues. Tangentially, 
by what method does the pre-eminent philosopher pursue knowledge? We know that the pre-eminent 
philosopher is familiar with geometry and astronomy (173e-174a). Yet surely we would not expect the 
methods particularly associated with these sciences to assist him in answering the question ‘What is 
Man?’, or with coming to know Justice itself (cf. 174b, 175b). It is quite possible that there is no single, 
universal method that Plato has in mind during the digression. I return to this point below. 
301 This reading is influenced by Socrates’ remarks on storytelling of the divine in the Republic. Cf. 
Rep. II, 377b-385c. Note Rep., X 607a, where stories and encomia to the gods, as truthfully 
broadcasted by the philosopher, are the sole poetic genres allowed to remain in the city. 
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limited to supervise the intellectual labours of his mortal patients. Even if a given 
patient were pregnant with a logos (story) concerning the divine, Socrates’ task here 
would be to determine whether said logos is tenable. We would not further expect 
Socrates to supply his own logos, claiming it as his own.302 
In sum, apart from sharing in leisure, no other aspect ascribed to the 
philosopher of the digression can be immediately ascribed to Socrates the intellectual 
midwife. And as I have just shown, even the sharing in leisure calls for qualification. 
The pre-eminent philosopher and Socrates use their respective free time for different 
aims. The former uses his leisure pursuing knowledge or wisdom, inquiring into the 
nature of unchangeable things. The latter uses his leisure seeking to temper his 
interlocutor’s soul via scrutinizing his beliefs (be they on the nature of universals or 
not) in order to see whether or not those beliefs are tenable. The two figures are 
certainly distinct intellectuals. 
 Whilst distinct, we should not consider the intellectual midwife and the pre-
eminent philosopher to be in conflict. Quite the opposite, so I argue, is what Plato 
wants to show us. The reference at 177b (quoted below) to the unjust conventional 
man being subjected to elenchus is noteworthy if only given the fact that in the 
preceding account of the pre-eminent philosopher (172c-177b) the use of elenchus is 
not explicitly attributed to him. To be sure, the remarks particularly at 175bd, which 
speak of the philosopher taking on a conventional man and moving him to abandon 
inquiries into, say, a just or unjust action, for an examination of the Just and Unjust 
themselves, do not refer to the use of elenchus. Indeed, the remarks hint that the 
conventional man is so confused by questions regarding universals that he is 
incapable of coming up with any belief/thesis that would otherwise be scrutinized via 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Similarly, look at all that Socrates has to say concerning the thesis that knowledge is perception; 
Socrates never claims a single line on the matter as his personal view. 
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elenchus. This suggests that the conventional man is as far below even Socrates’ not 
very good interlocutors, for even the ones who lose their temper at least understand 
what Socrates is trying to do, as the pre-eminent philosopher is above the intellectual 
midwife. 
Granted, the general point being made at 175bd is that the pre-eminent 
philosopher attempts to move the conventional man beyond instances or particulars 
for an inquiry into the greater whole or paradigm. Surely this is part and parcel of 
Socratic elenchus, broadly construed:   
 
‘Try to imitate your answer about the powers. There you brought together the many 
powers within a single form; now I want you in the same way to give one single 
account of the many branches of knowledge.’ (Tht., 148d4-7) 
 
‘Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions 
but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious 
actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don’t you 
remember?’ (Euth., 6d9-e1) 
 
‘The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even if they are many and various, all of 
them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to 
this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is. Or do you not understand what I 
mean?’ (Men., 72c6-d1) 
 
Nevertheless, the context surrounding the move from the particular to the general in 
the digression of the Theaetetus discourages calling such a move an instance of 
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elenchus: the conventional man, prior to being drawn up to higher level, does not 
have a particular thesis concerning, say, Justice itself, which in turn the philosopher 
seeks to scrutinize. This is confirmed by noting that even after being drawn up to 
ponder the Just itself the conventional man still produces no belief on the Just itself, 
which is subsequently subjected to elenchus.303 
All the same, elenchus is mentioned at the close of the digression. 
Accordingly, it demands some attention.  
 
‘{Socrates} But there is one accident to which the unjust man is liable. When it comes 
to giving and taking an account in a private discussion of the things he disparages; 
when he is willing to stand his ground like a man, for long enough, instead of running 
away like a coward, then, my friend, an odd thing happens. In the end the things he 
says do not satisfy even himself; that famous eloquence [alt. ‘rhetoric’ (ἡ ῥητορικὴ 
ἐκείνη)] of his somehow dries up, and he is left looking nothing more than a child.’ 
(177b1-7) 
 
I suggest that Plato closes the digression with the implication that elenchus is in the 
right hands a valuable tool: it tempers, via the purgation of untenable beliefs, or 
praising of tenable ones, a given individual. Yet there is a hidden proviso here: whilst 
the text allows us to attribute to the philosopher of the digression the use of elenchus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Whilst Socrates struggles at times to get his interlocutor to abandon pointing out instances of, say, 
piety or virtue per se, for a definition of piety itself or virtue itself, he does ultimately elicit a thesis, 
weak though it usually is, that attempts to define piety or virtue per se. This course of events is not 




(though I ultimately doubt this attribution, see below),304 elenchus is not what makes 
him unique. Recall that what makes the pre-eminent philosopher unique is his pursuit, 
considered divine (cf. 176ae), of genuine wisdom or knowledge of universals. This 
again brings up the contrast between the pre-eminent philosopher and Socrates the 
intellectual midwife. The latter does not seek per se to gain or provide genuine 
wisdom or knowledge of such things. Yes, some god has instructed Socrates to 
engage only in his sort of midwifery (150cd). But following a divine command is 
different from pursuing what is divine. Ironically, it is a divine command that 
prevents Socrates from pursuing what is divine, from philosophizing in the same way 
that the philosopher of the digression does. 
 Now, there are especially three points to take away from the presentation of 
Socrates as intellectual midwife in the Theaetetus. Firstly, this presentation announces 
an acute intellectual limitation of the elenctic Socrates: relegated to expertise in the art 
of intellectual midwifery, Socrates notably cannot comprehend the things in 
themselves; he cannot generate his own logoi about the nature of ‘those which are’. 
This immediately, though as I have shown above not solely, differentiates him from 
the philosopher showcased during the digression. Nevertheless (this is the second 
point), Plato’s depiction of Socratic midwifery in the Theaetetus is not wholly 
negative. Far from it. Socratic midwifery is needed for the conditioning of the soul for 
future philosophical studies; the intellectual midwife is the designated expert with the 
particular capacity to rid an individual of his untenable beliefs so as to leave him at a 
better investigative starting point in the future. The close of the digression (177bc), as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 It may be that the pre-eminent philosopher is not whom Plato has specifically in mind here; that 
Plato is instead thinking of Socrates or some similar elenctic figure. All the same, nothing in the 
description of the pre-eminent philosopher prohibits us from attributing to him the use of elenchus. I 
shall return to say more about the pre-eminent philosopher’s relationship with the conventional man. 
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we have just seen, openly cites the need (justification) for such an art: before even 
beginning to think that one can turn to inquire into say the just itself, a man needs to 
be purged of any lingering untenable beliefs regarding what is just. The beneficial 
impact of undergoing examination under Socrates is also evidenced with the allusion 
to Theaetetus’ potential intellectual advancement at the end of the dialogue (210cd). 
Understanding what is not knowledge per se, for example, is the sort of insight 
obtained via examination under Socrates that betters one’s overall wisdom. 
Generalized, post examination with the intellectual midwife, one understands what 
thesis on x to avoid pursuing in future investigations of x.  
Thirdly, the intellectual midwife’s conditioning of the soul for future pursuit 
of wisdom concurrently provides an ethical benefit in addition to making one more 
temperate (ἡµερώτερος σωφρόνως, 210c3): taking for granted that wisdom per se is a 
virtue (cf. Rep. IV)), one is virtuously better off now knowing what investigative 
paths not to take in the future. So, supervision under the intellectual midwife does not 
just purge one of untenable beliefs, it also positively adjusts the moral character of the 
individual by making him both temperate and in some sense wise. To review, the 
principle aim of Socratic midwifery is to condition the soul of the ‘pregnant’ 
interlocutor for the future pursuit of knowledge (wisdom) via purging said 
interlocutor of untenable beliefs. This act concurrently betters the interlocutor’s 
overall moral character. Plato has saddled Socrates with quite the laudable art. 
 Can we accordingly surmise a complementary relationship between the pre-
eminent philosopher and the intellectual midwife? I suggest that we should see 
Socrates (or any other expert of intellectual midwifery for that matter)305 working in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Nothing in the text outright excludes others from becoming intellectual midwives. Compare 
Socrates’ remarks in the Phaedo (78a), where he urges Simmias and Cebes to search for other 
philosophers like Socrates (i.e., other elenctic experts, removers of unfounded fears (i.e., beliefs)). 
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conjunction with the pre-eminent philosopher. The former prepares the soul for the 
sort of inquiries conducted by the latter: the pupil must be cleansed of falsehoods 
regarding x before properly understanding what x is.306 So, Plato wishes to make clear 
the important role Socrates’ art plays. Yet the intellectual midwife alone could never 
help us obtain wisdom particularly of the things in themselves (of Justice itself, of 
Man per se, and so on). This too is what Plato wants us to note, hence the showcase of 
the pre-eminent philosopher of the digression. What is revealed in the Theaetetus is 
that philosophy is minimally composed of two separate but equally important 
methodological branches.307 On the one hand, philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom 
and virtuous betterment via elenchus; it purges one of untenable beliefs, discourages 
one from pursuing untenable beliefs. On the other hand, philosophy is the pursuit of 
wisdom and virtuous betterment via whatever applicable method, culminating 
(hopefully) in positive knowledge. 
 Reflecting on this relationship prompts me to qualify something mentioned in 
passing earlier: the pre-eminent philosopher is not an educator of the conventional 
man.  Indeed, he has no hope of succeeding unless Socrates or some elenctic figure 
like him has gone before. This is because there is no good motivation to identify the 
elenctic figure mentioned at the close of the digression (177b) with the pre-eminent 
philosopher.  Note that the reference to elenchus at 177b comes as a postscript: the 
contrast between the godlike conception of eudaimonia (a good life being one of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Interestingly, a similar educative process is suggested during the account of the elenctic expert in 
the Sophist  
‘The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any 
advantage from any learning that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes the 
opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things 
that it does know, and nothing more’ (230c7-d4, cf. 226a-231b). 
307 Below I further promote the idea that, in the Theaetetus, ‘philosophy’, far from referring to just one 
science, is an honorific title encompassing several diverse sciences. 
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virtue) and its contrary wretchedness culminates at 176e-177b. By contrast, the 
episode at 175b f. shows the pre-eminent philosopher not kindly trying to educate the 
convention man, but proving that the conventional man is just as embarrassed when a 
fish out of water as the pre-eminent philosopher is when a fish out of his water.  
 Further reflection elicits a related point: the negativity of elenchus reinforces 
the idea that man is not the measure, something which clearly butts heads with 
Protagoras’ homo mensura (central to discussion leading up to the digression). By 
itself this negativity could leave us with the archaic notion that man, not being a god, 
is unable to access true knowledge full stop. But then, the digression emphasizes what 
is only presupposed in the Republic: certain humans can have access to the whole 
truth (i) if initially cleansed of their falsehoods as well as their self-conceit of 
knowledge, and (ii) if they accept that the same rigour that can be brought to 
mathematical studies can also be applied to, in particular, ethical universals (viz., 
knowing the Just itself, Temperance itself, etc.). With (i) and (ii) satisfied, the 
individual’s ensuing detachment from conventional interests is promoted as the way 
forward for ethics after elenctic therapy (i.e., after Socrates and his ilk have done their 
job). This is where the pre-eminent philosopher would come in: he may not be 
capable of helping the conventional man, but that alone does not rule out his task of 
assisting those amongst men who have satisfied (i) and (ii) to pursue positive 
knowledge.308  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 In all this there is a clear similarity with the Republic, one that bypasses the question whether the 
digression recognizes ‘Platonic Forms’ as metaphysical entities (cf. n. 291). Indeed, the language of 
174a and 175c simply relates a concern with universals regardless of the metaphysics. For sure, the 
pre-eminent philosopher of the Theaetetus is looking for changeless truths, but this underdetermines 
the metaphysics of ‘Platonic Forms’. 
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IS THE PRE-EMINENT PHILOSOPHER AN EXPERT OF FORMS? 
 
I now wish to see if the pre-eminent philosopher of the Theaetetus is meant to 
represent the full-fledged expert of dialektikēE, wherever the latter is found in Plato.309 
I think that there exists a fundamental difference between the two philosophers, which 
ultimately dissuades one from equating them: unlike the full-fledged expert of 
dialektikēE, the pre-eminent philosopher of the Theaetetus is shown still in pursuit of 
knowledge.  
 
‘The question he asks [sc. the philosopher] is, What is Man? What actions and 
passions properly belong to human nature and distinguish it from all other beings? 
This is what he inquires into and seeks to track down (ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγµατ' ἔχει 
διερευνώµενος).’ (174b3-6) 
 
This is not to say that the pre-eminent philosopher is completely without some 
knowledge: 
 
‘[The philosopher] spurns them and pursues its wingéd way, as Pindar says, 
throughout the universe, ‘in the deeps beneath the earth’ and geometrizing 
(γεωµετροῦσα) its surfaces, ‘in the heights above heaven’, astronomizing 
(ἀστρονοµοῦσα) and searching (ἐρευνωµένη)310 by every path the entire nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 This presupposes a generally consistent (which is not to say identical) picture of this unique science 
of universals as such, which is what I have been arguing for up to this point. 
310 Levett’s translation, my italics, with a minor adjustment on my part. Again, this philosopher does 
not have the knowledge at present. 
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each whole among the things that are, never condescending to what lies near at hand.’’ 
(173e4-174a2) 
 
Surely talk of ‘geometrizing’ and ‘astronomizing’ suggests the exercising of 
possessed knowledge. However, note what is also said: ‘searching (ἐρευνωµένη) by 
every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are’. This must 
indicate seeking a certain type of knowledge that the philosopher does not have 
already.  
What type of knowledge exactly? Surely it is knowledge of a certain set of 
entities that are, like the mathematical concepts this philosopher already has 
possession of, universal by nature. As has already been discussed, I hesitate to say 
anything more about the exact nature of any universal hinted at in the Theaetetus. 
Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of argument that the ‘whole’ of each thing is 
one of those special universals, those famous ‘Platonic Forms’. Let us also assume for 
the sake of argument that Platonic Forms are the ultimate objects of knowledge for 
the full-fledged philosopher according to Plato. The fact remains that the pre-eminent 
philosopher does not have knowledge of such entities. To be clear, we may also 
assume that Platonic Forms are the ultimate objects of knowledge for the expert of 
dialektikēE, wherever we find him in Plato. So be it, at least for this argument. Again, 
the point here is just that the pre-eminent philosopher of the Theaetetus is not ascribed 
this knowledge. 
 But not matching up with the accomplished expert of dialektikēE does not 
mean that the pre-eminent philosopher does not come across as an aspiring 
dialectician. Indeed, traits (I)-(VI) of the pre-eminent philosopher can practically be 
ascribed to someone aspiring to master dialektikēE: the latter implicitly has leisure to 
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engage in theoretical activity311-where said activity concerns the nature of universals 
(cf. Sph., 253c-254b, Pol., 285d-286b, Phlb., 58a). 312  Further, like pre-eminent 
philosopher, the expert of dialektikēE rejects deriving most knowledge from what is 
immediately at hand, that is subject to change (cf. Pol., 286ab, Phlb., 58e-59a). 
Accordingly, this aspiring dialectician also seeks to remove himself, as much as he 
possibly can, from any conventional concerns. Instead, he focuses on what is in 
essence divine (cf. Sph., 254ab). In doing so, he seeks to become as godlike as 
possible. Additionally, given his closer approximation to what is divine, in 
comparison to that of a non-dialectician, it is safe to surmise that the aspiring 
dialectician’s account of what is divine would be more accurate. In general, then, 
there is enough evidence in the Theaetetus to identify the pre-eminent philosopher as 
an aspiring expert of dialektikēE. To be clear, what this roughly means is that the 
former is in pursuit of a systematic body of knowledge regarding the essences of 
things.  
Interestingly, with no explicit mention of grasping or employing dialektikēE, 
this passage in the Theaetetus (173e3-174a2) may help in part to explain why Plato 
refrains from calling the pre-eminent philosopher a ‘dialektikos’: whilst laudable, this 
philosopher still comes up short of the full-fledged dialectician highlighted in certain 
dialogues. For sure, ‘dialektikos’, without further qualification, does not only refer to 
an expert of dialektikēE. So perhaps a safer conjecture would be that refraining from 
using ‘dialektikos’ in the digression is meant to dissuade the reader from directly 
associating the pre-eminent philosopher with any referent of ‘dialektikos’ (or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Whilst there is no explicit mention of leisure (scholē) in the ensuing citations from the Sophist, 
Statesman, Phaedrus and Philebus, the dialectician must have such leisure to engage in the sort of 
intellectual activity that defines him. 
312 Talk of universals need not prove too problematic for our present task; the exact essence of these 
beings, which the philosopher sets his sight on, can be overlooked. 
 	  
206	  
‘dialektikē’ for that matter) found in Plato. Indeed, opting for the broader term 
‘philosophos’ (cf. 173c, 175e) is surely less discriminatory than ‘expert of 
dialektikēE’; ‘philosophos’ certainly connects the pre-eminent philosopher more 
closely to a vast array of intellectuals (Socrates and Theodorus included, cf. 173bc)-a 
point I return to below.  By contrast, ‘dialektikos’, by itself, does not hit off the pre-
eminent philosopher’s interest in, say, astronomy and geometry. All this helps to 
explain Plato’s preference for ‘philosophos’ in the digression: the pre-eminent 
philosopher is a generic intellectual, a theoretician who includes or combines 
mathematics, physics and inquiries into moral truths.  
 As was just highlighted, the pre-eminent philosopher is still bettering his 
philosophical ability, still inquiring into a diverse array of entities (Man, King, 
Happiness, etc., etc.). Interestingly, the clause ‘searching by every path’ 
(πάντῃ…ἐρευνωµένη) leaves open the possibility that this philosopher may employ 
division, the method par excellence used especially by the science par excellence 
(dialektikēE), albeit in some limited capacity, for he still does not have knowledge of 
what he is ultimately looking for. But this is only a conjecture, given that there is no 
insight in the digression into what precise method, setting aside the mathematical ones 
used for geometrical and astronomical research, 313  the pre-eminent philosopher 
employs to obtain knowledge of ‘the nature of every whole among the things that are’. 
It should be clear by now that this rough account of the pre-eminent 
philosopher as at best an aspiring expert of dialektikēE does little to explain the silence 
in the Theaetetus regarding Plato’s supreme science, as it is variously cast. Indeed, we 
may ask why Plato refrains from identifying some version of dialektikēE in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 As we know, Plato is consistently critical, though to be sure not wholly dismissive, of the methods 
of mathematics. We may safely infer, then, that the pre-eminent philosopher’s ‘geometrizing’ and 
‘astronomizing’ does not by itself yield knowledge of the universals he is still searching for. 
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Theaetetus as the pinnacle of philosophy? My conjecture, already mentioned in 
passing above, is that by refraining from equating the philosopher of the digression 
with the expert of dialektikēE, and thereby discouraging the interpolation of a supra-
mathematical science which can be called ‘dialektikē’ in the course of the dialogue, 
Plato wishes to focus our attention more generally on the idea that philosophia in the 
Theaetetus represents any intellectual and ethical endeavour, a spirit so to speak and 
corresponding activity of truth-seeking; that there are various philosophoi 
corresponding to types of philosophia.  
What further proof is there to show that Plato is endorsing in the Theaetetus 
this conception of philosophy? Well, apart from promoting the pre-eminent 
philosopher, Socrates openly calls geometry, amongst other sciences, a type of 
philosophy: 
 
‘If Cyrene were first in my affections, Theodorus, I should be asking you how things 
are there, and whether any of your young people are taking up geometry or any other 
type of philosophy (περὶ γεωµετρίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν).’ (143d1-3)314 
 
Geometry qua philosophy, or more generally a science used by philosophers, is often 
cited in Plato. The pre-eminent philosopher of the digression in the Theaetetus is 
familiar with geometry. The philosopher-king of Kallipolis must know geometry as a 
prelude to the science of dialectic in the Republic. Timaeus in his eponymous 
dialogue clearly demonstrates a mastery of geometry. In the Philebus, Socrates speaks 
of the ‘the geometry and calculations practiced by philosophers’ (κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν 
γεωµετρίας τε καὶ λογισµῶν καταµελετωµένων, 56e8-57a1). Moreover, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Tr. Levett rev. Burnyeat, with slight adjustment of my part 
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Epinomis (990c ff.), geometry is recognized as an essential study for philosophically 
gifted souls slated to comprise the Nocturnal Council.315 
Furthermore, in the Theaetetus we have Socrates consider Theaetetus an 
aspiring philosopher not because of the latter’s grasp of a specific science, but rather 
because of his overall intellectual curiosity:316  
 
‘It seems that Theodorus is not poorly guessing your nature. For this is indeed an 
experience characteristic of a philosopher (µάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος,), 
wondering: this is the beginning of philosophy, nowhere else.’ (155d1-4, my 
translation) 
 
There is also the generalized account of proper philosophical argumentation 
put in the mouth of Protagoras: if Socrates, though surely this applies to anyone using 
whatever applicable method, avoids the argumentative style of professional 
controversialists and instead pursues the truth of the matter, 
 
‘…those who associate with you will blame themselves for their confusion and their 
difficulties, not you. They will seek your company, and think of you as their friend; 
but they will loathe themselves, and seek refuge from themselves in philosophy (εἰς 
φιλοσοφίαν) in the hope that they may thereby become different people and be rid 
forever of the men that they once were.’ (168a2-7, cf. 167d-168a) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Even if spurious, this patently ‘Academic’ opus shows the importance of geometry amongst 
philosophers close to Plato. 
316 Thereby confirming Theodorus’ account of Theaetetus’ philosophical character (cf. Tht., 143e-




Ultimately, the point I want to stress here is that there is no convincing proof 
in the Theaetetus of equating philosophy solely with either Socratic midwifery, or the 
science of dialectic, with any distinguished science really. This is roughly the reason 
why no particular version of dialektikēE is singled out in the Theaetetus: the pinnacle 
of philosophy takes backseat to the whole of it; genuine philosophical inquiry, 
broadly speaking, is what Plato wants to highlight in the dialogue. Indeed, the more 
general notion of philosophy sits well with what most scholars take to be a central aim 
of the Theaetetus: to honour the historical Theaetetus, a revered mathematician.317 
The point here is just that it may well have seemed backhanded of Plato from this 
point of view to emphasize that what Theaetetus (both the young character in the 
dialogue and the actual mathematician) concentrated on was, whilst important, only a 
propaedeutic to Plato’s most important science. Instead, Plato may well be dwelling 
more positively on the affinities between pure mathematics and that science of ‘the 
nature of the whole among the things that are’. This surely fits well with the picture in 
the Philebus of the harmonizing ‘philosophical’ sciences (56d-57e): any science is a 
bona fide insight into reality when in the hands of a philosopher. That the sciences 
differ from each other in their respective proximity to reality is beside the point here. 
Surely Plato need not always pit the sciences against each other. Indeed, the 
harmonization of ‘philosophies’ is what is more positively evidenced in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 See Knorr (1975) Ch. XIII for an account of the historical Theaetetus’ mathematical work. See as 
well Pappus’ remarks (in Burnyeat (1978) 507) on the historical Theaetetus. However, cf. Burnyeat 
(1978) 512 n. 88 for certain critiques of Knorr’s claims, particularly with regard to his treatment of the 
character Theaetetus in Plato’s Theaetetus. In addition, cf. Suidas, s.v. Theaetetus: ‘Ἀθηναῖος, 
ἀστρολόγος, φιλόσοφος’. However, note that what follows next in the entry on Theaetetus in the 
Suidas, µαθητὴς Σωκράτους (‘pupil of Socrates’), is probably false. Theaetetus would have been 
between the ages of 17-18 when Socrates died in 399 BC, a period in which Theaetetus was involved 
(predominantly?) in mathematical studies-something the historical Socrates was not particularly known 
for. This line in the Suidas may simply be based on the dramatic interaction between the young 
Theaetetus and Socrates in Plato’s Theaetetus. 
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Theaetetus. The Philebus only lends support to this picture: all genuine sciences 
subsume under the greater conception of philosophia as a spirited pursuit of wisdom. 
 In sum, ‘philosophy’ in the Theaetetus remains an honorific term 
encompassing various arts or sciences (e.g., dialektikēE (whatever exactly it may be), 
geometry, astronomy, intellectual midwifery, etc.). Nonetheless, all philosophiai are 
broadly unified by one general aim: betterment of self via intellectual activity.318 The 
Theaetetus, in keeping with what Plato affirms elsewhere, shows philosophia as 
something bigger than any one discipline. 
 
ON PETERSON’S READING OF THE DIGRESSION 
 
Of course, not every scholar would endorse my reading of Plato’s conception 
of philosophy in the Theaetetus. Sandra Peterson 319 argues that philosophy, as 
described during Socrates’ digression in the Theaetetus, is not what Socrates actually 
endorses.320 In fact, so argues Peterson, Socrates provides an account of philosophy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Even the activity of geometrizing, if recognized as proper philosophizing, must be considered a 
virtuous, namely just, activity that hopefully culminates in wisdom, a further virtue. 
319 Peterson (2011) 
320 Indeed, Peterson (2011) xvi, 233-34 argues that there is insufficient evidence to ascribe to Socrates 
the vast majority of views that most scholars have ascribed to him in Plato. Peterson goes one step 
further and denies that Plato enodorses any of the doctrines found in his dialogues (e.g., the theory of 
Forms in the Republic; the arguments for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo), save the one 
regarding philosophy that is described by Socrates in the Apology: philosophy is a constant process of 
(self-)examination, one which denies all claims to knowledge of the greatest matters (cf. (2011) 233-
34). To be clear, Peterson accepts that Socrates acts as a sort of mouthpiece for Plato in the dialogues 
(cf. (2011) 4-5, 15). Though, according to Peterson, Socrates never personally endorses any doctrine 
found therein (cf. (2011) 233). She adds that Plato ‘disappears into his writing’ (235), for the most part 
only interested in critically examining the views of others, not promoting his own (cf. (2011) 231-35). 
In passing, I must point out that Peterson’s project rests on a tenuous assumption: that the account of 
philosophy in the Apology, as told by the character Socrates and (so argues Peterson) ultimately 
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representative of Theodorus’ unexamined convictions. Concurrently, Socrates 
disassociates himself from said account.  
 
‘…Socrates implies that the statements of the digression addressed to Theodorus 
come from Theodorus, and do not come from Socrates...What count as your views for 
the purposes of an examination discussion are not only views adopted formally long 
ago and proclaimed ever since; your views also include proposals that appeal to you 
to which you assent when you are first asked about them.’321  
 
My aim in this last section is to cast serious doubt on Peterson’s reading particularly 
on the first part of the digression (roughly, 172c-176a). In addition, I argue against 
Peterson’s claim that the Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the 
Apology. I also show that her related reading of the close of the Theaetetus is 
misguided. Lastly, I offer an alternative reading of the close of the Theaetetus.322 
Generally put, Peterson’s overarching claim is that Socrates never actually 
endorses any proposition that arises in discussion in any dialogue (save the 
Apology).323 In other words, all propositions, be they first uttered by Socrates in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
defended by Plato all his lifetime, is more or less an accurate reflection of the account of philosophy 
that the historical Socrates held. On various problems with this assumption, see Morrison (2000). 
321 Peterson (2011) 69 
322 I am aware of Taylor’s (2012), Wilburn’s (2011), and Reshotko’s (2012) similarly critical remarks 
on Peterson’s project. I note, though, that none of these scholars directly and extensively address 
Peterson’s treatment of the Theaetetus.  
323 Admittedly, in various places Plato has Socrates explicitly disclaim authorship of views he lays out: 
cf., e.g., Phd., 108c, Crat., 397d, 399a, 428c, cf. 400a, 407d, Smp., 201de, Phdr., 242d ff., 244a, 
Menex., 238b ff., and Tht., 164e. Accordingly, this puts the onus of proof on anyone claiming that 
Socrates voices a view only tacitly not endorsed by him. That being said, I find it very odd that 
Peterson does not reflect on the fact that Socrates disclaims ownership in the passages that I have listed. 
Surprisingly, Peterson (2011) 246-8 attempts to harmonize Diotima’s speech on Love and philosophy 
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form of a question or declaration, are ultimately propositions endorsed by the 
interlocutor and only the interlocutor.324 Specifically, Peterson distinguishes between 
two types of examination applied by Socrates in the Theaetetus: there is an elenctic, 
or more generally question-and-answer type of examination (more on this below), 
prevalent through much of the dialogue. There is also another type of examination: it 
is a presentation of a set of propositions first uttered by the examiner that is in turn 
accepted by and accordingly ascribed to the interlocutor, only to be scrutinized (by 
the examiner) at a later stage.325 The latter type of examination is, according to 
Peterson, in evidence during the digression.  Both types of examination, so argues 
Peterson, harmonize with philosophizing as accounted for and endorsed by the 
Socrates of the Apology.  
Now, it is one thing to say that Socrates does not openly endorse any thesis 
put forth in a given elenchus; an aporetic terminus to a given elenctic examination 
casts doubt on any thesis proffered by any speaker during examination. By this I mean 
that a typical elenctic episode ends by showing that a given thesis is at minimum 
untenable, that no one present in the discussion ought to hold onto the thesis, at least 
in its current shape. Accordingly, it is reasonable to maintain, as Peterson does 
throughout her book, that Socrates does not commit himself to any thesis at play in a 
typical elenchus. For that reason, I shall not question Socrates’ disassociation from 
theses scrutinized via elenchus in the Theaetetus. Instead, I shall focus on the other 
purported type of examination by which Socrates purportedly disavows any sort of 
philosophical commitment. More precisely, I want to question Peterson’s claim that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with Socrates’ view of philosophy of the Apology; as far as I can tell, Peterson never reflects on the 
point that Socrates explicitly disclaims authorship of the speech in the Symposium.  
324 Cf. Peterson (2011) 15 et passim 
325 Cf. Peterson (2011) 64-70. The parenthetical is important, as I show below. Peterson calls these two 
types of examination ‘extraction by interrogation’ and ‘extraction by declaration’.  
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the digression of the Theaetetus constitutes an ‘extraction by declaration’ (Peterson’s 
expression); that Socrates does not endorse the account of the philosopher presented 
during the digression; that the account of the philosopher is a type of examination of 
Theodorus’ (not Socrates’) conception of the philosopher.326 
To review, Peterson is essentially saying that in the Theaetetus Socrates does 
not commit himself to any thesis found in any part of the dialogue, including the 
digression. To fairly represent Peterson here, I quote her at length: 
 
‘In the digression addressed to Theodorus Socrates does not ask 
questions and get assents [i.e., he does not engage in elenchus]. Rather, 
he enunciates declarations that Theodorus praises…The sense in which 
these declarations do not come from Socrates is that Socrates is not 
presenting himself’ as endorsing or recommending them, because he 
has already said that he knows nothing, except how to get a statement 
from someone else who is wise, and to take its measure. That is to say, 
Socrates has told us that he merely tests candidate wise statements. He 
does not offer them as doctrines or teaching, even though he may be the 
first to utter them.’ 
 
I now turn to criticize Peterson’s reading particularly of the first half of the digression.  
To start, surely Socrates’ ‘terrible lust’ (cf. Tht., 169bc) for conversation, 
which Peterson highlights,327 and which in turn she uses to state that Socrates is in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Peterson (2011) is not the first scholar to question Socrates’ (Plato’s) endorsement of the account of 
the philosopher during the digression of the Theaetetus. See, e.g., Rue (1993). A critique of Rue’s 
thesis is found in Lännström (2011). 
327 Peterson (2011) 67-8  
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essence a slave to the investigative course that the argument itself takes,328 refers 
particularly to elenctic exchanges, not conversation simpliciter. Indeed, most of 
Peterson’s ensuing quotations (Tht. 150c, 157cd, 161a, 169b, 184e, 190b, 210bc) used 
in support of her thesis clearly refer either to a particular elenctic exchange, or to the 
elenctic nature of Socrates’ art of intellectual midwifery. At 150c, Socrates speaks of 
his way of eliciting from his pregnant patients answers (propositions), which, as we 
find out, are in turn scrutinized by Socrates to see whether they are ‘wind-eggs’. At 
157cd, Socrates is clarifying his role as intellectual midwife, after building up the first 
thesis on knowledge (cf. 156c-157c), which will ultimately be refuted via elenchus.  
At 161a, Socrates is explaining to Theodorus how, via elenchus, he (Socrates) is 
going to proceed in discussion with Theaetetus.  At 169bc, context patently details the 
elenctic exchange in progress between Theodorus and Socrates.  So too at 184e, 
Socrates is obviously in the middle of an elenchus with Theaetetus. And at 190b, 
Socrates is alluding to any viable answer that may survive the current elenchus. The 
point I want to make here is this: even if we assume for the sake of argument that 
Socrates does not commit himself to a particular thesis in a given elenchus, this move 
does not, ipso facto, further entail a habitual disavowal of all theses considered in all 
forms of philosophical conversation.  
Perhaps Peterson could respond here by referring back to what Socrates says 
at 150c and 161a: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Peterson (2011) 71: ‘Theodorus thinks that philosophers have their arguments totally under their 
control, like slaves, and that philosophers are divine. In contrast, Socrates is prepared for the argument 
to trample and humble him, and he thinks that philosophers are in the first place puzzled.’  
 
In passing, Socrates actually says that philosophers are in the first place in wonder: ‘wonderment: this 
is the start of philosophy, nowhere else’ (τὸ θαυµάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, 155d3-




‘I always ask others, and I myself profess nothing about anything on account of 
having nothing wise [to say]’ (150c, tr. Peterson (2011) 69) 
 
‘Not one of the arguments comes from me but always from the one that is having the 
discussion with me. I know nothing more, apart from a tiny bit, enough to be able to 
get a statement from someone else who is wise, and to take its measure. That’s what 
I’m going to do now: I’m going to try to get an argument from Theaetetus, not to say 
anything myself.’ (161a7 ff., tr. Peterson (2011) 68) 
 
Peterson claims that Socrates’ adverb, ‘always’, which extends to every discussion in 
which he is engaged, particularly ‘implies that he [sc. Socrates] counts even this 
sequence of declarations [i.e., the digression] as extracted from his interlocutors.’329  
However, aei need only mean ‘on each occasion’,330 or suggest some other 
specification of time, as in the context of elenchus. And that is just what context 
indicates in these passages: context informs us that Socrates’ statements are closely 
tied to his elenctic art of midwifery (cf. 150b, 160e-161b). Accordingly, there is no 
implication at 150c or 161a that Socrates never (i.e, in every discursive situation) says 
something positive of his own. At most, these passages suggest that he may not 
proffer a personally held belief when engaged in elenchus. The digression is clearly 
not an instance of elenchus. Therefore there are no good grounds to extend Socrates’ 
disavowal of a thesis during a given elenchus to a patently non-elenctic part of the 
dialogue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Peterson (2011) 70 
330 See LSJ entry 
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In addition, if by ‘thesis’ we mean a positive view put forward for discussion 
within some recognized type of investigation, then Socrates’ account of the 
philosopher of the digression is not, technically speaking, a thesis proper. In fact, one 
could reasonably argue that the account of the philosopher of the digression is a sort 
of ‘meta-picture’, that is a picture of what the philosopher is like, not a statement 
either supporting or criticizing claims such a philosopher makes within any one of his 
investigations. This brings up a related question: Is Socrates’ disavowal of positive 
positions (1) completely universal, or (2) is it a refusal to compete (on their level) 
with thinkers who do put forward positive views? Surely Peterson is forced to admit 
that Socrates’ disavowal is not completely universal; after all, Peterson argues that in 
the Apology Socrates endorses what is in essence a positive view of philosophy (viz., 
that philosophy is X).331  
Yet (2) is perfectly compatible with Socrates’ recognizing the existence (or 
anyway possibility) of a figure like the philosopher of the digression.332 A figure such 
as the philosopher of the digression will have been more or less familiar from what 
people (not just the characters in Plato) knew of the Pre-Socratics (e.g., Thales, 
Parmenides, Anaxagoras). Indeed, even if Plato fabricated the Thales story in the 
Theaetetus (174ab), he evidently assumes that readers will latch on to a familiar type 
(cf. Aristophanes’ Clouds, as well as Phaedrus 270a). Is Socrates not allowed, then, 
in common with others in his culture, to recognize this type (even from afar)? I take it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 In Peterson’s (2011) 233 own words, philosophy is believing ‘that it is important to acknowledge 
that one does not have knowledge of the greatest matters; that the greatest harm one can do to someone 
else is to offer as knowledge teachings about how to live that are less than genuine knowledge; and that 
continually subjecting oneself to examination – possibly by examining others – is a requirement of a 
thoughtful life.’  
332 Incidentally, I take it Peterson would say that Socrates is insincere in making statements in which he 
recognizes the existence of the discussions of mathematics, just because he (Socrates) does not want to 
put himself forward as a mathematician himself. I find this very odd. 
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Peterson would dig in her heels and say that Socrates is allowed to recognize this type, 
without further endorsing it. But then the point raised above about the non-thesis 
nature of the account of the philosopher of the digression returns: What grounds do 
we have to think that Socrates is disavowing this type during the digression? 
Peterson might argue that at 150bc Socrates refers to any number of ‘possible 
tests’ at his disposal; that Socrates is always at the ready to test someone in someway; 
that there is nothing in the passage that explicitly says Socrates is only testing 
someone when he is found employing elenchus:  
 
‘And the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to 
the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, 
that is, an error, or a fertile truth.’ (150b9-c3) 
 
Accordingly, Socrates the midwife could be applying some test different from 
elenchus to Theodorus during the digression.  
In reply, first note the reference to a ‘young mind’ (τοῦ νέου). Theodorus is 
not young. Note as well Theodorus’ plea to get out of an examination with Socrates 
on account of his old age and Socrates’ reply that the ensuing discussion will only go 
as far as Theodorus is comfortable taking it (Tht., 168e-169c). Surely this puts into 
doubt whether Socrates wishes to seriously ‘test’ Theodorus in the Theaetetus. 
Moreover, even if we were to accept the reference to an assortment of tests at 
Socrates’ disposal at 150bc, Peterson would still have to show exactly when and how 
Socrates actually determines the tenable or untenable nature of the digression, as well 
as when it becomes clear that the digression expresses only Theodorus’ opinion. As 
far as I can tell, Socrates never once scrutinizes the content of the digression.  
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Peterson admits that no actual examination of the account of the philosopher 
of the digression occurs in the dialogue.333 Ultimately, her preferred explanation for 
this is that Socrates, by bringing to the fore Theodorus’ ‘self-congratulatory beliefs’, 
is urging Theaetetus to be an independent inquirer and accordingly examine his 
teacher’s (Theodorus’) views at some later point.334 Peterson adds to her explanation 
by pointing out that ‘Socrates is often interested in the examination of people who act 
as guides or teachers to the young. He gives extensive examinations of teachers in 
Protagoras, Laches, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Gorgias, and Euthydemus.’335  
In reply, it is unclear how these references to other dialogues are relevant, 
unless the philosopher of the digression is presented as a teacher of the young. The 
problem, for Peterson, is that nowhere during the digression is the philosopher cast as 
a teacher of the young. What is more, Socrates never questions Theodorus’ capacity 
as a mathematics instructor. Indeed, if anything, Socrates is shown approving 
Theodorus’ role as a mathematics instructor to Theaetetus and Young Socrates (cf. 
Tht., 147d-148b).336 More substantially, as midwife Socrates’ task is not to simply 
bring to the fore an ‘egg’ (proposition, thesis), but to further scrutinize the egg 
alongside its progenitor. By simply presenting Theodorus’ account of the philosopher 
to Theaetetus, all Socrates would be doing in his capacity as midwife at this point in 
the Theaetetus is putting into words what Theodorus is thinking; Socrates the midwife 
would be acting as nothing more than a reporter. Surely this action falls far short of 
what Socrates has claimed about his art earlier in the dialogue. Lastly, whilst I agree 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Peterson (2011) 73 
334 Peterson (2011) 74 
335 Peterson (2011) 74 
336 After hearing Theaetetus’ explanation of mathematical ‘powers’ or squares: ‘{Soc} Excellent, my 
boys. I don’t think Theodorus is likely to be had up for false witness’ (148b3-4). Peterson (2011) does 
not address this remark. 
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with Peterson on the point that Socrates is often interested in quizzing so-called 
experts of the young, in the dialogues cited by Peterson Socrates directly examines 
those teachers via elenchus. Indeed, there is no suggestion in any of the cited 
dialogues that Socrates simply (re)formulates the respective theses of the likes of 
Protagoras or Hippias to then abandon the conversation and have someone else 
(especially a young person) point out their flaws at a later date.  
Another piece of evidence that Peterson uses to attribute the depiction of the 
philosopher of the digression to Theodorus follows: 
 
‘Theodorus makes the limited agreement to answer certain questions as 
a stand-in for his deceased friend Protagoras (169c6-7), Theodorus 
serves as formal answerer in two passages. The digression, and nothing 
else, occurs between those two passages. So Plato has placed the 
digression exactly within Theodorus’ official contribution to the 
discussion as answerer.’337 
 
Peterson makes a good observation: the placement of the digression must be 
significant. But not necessarily in the way she supposes. Indeed, since the digression 
comes between two passages in which Socrates scrutinizes Theodorus, then if the 
digression does represent Theodorus’ position, all the more strange that Socrates does 
not criticize it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Peterson (2011) 73. There is some ambiguity here with ‘within Theodorus’ official contribution’. 




In addition, Peterson appears to overlook the very nature of the digression or 
side-project (πάρεργα, 177b8): it does not constitute an official part of the 
examination of ‘Protagoras’’ position.  
 
‘{Socrates} But we had better leave it there; all this is really a digression; and if we 
go on, a flood of new subjects will pour in and overwhelm our original argument. So 
if you don’t mind, we will go back to what we were saying before. {Theodorus} As a 
matter of fact, Socrates, I like listening to this kind of talk; it is easier for a man of my 
years to follow. Still, if you like, let us go back {to the argument} (πάλιν ἐπανίωµεν).’ 
(177b7-c5).338  
 
The digression’s relevance to the latter is, at least in part, probably that it taps into a 
familiar picture of the unworldly theoretician, a picture which portrays him as 
operating precisely not as if man is the measure of all things (but rather, God is).  The 
picture alone is, of course, not any sort of conclusive argument against 
Protagoreanism (or any sort of moral relativism, for that matter), but it certainly 
reminds anyone tempted by such a position that our culture does have room for this 
opposed intellectual ideal (even if it is somewhat caricatured here in the Theaetetus). 
Giving this reminder is like adducing, in argument, an (commonly) accepted opinion.  
Peterson also claims Socrates’ phrase, ‘whom you call a philosopher’ (175e1), 
is a ‘concluding signal that Socrates is speaking here as Theodorus speaks.’339 Surely 
this is not the only interpretation of the phrase in question, ‘ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 I bracket ‘to the argument’ above, for the clause is not explicitly stated. Yet Socrates’ request, ‘ἐπὶ 
δὲ τὰ ἔµπροσθεν ἴωµεν’ (177c1-2), clearly refers to the argument that was interrupted at 172c. Further, 
see Labriola (2012) for the argument that the position under scrutiny immediately leading up to the 
digression is not specifically Protagoras’. 
339 Peterson (2011) 73 
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‘dē’, as a particle of emphasis, may indicate that Socrates is approving Theodorus’ 
appellation of the individual in question as a true philosopher. If the point were what 
Peterson wants it to be, surely Plato would have simply written ‘su kaleis’ (or even 
‘su gē kaleis’).340 
On a separate note, Peterson holds that the Socrates of the Theaetetus, the 
Socrates that purportedly disassociates himself from any opinion scrutinized in 
discussion, and thereby particularly disassociates himself from the account of the 
philosopher of the digression, is exactly that Socrates witnessed in the Euthyphro, 
Crito and Apology; that the Socrates of the Theaetetus is particularly the same non-
doctrinal inquirer of the Apology whose purportedly fixed conception of philosophy 
involves the sort of constant examination and reproaching alluded to in the Apology. I 
wish to go right for the jugular here and show that this alleged equation is 
misguided.341 By dismissing the equation, I hope to cast further doubt on Peterson’s 
reading of the Theaetetus. 
 
‘Plato could hardly have made it plainer that the Socrates of the 
Theaetetus and the Socrates of the Euthyphro (and hence of the Apology 
and Crito) are the same.’342 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Incidentally, at no point between 172c-177c does Theodorus use any case of ‘philosophos’. 
‘Philosopher’ at 173c, which is attributed to Theodorus in the Hackett translation, is an interpolation. 
All the same, at 175e1 Socrates must be referring back to what is said about the philosopher by the two 
men between 172c-173b. This may help explain manuscript P, which gives ‘ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον 
καλοῦµεν’ at 175e1. 
341 It is outside the scope of this section to question the purportedly unique to Socrates conception of 
philosophy in the Apology. To be clear, my aim here is specifically to question the equation drawn by 
Peterson between, on the one hand, Socrates of the Apology, Crito and Euthyphro and, on the other 
hand, Socrates of the Theaetetus. 
342 Peterson (2011) 63 
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Peterson rests the ostensibly clear-cut equation between the Socrates of the 
Theaetetus and the Socrates of the Euthyphro (Apology and Crito) particularly on the 
closing remarks of the Theaetetus: 
 
‘And now I must go to the King’s Porch to meet the indictment that Meletus has 
brought against me; but let us meet here again in the morning, Theodorus.’ (210d1-4) 
 
I grant Peterson this much: the end of the Theaetetus prompts recollection of the 
Euthyphro, a dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro dramatically set en route to 
the King Archon’s porch. Indeed, surely it is meant to remind us of the whole 
sequence: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito. Yet, frankly, I find it rather curious that 
Peterson is so eager to look inter dialogues without first looking intra dialogue for a 
more immediate interpretation of Socrates’ remarks at the close of the Theaetetus 
(something I offer below). I particularly find it surprising that Peterson makes the 
equation between Socrates of the Theaetetus and Socrates of the Apology with little 
more than the closing lines of the Theaetetus in favour of such a equation; no 
considerable time is given in her chapter dedicated to the Theaetetus to address what 
are surely notable differences between the elenctic intellectual midwife and other 
versions of the elenctic Socrates displayed in other dialogues.343 And whilst Peterson 
acknowledges in a footnote the argument put forth by Charles Kahn, that the Socrates 
of the Apology could not be equated with the Socrates of the Euthyphro on account of 
the former being incapable of consistently searching out definitions,344 Peterson never 
attempts to directly refute Kahn’s rival argument. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 The emphasis here is on the different versions of elenchus and its most famous user, Socrates, as 
found in various dialogues. 
344 Peterson (2011) 63 n. 8, referencing Kahn (1996) 93-5  
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Above all, Peterson herself acknowledges that the very lines at the end of the 
dialogue, on which the equation hinges, do not explicitly match the intellectual 
midwife with the gadfly: 
  
‘The end of the Theaetetus (210b11-d) is evocative of statements in the 
Apology though its allusions to midwifery do not occur in the 
Apology.’345 
 
If the midwife does not explicitly match the gadfly, and, taken for the sake of 
argument, the gadfly is also the Socrates of the Euthyphro and Crito, then the midwife 
does not explicitly match the Socrates of the Euthyphro and Crito. Therefore, there 
are no strong grounds for supporting the equation claimed by Peterson.  
Now, Plato must have expected that those in his audience who have already 
read the Apology, Euthyphro and Crito (or even just the Apology) will be reminded of 
these, hence of the Socrates of those dialogues. However, Peterson needs the much 
stronger point that the final lines of those dialogues show that the Socrates of those 
dialogues is the Socrates of the Theaetetus, and she fails to make it stand up. Here is 
my alternative reading of the closing remarks of the Theaetetus, which makes no 
attempt to connect the Theaetetus and its Socrates with any other dialogue or 
manifestation of Socrates. I believe that an intra-dialogue explanation is the most 
straightforward and reasonable explanation to endorse. Surely it avoids any number of 
issues that arise when attempting to link Plato’s dialogues, as well as the presentation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Peterson (2011) 69, my underline  
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of Socrates in different dialogues.346 To be clear, I do not deny that the reference to 
Socrates’ impending trial at the close of the Theaetetus is meant to recall the Apology 
(and probably the actual historical event for those very close to it in time). 
Nevertheless, contra Peterson, it does not follow that Socrates in the Theaetetus 
stands only for what Socrates in the Apology stands for. 
Through the course of the Theaetetus, Socrates has taken the time to note his 
expertise as an intellectual midwife. In particular, he has relayed the positive 
intellectual benefits had by some of those pregnant individuals placed under his 
supervision: 
 
‘At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as 
time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make 
progress-a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet 
it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they 
discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into 
the light. But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring’ (150d2-e1). 
 
Socrates has a most valuable expertise. It is an art that assists in an 
individual’s intellectual (this includes virtuous) progress. And yet, it is an expertise 
that perhaps only a few men truly understand and accordingly value.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 To be clear, I accept that there is an unquestionable reference forward to the Sophist at the end of 
the Theaetetus (cf. Tht., 210d, Sph., 216a). Whatever the exact connection is between these dialogues, 




‘And a proof of this may be seen in the many cases where people who did not realize 
this fact [viz., that Socrates possess and utilizes this divine-granted expertise, cf. 
150d2-31 quoted above] took all the credit to themselves and thought that I was no 
good. They have proceeded to leave me sooner than they should, either of their own 
accord or through the influence of others…the result [being] that what remained 
within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to 
bring forth, and lost then, because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than 
upon the truth…’ (150e1-9) 
 
This point of generally misinterpreting Socrates’ expertise and corresponding 
modus operandi is recurrent in the dialogue: 
 
‘But I do [have this art], believe me. Only don’t give me away to the rest of the world, 
will you? You see, my friend, it is a secret that I have this art. That is not one of the 
things you hear people saying about me, because they don’t know (ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες); 
but they do say that I am a very odd sort of person, always causing people to get into 
difficulties (ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰµι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν).’ (149a6-10) 
 
Ultimately, the misinterpretation of Socrates as a meddlesome and practically useless 
inquisitor is the topic that reappears at the end of the dialogue: Socrates is apparently 
worthless by comparison to the ‘great and inspired men’ (ὅσοι µεγάλοι καὶ θαυµάσιοι 
ἄνδρες, 210c5-6). In truth, so Socrates’ final words in the dialogue imply, it takes 
someone special, a genuine philosopher, to understand how valuable someone like 







The general aim of this dissertation has been to present a coherent account of 
Plato’s conception of philosophy in certain dialogues. In doing so, it has sought to 
shed light on, amongst other things, the multi-disciplinary nature of philosophy, and 
both its positive and negative fashions. This dissertation has also sought to shed light 
on the general contrast (according to Plato) between philosophy and non-philosophy, 
the hierarchy of the philosophical sciences, the relation between the various types of 
philosophers (Socrates included), Plato’s endorsement of the various philosophers on 
display in the dialogues in question, and Plato’s promotion of the method of 
collection and division as the universal method par excellence. Additionally, a much 
discussed topic of this dissertation concerned the highest science of philosophy: 
namely that, in the Republic and certain post-Republic dialogues, the science par 
excellence is consistently cast as a supra-mathematical science called ‘dialectic’; that 
the topmost philosopher’s body of knowledge is completed by his mastery of this 
science. To conclude this dissertation, I would like to reflect a bit more on certain of 
its findings. My hope is that in doing so I am able to adequately summarize the thesis 
as a whole, as well as stimulate further discussion in future on Plato’s conception of 
philosophy. 
 There are particularly three topics discussed in this dissertation that require 
some additional clarification. (1) The relation between dialectic qua supreme science 
and dialectic qua the method of collection and division. (2) The relation of elenchus 
to the philosopher’s acquisition of knowledge. (3) The criterion (or set thereof), 
according to Plato, between what is philosophy generally speaking and what is non-
philosophy generally speaking. After discussing these three topics, I shall turn to 
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reflect on whether or not my account of philosophy provides good evidence for a 
Developmentalist reading of Plato. 
 On (1): What is the relation between dialectic qua supreme science and 
dialectic qua the method of division, including in the Sophist the relation between 
dialectic and division with regard to the five greatest Kinds? This question actually 
unfolds into three related ones: What is the relation, in general, between dialectic as a 
supreme science and dialectic as a particular method? What is the status, in terms of 
the contrast between science and method, of dialectic in the Sophist? What is the 
status, in light of the distinctions highlighted in the Sophist, of collection and 
division? 
The science of dialectic in Plato is distinguished by way of its special subject 
matter, that is, its unique scientific understanding of either (i) the Good as such of 
Republic VI-VII, or (ii) the ‘greatest’ Kinds in the Sophist and Statesman. Otherwise, 
this special science is cast more broadly (iii) as a science of formal ontology in the 
Philebus. It is a science, I surmise, that has exclusive access to an unspecified set of 
distinguished Kinds understood qua Kinds (cf. Ch. IV p. 173-4).  
To be clear, Plato postulates different sciences of dialectic in the dialogues 
highlighted in this dissertation; he does not have a fixed referent for the super science 
he calls ‘dialectic’. The Sophist’s topmost science, for example, is not identical to the 
supreme science of the Republic: the Good as such is noticeably missing from the 
class of megista genē, which constitute the exclusive subject matter of the Sophist’s 
supreme science. Moreover, in the Republic, the science of dialectic is not shown as 
being concerned with the sort of formal questions that dialectic qua science is 
expressly concerned with in the Sophist (and Philebus too): e.g., ‘what does it mean to 
be a Kind?’ ‘How can Kinds be both one and many?’ How is it possible for Kind A to 
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combine and separate with Kinds B, C, D, etc.?’ All the same, there are, as I have 
argued in this dissertation, strong echoes between the Sophist and Republic (amongst 
other dialogues) regarding what Plato construes as a supreme science for mankind. 
The ‘science of dialectic’ is regularly presented as a science inquiring into some kind 
of abstract subject matter (be it (i), (ii) or (iii) above), such that no other science has 
direct access to. It is, accordingly, considered the top philosophical science. The main 
point is that there are different candidates in Plato for the philosopher’s topmost 
science. Whilst these candidates are not identical, they all share a common feature: 
each is cast in its respective dialogue(s) as the topmost supra-mathematical science of 
philosophy.  
This brief recapitulation of the science(s) of dialectic should help us see more 
clearly the relation between dialectic as a science and dialectic as a method. In the 
Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus and Philebus, the dialectical method par excellence is 
unquestionably taxonomic division. Yet the Phaedrus and Philebus tell us that this 
type of dialectic is applicable to just about any subject matter; that division is used, 
with varying degrees of awareness of the metaphysical and epistemological 
implications, by any genuine craft or science (e.g., Medicine, the proper Rhetoric of 
the Phaedrus, etc.) in its specific field. What, then, is the precise connection between 
this universal method and the supreme science, as the latter is variously presented in 
these post-Republic dialogues? What distinguishes the science of dialectic’s use of 
division from all other disciplines’ use of it? 
In these post-Republic dialogues a central point is maintained: the science of 
dialectic, whatever else distinguishes it in a given dialogue, is not as such taxonomic 
division, but a grasp of this science underlies any precise definition of any particular 
Kind (e.g., Sophist, Weaving), understood qua Kind, which is obtained via taxonomic 
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division. In other words, the rigour of dialectic qua the method of division is needed 
in order to pin down the definition of a particular Kind. Yet (as I am about to explain) 
only a prior understanding of certain Kinds as such, the exclusive subject matter of 
dialectic qua science, will allow the philosopher to use division to its fullest, to arrive 
at a thorough account of that particular Kind.  
What immediately follows expounds the relation between the two dialectics in 
the Sophist.  
 
‘{EV} [P] Aren’t we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things 
by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form 
is the same? {Tht} Yes. {EV} So if a person can do that, [T1] he’ll be capable of 
adequately discriminating a single form spread out all through a lot of other things, 
each which stands separate from the others. In addition, [T2] he can discriminate 
forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that’s 
outside them, [T3] or a single form that’s connected as a unit throughout many wholes, 
[T4] or many forms that are completely separate from others. [E] That’s what it is to 
know how to discriminate by kinds how things can associate and how they can’t. 
{Tht} Absolutely.’ (Sph. 253d1-e3)347 
 
The highlighted passage details the connection between dialectic qua method 
and dialectic qua science. Dialectic qua science has its own special subject matter, 
namely the formal concepts of Being as such, Not-Being (sc. Difference) as such, and 
Sameness as such, that are presupposed in all uses of dialectic qua method of division. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 For the various interpretations of this passage see Notomi (1999) 235 and literature therein. I adopt 
Notomi’s (1999) 235 numbering of this passage, which is basically Gómez-Lobo’s (1977) 30. My 
interpretation of this passage largely follows that of Gómez-Lobo and Notomi.	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The general point being made in the highlighted passage is that, if the connections 
between these Kinds are incoherent, or if the nature of one Kind is in particular 
incoherent (e.g., Non-Being as such), then dialectic as the method of division is not 
fully grasped, and so it is not properly employed. What follows from this is actually 
something stronger: namely that when division is employed by someone who does not 
have the requisite knowledge of greatest Kinds (understood qua Kinds), then it cannot 
be relied on to lead us to the whole truth (regarding any Kind). The major implication 
in this passage, then, is that the precise use of division presupposes knowledge of the 
greatest Kinds as such. And this knowledge is ascribed to none other than the science 
of dialectic.  
To elaborate, in the passage quoted the first sentence, [P], is straightforwardly 
a reference to division. Indeed, ‘to divide things by kinds’ is, as it were, a catch-
phrase in Plato for the use of division (cf. Phdr., 265e1-266b1, Pol., 262d7, e3-4, 
287c3-5). In general, the overarching aim of division is to understand the sameness 
and difference between kinds; how a given Kind stands in relation to other (closely 
related) Kinds (Sph. 253d1-4, cf. Phdr. 265e-266c). In the Sophist, the reference to 
division in this passage explicitly connects to the overarching aim of the dialogue: to 
hunt down the Kind Sophist by means of division; to show how Sophistry is both 
similar to and different from other technai.348 Yet [P] is not the only thing in this 
passage that falls within the domain of the science of dialectic.  [T1]-[T4] roughly 
explain the combination and separation of Kinds through certain pervasive Kinds, 
particularly Being as such and Non-Being (sc. Difference) as such-we may surmise of 
the greatest Kinds in general. It is principally the understanding of said combination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 ‘Diaireisthai’, ‘diairesis’ and cognates are frequently used in the Sophist to refer to the method. Cf. 




and separation of these special Kinds that constitutes knowledge of the science of 
dialectic. Indeed, to perform [P] in order to arrive at a thorough account of any given 
Kind, one must already possess knowledge of how the greatest Kinds separate and 
combine both with each other and with inferior Kinds. A fortiori, one must possess 
prior knowledge of the very nature of the greatest Kinds individually.349  
To review, we have discussed the relation between dialectic as a science and 
dialectic as the method of division, as said relation is found in certain post-Republic 
dialogues. The science’s unique subject matter is presupposed when employing the 
method of dialectic in investigations into the nature of Kinds as such. The Sophist, in 
particular, casts the science of dialectic as principally a science of the greatest Kinds; 
the rigour of division is fully achieved only by this science in light of its prior grasp of 
the nature of greatest Kinds. With regard to the status of division as such, in light of 
the distinctions highlighted in the Sophist, the central message in the dialogue is that 
philosophically confident division is the sole possession of the topmost philosopher; 
that the full extent to which division reveals the nature of its intended target is 
dependent on its user’s prior knowledge of certain Kinds as such. For sure, the 
Phaedrus and Philebus strongly suggest division’s universal application; there is one 
method used by various disciplines for a multiplicity of subject matter. All the same, 
the Sophist reveals (and so too the Statesman, albeit circuitously, with its mention of 
the dialectician hunting down the nature of ‘all things’) that only the expert of the 
science of dialectic applies division with the result of achieving the most informed 
and thorough insights into reality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 A convincing case for this is made by Gómez-Lobo (1977) 36-47. See also Notomi (1999) 236-7. Cf. 
my Ch. III p. 111-12: to properly understand the relation between Kinds presupposes knowledge of 
those Kinds individually, which itself is possible only with a prior grasp of the greatest Kinds.	  
 	  
232	  
 On (2): I wish to focus on a passage in Republic VII for the sake of elucidating 
the relation between elenchus and the acquisition of knowledge (where this means 
‘positive scientific knowledge’). I concentrate on this passage because it is perhaps 
the strongest evidence in all of Plato for the view that elenchus as such helps to 
acquire positive scientific knowledge.  In what follows, I dismiss this evidence. I 
show that elenchus as such does not help the philosopher acquire positive scientific 
knowledge; that elenchus remains at its core a negative way of doing philosophy.  
In Republic VII (534b8-d1), elenchus plays an important part in the 
philosopher’s arrival at, above all, the Good as such. Indeed, the reader may hold that 
elenchus plays a crucial last step in acquiring such knowledge; that elenchus does 
more than just verify or confirm the knowledge that the philosopher has already 
obtained (cf. Ch. II pp. 87-8). If this is so, then the straightforward distinction 
between a ‘positive’ fashion of philosophy and a ‘negative’ one, which I have 
suggested in this dissertation, is in fact not so straightforward. This would be because 
elenctic philosophy, particularly given the remarks in Republic VII, is not simply 
‘negative’; it does not simply remove false beliefs and conceit, or otherwise highlight 
the faults of one’s thesis. It is, instead, the last step toward obtaining the highest 
knowledge.	   
 A final review of the Republic passage in question only confirms what I have 
been arguing throughout this dissertation concerning the nature of Socratic elenchus: 
this philosophical method is limited to scrutinizing the account already formulated; 
elenchus at most tentatively confirms the tenable nature of an already put together 
thesis, it does not add to any thesis already formulated. Note, for one, that the 
philosopher in possession of an account of the Good as such is expected to ‘come 
through’ or ‘survive’ (διεξιών, 534c2) all refutations or elenchoi; that, more 
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importantly, only after coming through ‘all this with his account still intact’ (ἐν πᾶσι 
τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ, 534c3) will he be said to have an unquestionable grasp of 
the Good as such. For sure, elenchus plays an important role in the philosopher’s 
grasp of the Good as such: it is the last test (or series thereof) before confirmation of 
the highest knowledge. But it would be misleading to call the elenctic experience the 
last crucial step in acquiring positive knowledge of the Good as such. Again, the 
passage explicitly states that, were the philosopher to have survived elenctic quizzing, 
his account of the Good as such would remain ‘intact’ (aptōs). This implies that 
elenchus does not add to the account put under scrutiny, but rather confirms its 
already crafted tenable nature. Accordingly, the closest elenchus comes to being 
‘positive’ is in verifying that a certain thesis is tenable.  
To review, then, elenchus as such (i) does not help initially form an account. 
(ii) Nor does it add to said account during examination of it. Elenchus as such cannot 
do (ii).  It may point out where a thesis needs correcting, but it does not take the extra 
step and provide the precise material needed to make the correction. Thus elenchus is 
still at its core ‘negative’, just insofar as it is principally used see whether a thesis is 
faulty, and so underline, if necessary, what the possessor of said thesis does not know 
about the topic at hand.  
 On (3): Given the distinction between philosophy at its highest being the 
supreme science of dialectic and philosophy more generally being a set of various 
disciplines, what criterion (or set thereof) brings together all these otherwise 
independent disciplines under the heading of ‘philosophy’? What identifies various 
experts as philosophers? Are there subjects that count as philosophical and ones that 
do not? Alternatively, does the general distinction between philosophy and non-
philosophy amount to a philosophical and a non-philosophical way of doing any given 
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subject? Furthermore, what exactly are the implications of the claim that philosophy 
is not identifiable with one exclusive discipline?  
 What identifies various experts as ‘philosophers’? The broad answer is the 
committed search for the truth. This aim at once distinguishes those that ‘play fair’ in 
a given investigation in order to arrive at the truth of the matter from those that just 
want to win the argument at all costs. The distinction between truth seekers or 
‘philosophers’ and lovers of victory is best exemplified in the Euthydemus, although 
we are certainly not at a loss to find additional examples elsewhere in Plato (see, 
especially, Theaetetus 164c4-d2, cf. 167d-168a). In fact, this distinction immediately 
precludes certain so-called intellectual activities (e.g., the brothers’ sophistic display 
in the Euthydemus) from being labelled ‘philosophical’.  
However, as is, this distinction between truth seekers and lovers of victory is 
too broad. Does the carpenter’s serious pursuit of knowledge regarding his subject 
matter qualify him as a philosopher for Plato? No. According to Plato all craftsmen 
are practically unaware of the epistemological and metaphysical implications of their 
connection to abstract paradigms in their line of work. The typical carpenter, whilst 
indirectly looking to an abstract paradigm in his craft (cf. Rep. X 597a ff., Tim. 28ab), 
is just about completely ignorant of what it means to look at such a paradigm, of what 
follows from holding that there exists a perfect, abstract model which all perceivable 
instantiations at best approximate. Hence his art is not part of philosophy, because it 
does not reflect on (or otherwise specifically search for) the very essence of the 
intelligible paradigm, of what it means to be such an abstract entity.  
But even if we put all manual or crafts-related disciplines to one side, and 
restricted ourselves to the broad class of disciplines which we might label ‘intellectual’ 
(e.g., astronomy, geometry), we would still be left with the task of explaining what 
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makes some of these intellectual disciplines philosophical and others not 
philosophical. Generally put, there is (i) a way in which an intellectual discipline is 
used (ii) in relation to abstract subject matter (iii) that is understood as abstract subject 
matter by that discipline: (i)-(iii) identify that discipline as a part of philosophy.  
For example, there is a practically-oriented use of calculation and arithmetic, 
say in trading, which is contrasted with a philosophically-oriented use: ‘the study of 
the natures of the numbers by means of understanding itself’ (Rep. VII 525c2-3).  
There is, to use another example from the Republic (cf. VII 525b-531e), a use of 
astronomy that traces out the observable motions in the sky, which is contrasted with 
and ultimately subordinate to the philosopher’s astronomy that studies ‘motions that 
are really fast or slow as measured in true numbers, the true geometrical figures, that 
are all in relation to one another, and that are the true motions of the things carried 
along in them’ (529d2-4). The Philebus echoes the Republic’s distinction between a 
philosophical and non-philosophical discipline. The philosophers’ arts and sciences 
are distinguished by way of their ‘precision’, that is their application of abstract 
mathematics, for the sake of obtaining theoretical insights into the natures of shapes 
and numbers as such. The main idea is that these highlighted disciplines are not 
propaedeutical to philosophy as such. They are, instead, part of philosophy proper (cf. 
Rep. VII 521c, Phlb. 56be). 
This brings us to reflect on a related point: the differences internal to 
philosophy. Abstract mathematics, broadly construed, looks to that which is eternal 
and always the same. What is more, it is conscious of its inquiries into these 
universals qua universals (cf. Rep. VII, 527b ff.). However, abstract mathematics’ 
grasp of the metaphysical and epistemological implications of the nature of its 
intelligibles is limited. This is a point that Plato stresses explicitly in both the 
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Republic and Philebus.350 And this limitation serves as a convenient reminder of what 
is consistently identified in certain dialogues as the supra-mathematical zenith of 
philosophy: ‘the science of dialectic’. In the Republic this supra-mathematical science 
is cast as the science of the Good as such. In the Sophist, Statesman and Philebus, the 
science is presented as (what we would call) a science of formal ontology. 
Accordingly, as much as Plato lauds a variety of intellectual disciplines for their 
inherent philosophical nature, he does not consider all of them equal in value and 
importance.  
But we should not overlook the fact that the science of dialectic never serves 
as the only true philosophical discipline for Plato. What are the implications of the 
claim that philosophy is not identifiable with one exclusive discipline? I believe the 
best way to grasp the relation amongst the various disciplines that identify as 
philosophy in selected dialogues is to see each discipline as manifesting one 
necessary element of philosophy in general. Plato thinks that the topmost philosopher 
is a polymath whose view of reality is framed by his special understanding of 
universals as such. What Plato also thinks is that there is a particular order, a way of 
going about becoming a polymath, that requires the individual to commit himself to a 
lifetime of regimented study. As I pointed out in Ch. II, the subjects that comprise the 
educative programme of Kallipolis are not exclusive to Kallipolis; Plato believes that 
those studies, which ought to end at some supra-mathematical peak, can be pursued 
outside an ideal environment. We have echoes of this series of studies in the Philebus, 
a dialogue that does not speak of nor presuppose some ideal city-state: the 
philosophical arts and sciences, particularly abstract mathematics, are to be praised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 See Burnyeat’s (2000) 37-8 succinct explanation of the metaphysical limitations of mathematics as 
such, as mathematics is described in the Republic.  
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for their distinguished insights into reality, even if they are subordinate to the science 
of dialectic’s grasp of reality.  
What is more, the multiple references in Republic VII to the soul being turned 
around or adjusted, especially by certain mathematical disciplines, also tell us that 
each philosophical discipline conditions the soul in preparation for the ontological and 
metaphysical studies exclusive to the science of dialectic. The idea is that without this 
psychical conditioning, no one would be fit to embark on the supra-mathematical 
investigations envisioned by Plato. Each discipline, then, contributes not only to the 
philosopher’s comprehensive body of knowledge, but also to the fine-tuning of the 
philosopher’s soul, to the way in which the philosopher perceives reality and 
accordingly treats his subject matter. 
Incidentally, where does division figure in all this? More pressingly, how do 
we know following the method of division that we have carved out something real, so 
that indeed all the various disciplines aforementioned can be called philosophy? How 
do we know, in other words, that we have not gone wrong with our division in the 
pursuit of the Kind Philosophy? As I suggested in Ch. III, the Sophist and Statesman 
indicate that the philosopher par excellence is, unlike the sophist and genuine 
statesman, not tied down to a specific sub-branch of knowledge; that ‘philosopher’ 
picks out any one of a variety of experts found across a number of sub-branches of 
knowledge. Accordingly, one of the tasks of the topmost philosopher as kritikos 
would be to show via division the precise connection between these branches of 
philosophy, to show just how the philosopher can be found across different sub-
branches of knowledge. Via division, this kritikos would show, moreover, the precise 
relation between the Kind Philosophy and other sub-branches of Knowledge as such. 
All this is possible on account of the philosopher having the requisite knowledge of 
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greatest Kinds, in order to perform the pertinent divisions. Accordingly, the 
philosopher as kritikos would know that his divisions have carved out something real, 
because his divisions are informed by his prior knowledge of especially the greatest 
Kinds. Indeed, only the topmost kritikos would be able to explain, just like the EV 
does in the Sophist and Statesman, when and where exactly to make the right cuts.  
Switching direction, I would like to briefly highlight certain parts of this 
dissertation that relate to the Developmentalist v. Unitarian debate on Plato. I argued 
that ‘the science of dialectic’ does not refer to the exact same science in every 
dialogue wherein a ‘science of dialectic’ features. A Developmentalist may welcome 
my findings: whilst consistent, the various sciences of dialectic found in selected 
dialogues evidence a change in Plato’s thought regarding what exactly the topmost 
philosopher ought to master. This, in tandem with the complete silence regarding a 
supra-mathematical zenith of philosophy in the early/Socratic dialogues, further 
allows us to posit that the hierarchy of the philosophical sciences on prominent 
display in middle and later dialogues reflects a development in Plato’s conception of 
philosophy.  
Perhaps a Unitarian (other than Charles Kahn) could counter: all that the 
showcase of the science of dialectic in the Republic and its repeated occurrence in 
certain post-Republic dialogues shows is that Plato chose to divulge to his readers his 
science par excellence only in parts or aspects and only in a certain number of 
dialogues. In other words, the Unitarian may argue, so long as the remarks on 
philosophy in the early/Socratic dialogues and the Republic and post-Republic 
dialogues are shown to be harmonious, then there are no good grounds to reject a 
Unitarian reading of Plato in favour of a Developmentalist one.  
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Here I must register my inclination toward the Developmentalist reading of 
Plato. The Unitarian would be hard pressed to show, for example, that the science of 
the Good as such of the Republic is the very same science of greatest Kinds in the 
Sophist. Indeed, a central part of this dissertation has indirectly argued against that 
line of thought: whilst Plato may consistently identify a supra-mathematical science 
as the height of philosophy, the selected dialogues evidence a different science in 
each dialogue that identifies as such. If the subject matter of the supreme science is 
the same in both the Republic and Sophist, why is there no discussion on the method 
of division in the Republic? Why is there complete silence on the Good as such in the 
Sophist when the EV speaks of the ‘philosopher’s science’ therein? These 
inconsistencies between the dialogues appear to suggest a development or shift in 
what Plato thinks is the most important task and subject matter to master for his 
topmost philosopher. 
 On a related note, the middle books of the Republic display a serious concern 
with making distinctions amongst the philosophical sciences, with explaining why 
certain sciences are superior to others with regard to their epistemic proximity to 
reality. Yet (as we saw particularly in Ch. III and IV) the post-Republic dialogues 
perused in this dissertation do not seem so exclusively concerned with reflecting on a 
hierarchy of the sciences. Indeed, Plato appears more concerned with clarifying the 
ubiquity and importance of division in all the arts and sciences than with accounting 
for the differences amongst the philosophical sciences.  
Granted, any suggested shift of interest from topic A to topic B need not entail 
an abandonment or (substantial) revision of A. Indeed, there is no evidence in the 
post-Republic dialogues that Plato questions the validity of a hierarchy of the sciences 
as such. As was shown in Ch. IV, the Philebus affirms a central message of Republic 
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VI-VII: not all philosophical sciences are of equal value. All the same, the post-
Republic dialogues do evidence the aforementioned shift. And this shift suggests a 
move away from reflecting as much on the nature of the objects studied by the various 
sciences to reflecting more on exactly how (i.e., by what means) knowledge of these 
objects is to be obtained. The main idea is that, in the later stages of his life, Plato was 
more concerned with discussing in his dialogues how to arrive at knowledge of 
universals (Forms, Kinds), than with discussing the precise ontological status of those 
universals. This conjecture is supported by the sheer amount of attention given to both 
the demonstration of the method and reflection on the method as such in the post-
Republic dialogues and only the post-Republic dialogues. 
Moving on, in Ch. II I argued that being an expert in the science of the Good 
as such satisfies just half of what Plato, at least when writing the Republic, thinks is 
the complete life for the philosopher: a unique combination of the theoretical and 
political life; the practical application, in the form of ruling, of one’s knowledge of 
Forms as such. Yet in Ch. III, an analysis of the philosopher in the Sophist-Statesman 
revealed that the philosopher par excellence was no longer saddled with any ruling 
duties. How do we square the two readings?  
My view, which I only roughly develop here, is that Plato is mindful of 
adjusting the practical/political duties of his philosopher par excellence depending on 
the environmental circumstances in which he places his philosopher. Hence, in an 
ideal environment like Kallipolis, where contemplative activity is emphatically 
promoted, the master of the science of dialectic is the natural choice for the ruler. In 
fact (as I argued in Ch. II), Plato believes, at least in the Republic, that the topmost 
philosopher is not fully developed qua philosopher until he applies his knowledge of 
Forms in the political arena. By contrast, in the Statesman’s polis, which has a 
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decidedly more ‘down-to-earth’ nature about it, there is no indication that the 
philosopher par excellence is fully developed qua philosopher only after undertaking 
the role of ruler.  
This does not mean, though, that the philosopher is fully removed from the 
political sphere outside a Kallipolis-like environment. As argued in Ch. III, the 
Statesman leaves room to see the philosopher par excellence performing the epitactic 
role of advisor to a statesman. An interesting thought to consider, then, is that the 
Statesman’s subtle projection of the philosopher as epitaktikos suggests that the 
philosopher’s political expectations in the Republic, which are intimately tied to the 
philosopher’s development qua philosopher, are not completely out of the picture in 
the Statesman; that the philosopher’s epitactic role as advisor to a statesman alludes to 
the need for the philosopher par excellence to maintain some sort of political function 
for the sake of developing himself qua philosopher. This still establishes a difference 
between the Republic and Statesman concerning the political duties the philosopher is 
saddled with: in the former he is expected to rule, in the latter he is expected to advise 
the ruler. All the same, it also suggests continuity between the two dialogues of a 
more general claim: that no philosopher is fully developed qua philosopher until he 
applies his knowledge to the political sphere (be it as ruler, advisor to the ruler, or 
what have you). Of course, I should note that any thorough analysis of politics, 
political theory, and the philosopher’s relation to the two in Plato (something that was 
not undertaken in this dissertation) would undoubtedly require an examination of the 
Laws (and perhaps the Epinomis) as well.  
The last topic I wish to reflect on is the depiction of the character Socrates in 
Plato. What I hope to have shown is that Socrates, particularly the elenctic persona, 
whilst not the philosopher par excellence for Plato, is still most definitely a bona fide 
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philosopher. All the same, the reader may certainly ask why Plato chose to replace 
Socrates, so to speak, with another philosopher? Why did Plato choose to put 
someone else at the top of the philosophical ladder? There are numerous, equally 
reasonable and equally dividing, explanations.351 All I can do here is slightly add to 
what I first suggested in Ch. II.  
With regard to the elenctic Socrates, it must have something to do with what 
Plato seriously sets down as that Socrates’ raison d’être (a raison d’être probably 
inspired by the historical Socrates): to philosophize, and in the process better others, 
by way of quizzing men on what they claim to know.352 With this in mind, coupled 
with Plato’s belief that positive scientific knowledge regarding Forms/Kinds is 
possible, the elenctic philosopher would intuitively have to come runner-up to the 
knower of Kinds as such. Of course, from Republic Book II onwards Socrates is not 
simply elenctic; there is no question that in the middle books of the Republic he 
subscribes to the heavy-duty metaphysics of Platonic Forms. Likewise, the Phaedo, 
Phaedrus and Philebus evidence a Socrates with a grasp of a more loaded 
metaphysics and epistemology than that seen in the Socratic dialogues. But we must 
not forget that this same man is never once projected as knowing, amongst other 
things, the nature of specific Forms. To recall just one example, in the Republic, 
Socrates notoriously cannot explain in detail what the Good as such is, and how it is 
related to the other Forms, except via analogy and metaphor.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 One could, of course, balk at the claim that Socrates was ‘replaced’. Peterson (2011) comes to mind. 
In the discussion above I take for granted that Socrates was replaced. By the by, I have not considered 
the possibility that Plato ultimately came to see (the elenctic) Socrates as more sophistic than 
philosophical. C.C.W. Taylor (2006) puts forward this thesis. The similarities (whether accurate or not) 
between the elenctic Socrates and the sophists have been well discussed in the literature. Apart from 
Taylor, see, e.g., Nehamas (1999). 
352 As we saw in Ch. V, this raison d’être is prominently featured in the Theaetetus. 
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But speaking in broad strokes about a theory of Forms and corresponding 
metaphysics and epistemology, about a philosopher-king, the expert user of division, 
and so on, may be just what this Socrates is intended to do by Plato: this Socrates 
serves as a sort of herald, as someone who is meant to entice the reader of Plato’s 
dialogues to the more positive sort of philosophizing that awaits, to the sort of 
philosophizing that Plato, certainly by the time of writing the dialogues examined in 
detail in this dissertation, thinks can bring one to understand and make use of, both in 
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